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Political Science Quarterly

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Vol. 89 No. 2 June 1974

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

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Lewis J. Edinger

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James T. Shotwell and the Science of International Politics
Charles DeBenedetti

Book Reviews

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Issued in March, June, September, and December, the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is published by the Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York, 10025. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $12 a year. Three years, $30. Students, $9 a year. Libraries and institutions, $15 a year. Second-class postage paid at New York, New York, and additional mailing offices. Volume 89 Number 2. June 1974.

Subscribers are urged to notify the Academy of any change in address.

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Publishing continuously since 1886.

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Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Currently articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, the *International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Service Bulletin* and abstracted in *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*. Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index to Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*. A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in its December issue.

Back issues prior to 1966 and reprint editions may be ordered from Kraus Reprint Corporation, 16 East 46th Street, New York, New York, 10016. Other back issues may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Single issue, $3.00. Reprints of articles are available from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. One copy, $3.00. Additional copies, $.50 each. Complete issue, $.08 per page.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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Number 2
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From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

LEWIS J. EDINGER examines some recent writings on political leadership and expresses his concern that nostalgic hero-worship of past "great" political figures may in a time of crisis for liberal democracies provide support for the emergence of authoritarian political movements.

F. CHRISTOPHER ARTERTON presents new attitude data showing how drastically Watergate has eroded the idealization of the presidency widely held in the past by children. Since many political scientists believe that it is precisely this early childhood idealization from which are derived adult feelings about the legitimacy of governmental authority in general, Arterton discusses the potentially serious implications of his findings for the future stability of our political system.

PATRICK J. McGEEVER reports and analyzes another opinion survey that reveals a seeming contradiction in adult public opinion: Although some two-thirds of McGeever's sample believed President Nixon seriously culpable in the Watergate affair, about one-half of those who hold the President guilty nevertheless did not call for his removal from office through impeachment or resignation.

GERALD B. FINCH, in a commentary on the McGeever data, speculates that the size of the inconsistent "Guilty, Yes; Impeachment, No" spectrum of opinion will shrink over time. Finch also predicts that the public's reaction to Watergate is unlikely to produce any permanent shifts in party loyalties among many Americans.

MARIANNA P. SULLIVAN explains the delicate role played by the French government in hosting the negotiations that led to the 1973 Vietnam cease-fire.

JUDITH A. CENTER analyzes the origins and content of the Democratic party's delegate selection "reforms" for the 1972 convention. In a sharp attack on the new procedures, Center argues that a convention constituted under the 1972 rules was incapable of choosing a presidential nominee with maximum chance of winning the November general election.

RICHARD L. McCORMICK gives a critical overview of the findings of American political historians who have tried to explain late nineteenth-century party alignments in terms of ethnic and religious identifications of voters.

CHARLES DeBENEDETTI traces how the thought and action of the scholar James T. Shotwell contributed to the idea that the study of international politics might become a science whose implementation by expert technicians could guarantee a peaceful world order.

And in the Book Review section, there will be found reviews of two 1974 Bancroft Prize winners—Stephan Thernstrom's *The Other Bostonians* and Townsend Hoopes' *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*—and of the winner of the 1974 Pulitzer Prize in history—Daniel J. Boorstin's *The Americans.*

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Where Are the Political Superstars?

LEWIS J. EDINGER

I used to go to the theater with an elderly aunt. Whenever I expressed my delight with a performance she would sigh and tell me that it was mediocre compared to what she had seen in her younger days. At first I listened with respect for the wisdom of experience, but before long I became increasingly vexed and eventually stopped paying any attention to her. My good aunt, I came to feel, could not appreciate what took place in front of her, for she could only see it through the distorting lenses of nostalgia.

More recently I have had a very similar reaction when alumni of my university speak of the awe-inspiring teachers of the past who are said to put the dullards who now occupy their chairs to shame. They may have been autocrats, but they were master performers who got their message across in no uncertain terms. Professors just do not seem to come that way anymore, so it appears, and students are the poorer for it. Here, too, fond memories seem to me to disallow that different times and different students may call for different, though not necessarily less effective, teaching methods.

Behold the Starless Firmament!

A Proustian mood of nostalgic remembrances of things past seems also to have come over prominent observers of the contemporary political

LEWIS J. EDINGER, Professor of Government at Columbia University, has been working this academic year on a study of comparative political leadership under a fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation. His books include *Kurt Schumacher, Politics in Germany,* and *Political Leadership in Industrial Societies.*

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scene. It has become rather fashionable to measure the performance of present political leaders against that of the leaders of bygone days and to find it all too commonplace by comparison. Eminent scholars and journalists maintain that today's statesmen are but pygmies stumbling in the footsteps of the giants of yesteryear; their virtues as well as their faults are said to lack heroic proportions; their achievements are considered puny and their crimes petty alongside those of the great men of a not so distant past. Gone are the days of those straightforward morality plays in which political superstars took the roles of saints, heroes, and devils locked in Manichaean battles on the world's political stage.

Such spectacles call for actors who write the script as they go along in disregard of conventional forms, and on a supportive cast that follows their cues. In contradistinction to the Tolstoyan view that no individual ever really shapes the course of human events—a view favored by most contemporary social scientists—the heroic image of the political superstar rests on a voluntary assumption that allows for exceptional individuals who "make" history.

This secular version of the transcendental spiritual leader has in particular fascinated and appealed to professed humanists among that amorphous crew of thinkers and writers commonly referred to as intellectuals. For these, great men—rather than less conspicuous cultural, socioeconomic, and political developments—represent the benchmarks of an era. And it is often made to follow that history "teaches" that it takes extraordinary leaders to cope with communal problems that stymie ordinary men.

Relatively few who have taken this position have achieved, or even sought, such eminence for themselves; far more have employed their sometimes considerable literary talents to propagate the ideal of the heroic leader in secular sermons. And I believe it was George Orwell who noted that politically powerless intellectuals who feel alienated from the prevailing system have been especially prone to hero worship.

Take the following celebration of the hero in a climate of widespread dissatisfaction with existing political arrangements and with the quality of life under conditions of spreading commercialism and industrialism:

> This . . . is an age . . . that denies the existence of great men; denies the desirability of great men. Show our critics a great man . . . [and] they begin to what they call "account" for him; not to worship him, but take the dimensions of him—and bring him out to be a little kind of man! He was the "creature of the Time," they say; the Time called him forth, the Time did everything, he nothing—but what we little critics could have done too!
>
> . . . Alas, we have known Times *call* loudly enough their great man, but not find him when they called! He was not there; Providence had not sent

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him; the Time, *calling* its loudest, had to go down to confusion and wreck because he would not come when called.

. . . no Time need to have gone to ruin, could it have found a man great enough . . . to discern truly what Time wanted, valour to lead it on the right road thither; these are the salvation of any time. . . . [1]

Thus Thomas Carlyle, the foremost proponent of illiberal, antirational English romanticism, in the 1840s. His countryman, Benjamin Disraeli, as yet far removed from the political power he would some day wield as prime minister, voiced similar sentiments in the novels with which he busied himself at the time. Here he denounced the optimistic belief in reason and progress identified with the Utilitarian Philosophy of the ruling establishment, deprecated the principles of self-government and parliamentary democracy, and declared that hierarchy and deference to authority were the natural basis of an orderly society.[2]

In a like vein romantic intellectuals in neighboring France voiced their contempt for the materialistic *enrichissez-vous* outlook which they associated with a pedestrian "bourgeois" regime under the "citizen-king" Louis Philippe. Leading writers expressed their alienation by propagation of a nostalgic Bonapartist myth that conceived the heroic leader as the incarnation of the Rousseauean "general will" of the people. A new plebiscitary autocrat, Napoleon III, emerged from the revolutionary crisis of 1848–1849, promising to return France to the glorious days of his illustrious predecessor.

The mystique of the providential man of destiny has remained a basic ingredient of reactionary romanticism into our own day. Twentieth-century versions, influenced by the theories of mass psychology of Gustave LeBon and others, have come to place particular stress on the nonrational sources of political leadership. Both the liberal democratic and Marxist notions of "economic man" guided solely by reason and self-interest are seen as "monstrous abstractions," as Joachim Fest puts it in his new biography of Hitler.[3] Reactionary romanticism prefers another abstraction, "the common people," who always and everywhere, are said to need and want strong inspirational leadership, especially in times of communal crisis. The "masses" are seen as dreading the unknown, as being guided more by emotions than by rational calculations, and as longing instinctively to obey majestic authority. Childlike, they are believed to be pure in spirit but manipulable, and therefore susceptible to corrupting influences that may lead them astray into rebellious behavior.

[1] Thomas Carlyle, "The Hero" in R. P. McCutcheon and W. H. Vann (eds.), *An Anthology of English Literature* (New York, 1931), p. 850.

[2] Robert Blake, *Disraeli* (New York, 1967), p. 308ff.

[3] Joachim C. Fest, *Hitler* (Frankfurt/M-Berlin-Wien, 1973), p. 149. (English translation, New York, 1974.)

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The counterpart to this collective image of the common folks is the strong authoritative leader who rises above the relatively trivial concerns that limit the vision and action of ordinary men. Unfettered by the bonds that tie these down—family ties, friendships, employment, and the like—he both expresses and defies historical forces; he can perceive what others cannot and he has the innate strength to sustain his convictions in the face of adversity.

These opposite concepts—Mass Man and Heroic Man—were the stock-in-trade of the authoritarian nationalists who acted as intellectual handmaidens to the grave diggers of liberal democracy in twentieth-century Europe. The Nietzschean ideal of the superman, Swiss historian Jacob Burkhardt's glorification of superior individuals, and Max Weber's model of the charismatic leader provided updated versions of the absolutist divine right of kings and enlightened despots of a preindustrial era.

Two recent books, Adrian Lyttleton's *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy 1919–1929*[4] and Joachim Fest's *Hitler*, should help to refresh our memories here. Both Mussolini and Hitler were the beneficiaries of assiduously fostered myths of the heroic savior who was to deliver the benighted masses from the pernicious, "foreign" ideologies of democratic liberalism and economic determinism, from the "inhumanity" of modern bureaucratic organizations and technocratic structures, from the rule of mediocre politicians beholden to particularist parties and interest groups. A "revolt against reason" and scientific "positivism" on the part of disaffected romantic reactionaries paved the way to dictatorship. The mystique of the "creative spontaneity" and "the triumph of the will" personified by the extraordinary man of action served to justify the contempt of Mussolini and Hitler for legal rules and rational arguments and their use of brute force and deceit.

For some three decades or so, it seemed as if all this lay behind us and could, in any case, be ascribed to the unique characteristics of a particular period and people. The dictators and would-be dictators of those days were consigned to "The Epoch of Fascism" in Europe.[5] But though the times and settings may have changed, the heroic theme of romantic reactionaries has not. Ours, too, is an age wanting extraordinary leaders, we hear these days in Western countries that did not produce a Mussolini and a Hitler. "We are now in a period when there are mediocre men everywhere," complains former U. S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1970. "People have opinions but no knowledge and leaders are made in the image of the masses."[6] An august French intellectual,

[4] New York, 1973.

[5] This is the central thesis of Ernst Nolte's *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York, 1966).

[6] As quoted by Cyrus L. Sulzberger in *An Age of Mediocrity: Memoirs and Diaries 1963–1972* (New York, 1973), p. 2.

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André Malraux, calls it "a sadly barren era" that lacks "great men," and in the view of one American writer it is questionable "whether any society can avoid stagnation, if not disintegration, without them."[7]

Now as before the belief that the times call for heroic leaders is tied to a pessimistic, if not cataclysmic vision of a future without them. And now as then it goes with yearnings for ostensibly better, simpler days when one knew where one was at and who was responsible for what. Alvin Toffler has described such romantic longing for a mythical past as one of the most striking manifestations of contemporary "future shock."[8] It is a symptom of a cultural malaise, a feeling that there has been a general deterioration of cultural values and moral standards all the way to the top levels of state and society, a sense that ordinary men can no longer comprehend and control the course of events. It is in this respect that the politics of nostalgia and the cult of the hero are not so much conservative as reactionary. They engage those who seek to escape from a disconcerting present and a dubious future into a past that is associated with distinctive and orderly patterns of authority.

In politics, as in other areas, a mood of romantic nostalgia helps sell antiques—or facsimiles thereof—and in such a climate fashion makers can sell yesterday's discards as the *derniére cri* of tomorrow. Models set the style for political consumers and here opinion makers who dig into the past for attractive models are drawn more to spectacular solo performers than to prosaic ensemble players. However, the choice of characters that appear to make good copy is limited largely to more or less autocratic "crisis leaders" who claimed to have simple answers to complex questions, answers that evidently escaped less exceptional individuals. They may be dead, but what of the heroic leadership model they represent in the view of present-day romantic reactionaries? Has it been buried with them or is it waiting to be dusted off for a fitting to the right actor at the right time? This seems to me an unavoidable, nagging question posed by some recent efforts in political leadership mythology, archeology, and paleontology.

Political Astrology

Political giants trod the earth earlier in this century, we are told by Cyrus Sulzberger, one of our leading journalists.[9] A prominent English colleague, Brian Crozier, refers to them as "holy monsters," a breed of supermen "who transcend normal human capacities and ambitions" in

[7] Ibid., p. 4; Eugene E. Jennings, *An Anatomy of Leadership: Princes, Heroes, and Supermen* (New York, 1960), p. 1ff.

[8] Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York, 1971), pp. 343, 360 (paper ed.).

[9] Sulzberger, *Age of Mediocrity*, p. 1.

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their political appetites and resolute actions. "Whether essentially good or evil, cruel or benign," he writes in his new biography of Charles de Gaulle, "everything such men undertake far exceeds the scale of puny average."[10] According to the American philosopher Sidney Hook, these individuals are more than "eventful" men; they are "event-making" men of good or evil genius, heroic figures endowed with extraordinary political gifts and talents who are great because they change the course of history.[11]

Some of these giants are said to be still among us—Sulzberger singles out Mao and Crozier, Franco—but only as venerated relics held upright by calcified bones and institutionalized myths. Most, however, are no longer on but in the earth, as Sulzberger puts it. Churchill for one. Even before he died, Professor Isaiah Berlin considered him already "a mythical hero who belongs to legend" as "the largest human being of our time."[12] Stalin for another. Allowing for his brutalities Milovan Djilas recalls him as the greatest man he has known—greater even than Churchill—and André Malraux as a devil, "but a great devil."[13] And then there is Hitler. His former youth leader remembers him as a "fabulous monster," a "man with great gifts who in some way could be considered a genius because he had no sense of measure that he could not succeed."[14] Fest, the Fuehrer's latest biographer, comes to the same conclusion and holds that like no one else in his time Hitler altered the course of history.[15]

With superstars like these on stage it was comparatively easy to tell the leading from the supporting players, the heroes from the villains. Hitler and Stalin, for example, were distant godlike figures for millions while for millions more they represented satanic majesties. The very fact that each became the focus of a personality cult while alive made it all the easier to turn them into the scapegoats for the crimes of their regimes when they were dead. Germans could claim that it was all Hitler's fault and Stalin's successors could assert that he alone bore the blame where it was due. In short, one mythology replaced another, but the causal agent—the supreme leader—remained the same.

Political relations seem not nearly as neat these days. Gone are the

[10] Brian Crozier, *De Gaulle: The First Complete Biography* (New York, 1973), p. 663.

[11] Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility* (New York, 1943), pp. 153, 155, 175.

[12] Isaiah Berlin, "Mr. Churchill in 1940," *Atlantic Monthly*, 1949, p. 39, cited in an as yet unpublished essay by Denis Kavanagh, "Crisis, Charisma, and British Political Leadership: Winston Churchill" (May 1972).

[13] As quoted in Sulzberger, *Age of Mediocrity*, pp. 5, 38.

[14] "Aide Calls Hitler Fabulous Monster," *The New York Times*, September 14, 1968.

[15] *Hitler*, p. 23.

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times when Roosevelt, Gandhi, Ben-Gurion, Sukarno, and Nasser epitomized absolute good for some and absolute evil for others. Most political leaders appear nowadays to have neither the will nor ability to rise spectacularly above their fellow men and perform great deeds. In politics, as elsewhere, collegial leadership by interchangeable and indistinct—if not invisible—managers with relatively little individual decision-making authority has become the norm. In the "Third World" one obscure military junta replaces another, a reshuffling of the cards does not change the leadership deck in the Soviet Union and other Communist states. In the countries with liberal democratic regimes leading political actors find that the rules of party government require them to play more or less similar roles if they want to remain on stage. For the audience it has become increasingly difficult to tell leading from supporting players and to know who, if anyone, is running the show.

Thanks to modern mass education and mass communications we know today both more and less about the political world than our ancestors. On the one hand we are provided with an unprecedented stream of constant, instant, and extensive reports about ongoing events. On the other hand a consequent information overload makes it all the harder to sort out these messages and to make sense of what they say. Caught up in a world of breathtaking technological changes and complex international socioeconomic relations, we find it ever more difficult to fathom what is happening to us and why—and what, if anything, we or anybody else can and should do about it. The supposed experts we turn to for advice are of little help, for what all too often seems to emerge from their confusing babble is that they do not know themselves. It is sometimes said that this is because politics is an art and not a science, and that if it were more of the latter we could understand and predict political developments more readily. Perhaps, but then it was Einstein who told Sulzberger: "The more we progress in science, the more we realize what we don't know. Our ignorance increases, the riddle grows."[16]

As we head into the last quarter of this century distinguished analysts of the prospects before us predict that mankind faces a gloomy future and that the politics of postindustrial societies may put an end to liberal democratic government.[17] The Watergate affair in our own country and, more generally, the socioeconomic consequences of seemingly uncontrollable inflation and energy shortages in all countries with such

[16] Sulzberger, *Age of Mediocrity*, p. 43.

[17] See, for example, Robert L. Heilbroner, "The Human Prospect," *The New York Review of Books*, January 24, 1974, pp. 21–34; Samuel P. Huntington, "Postindustrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" *Comparative Politics*, January 1974, pp. 163–192.

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regimes have accentuated the question of whether their leaders and their political systems are equal to the enormous tasks confronting them. The world as we have known it seems out of joint and our present governors seem unable to put it right again. Accustomed patterns of life appear to be due for some drastic changes, but the whys and the wherefores, who or what has brought about this state of affairs are by no means clear to most people. The fact that basic causes seem obscure and long-range consequences dismal may well extend the belief that things were better in "the good old days" and that strong, authoritative leaders might somehow restore the lost paradise.

Beyond the loss of trust in particular leaders we seem to be heading into a crisis of confidence in the very principles of liberal democracy. These assume that leaders who are restrained by constitutional norms, and freely chosen and retired by the voters, should have the capacity to stay on top of developments and the ability to make and implement rational policy decisions. Who is placed in charge and what they do is supposed to make a significant difference; were it not so we might as well choose our leaders by lot, or leave it to hereditary rulers to choose at random among alternative courses of action, or place our fate in the hands of autocratic executives.

The very notion that government rests on the consent of the governed presupposes that the latter trust their elected officials to do the "right" things and to do them well. But contemporary opinion surveys and voting studies indicate that in most liberal democracies social unrest and widespread uncertainty about the course of future developments have been accompanied by a loss of faith in competitive party government and collegial leadership.

If we do indeed face, or perhaps are already caught up in, a crisis of confidence in liberal democracy the message that the problems of our time call for larger than life "nonpartisan" prophets of a new communal ideology may find a receptive mass audience. Listen to Professor Carroll Wilson of M.I.T.:

> Without strong leadership, personal leadership, these problems cannot be solved. We need leadership—committees and panels of experts are not enough. Without a standard bearer the mentality of the average citizen will not change in the spirit of a new ethic. People throughout the world are waiting for such guidance because they are increasingly crushed by the complexity of the problems that confront them. Let us hope that such leadership personalities will still emerge in time.[18]

In this light, latter-day versions of the providential redeemer seem to

[18] As reported in the German periodical *Die Zeit* (North American ed.), March 1, 1974, p. 10.

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be of more than academic significance. Who knows but that somewhere another frustrated artist is grooming himself to emulate Hitler's rise to power as a crisis leader, or that another obscure military intellectual is preparing to ride forth in the role of his country's savior like de Gaulle, or another unsuccessful politician is waiting in the wings for the call that will suddenly make him a political superstar, as it did Churchill.

Sulzberger gives us cause to contemplate the past not with nostalgia but with concern for the future when he quotes Max Weber echoing Nietzsche:

> No one knows who will live in this building . . . whether entirely new prophets will arise, whether old ideas and ideals of yesteryear will assume new vigor, or whether, on the contrary a mechanical rigidity . . . will gain the day. In the latter event it would be true of the "final men" of the evolution of culture that they would be mindless specialists, heartless men of pleasure. These nullities would boast of having climbed to a never previously reached peak of humanity.[19]

Portrait of a Stargazer

The third and, ostensibly, final volume of Cyrus Sulzberger's diaries and memoirs provides a prime example of nostalgic hero worship as an expression of future shock. After giving us his version of the twilight of the gods in *The Last of the Giants* (1970) Sulzberger now sounds the dirge in *An Age of Mediocrity: Memoirs and Diaries 1963–1972*.

He mourns the "splendid days" of Churchill, "Britain's greatest statesman since Pitt," of Adenauer, "Germany's greatest leader since Bismarck," of de Gaulle, "France's greatest hero since Napoleon."[20] Where are such superstars now that we need them more than ever? For people have lost faith in ideologies, according to Sulzberger, and "without isms or credos to guide them . . . must look even more to inspirational leadership, a characteristic that now seems to be sadly lacking."[21] Ours is an age of all too ordinary leaders made in the image of the common man. "No vast human shadows seem capable of dominating today's historical horizon"; none are able to "guide us down the highways being opened into space."[22] "In the footsteps of the giants we find the technicians," an "uninspiring lot" that falls far short of approaching "liminal grandeur."[23] The middle brow, the unnoble savages of lowly mien and mind,

[19] Sulzberger, *Age of Mediocrity*, p. 8.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., p. 3.
[22] Ibid., pp. 8, 51.
[23] Ibid., pp. 1, 44.

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have taken over; "none is a superman . . . they are men of man's dimensions."[24]

It is a tune that was sung to much the same lyrics by Spengler, Ortega y Gasset, and other European intellectuals earlier in this century. We might let it go at that were it not that Sulzberger's views command a large, politically attentive audience of opinion leaders here and abroad. He is, after all, a galleon figure of *The New York Times*, his column appears in close to 200 papers, his books are to be found in most public libraries, and he has wined and dined, hunted and golfed with more eminent men than probably any other living journalist. Such has been his reputation that monarchs, presidents, and prime ministers have sought his ear; statesmen, generals, and scholars have confided in him; public officials have leaked to him secret information they wanted to give international prominence. De Gaulle told him that he read his column religiously and Greek Prime Minister Papadopoulos that "it is a great honor to have an interview published by Sulzberger."[25]

Sulzberger's interview notes and reflections provide us with a personal history of public figures, a sort of reflective autobiography in the style of the conversations of Eckermann with Goethe and Boswell with Samuel Johnson. By the nature of the questions he puts to his subjects and the observations he makes about them the reporter tells us a good deal about himself as well. And in reading his account I found myself going through much the same series of reactions as in listening to my nostalgic aunt and to my university alumni. I approached it in the hope of learning something from the voice of experience, grew increasingly irritated with its tenor, and came away feeling that the recording angel's journalistic camera had gotten badly out of focus. I also realized, however, that my own as well as Sulzberger's prejudices were engaged here in a triangular relationship between the author, the reader, and the subjects of the book. As an involved observer of the times and men about which he speaks, Sulzberger's views provoked critical reactions on my part arising from rather different biases.

An ambience of burnt-out cases suffuses the book. Djilas, the disillusioned former partisan fighter and one-time intellectual star of Yugoslav communism, speaks despairingly of "the death of ideology"; Malraux, the erstwhile romantic revolutionary, mourns "the death of Europe"; the last of Sulzberger's giants, de Gaulle and Adenauer, make farewell appearances with one foot in the grave and no hope for worthy successors; Sulzberger himself writes in a postscript that he is saddened by his

[24] Ibid., p. 45.
[25] Ibid., p. 460.

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memories of the splendid days and wants to live out his remaining years in a private world where he need but listen to "the gentle noise of grandchildren, trout[*sic*] and birds. . . ."

At first glance he in effect seems to tell us to discount these wistful musings of old men. "Having long ago . . . passed the age of fifty," writes the sixty-year-old, "I know that it is hardly ever worth talking to anyone over that age, since by then they are either sclerotic or senile."[26] Or, for that matter, listening to them one might assume. The young student in Goethe's *Faust* comes to mind who proclaims "It is presumptuous that old men and hoar/ seek to be something when they are no more" and concludes that "If more than thirty years a man is old/ he is indeed as good as dead./ 'Twere best to kill you right away." Sulzberger, however, does not appear to put much stock in the promise of what his old friend Malraux disparagingly dismisses as the "exuberant self-confidence of the young."[27]

But the above "hardly ever" allows for exceptions, and invites us to listen to the retrospective wisdoms of the aged but outstanding journalist and of his even older mentors. As he sees his heroes, so Sulzberger appears to perceive himself as one of the last of a great breed. "Even journalism . . . has been marked by mediocrity's levelling influence," he writes. "Prejudice has replaced pride as inspiration, emotions substitute for intellect, passion for honesty."[28]

Sulzberger's tale struck me as that of an experienced traveler who finds himself stranded on his journey through time and space. He seems to typify those members of his generation whom Margaret Mead has found to be caught between an irretrievable past and an uncertain future. Timewise his life reaches from the era of horse-drawn carriages to the jet age, from the days of European political and cultural supremacy to those of non-European superpowers and turbulent "new nations." Here Sulzberger emerges as a wanderer who has lost his bearings and his guides, who knows what lies behind him but cannot penetrate the dark road ahead. And so we get a retrospective state of mind fittingly described by another journalist:

> For better or for worse, I am struck with the awareness that . . . my past looms larger in my consciousness than my future, that, indeed, my skill in reporting my past may constitute my only passport to the future. I am like those pre-revolutionary characters in Chekhov's plays or in "The Age of the Turbins" or "The Magnificent Ambersons" or in Chateaubriand or Lampedusa, those resonant reactionaries who know they must vacate the premises,

[26] Ibid., p. 33.
[27] Ibid., p. 44.
[28] Ibid., p. 8.

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but who cling to the dusty furniture of memory because their lives are meaningless without them.[29]

Along a different dimension Sulzberger emerges as a wanderer between two cultures—or what social psychologists would call reference groups. Born and educated on the east coast of the United States, he has lived for most of his life in Europe. On the one hand, he is the American journalist writing for readers in the United States, a role that gives him a professional interest in reaching an audience socialized to the egalitarian values of American mass culture. On the other hand, his long residence in Europe and his associations there and in his native country have provided him with a reference group whose values are elitist. What Sulzberger seems to share with his mentors and heroes struck me as intellectual arrogance, but other readers might more respectfully consider it the wisdom of a cultural aristocrat. I take it, for example, that Sulzberger—like Churchill and Acheson—subscribes to liberal democracy by default. That is, it is only a good system because all others are worse. But I gather that in his view it is inappropriate in many instances and in any case calls more for enlightened paternalism than maximal popular participation.

If I therefore see Sulzberger's evaluation of political leaders as colored by an un-American outlook it is not in the sense of critics that he says have at various times labeled his reports cryptocommunist or fascist. I mean rather that his admiration for autocratic superstars and his contempt for democratic team players seems to me to have European rather than American cultural roots in the sense of Tocqueville's distinction. He finds the "Age of Mediocrity" epitomized by the products of mass democracy in the United States—notably Lyndon Johnson, who strikes him as a crafty but vulgar politician without any claims to intellectual excellence. The qualities Sulzberger admires are those he identifies with his European idols—culture, wit, learning, style—qualities that he finds sadly wanting in their pedestrian successors.

My point, then, is that a man is not only known but influenced by the company he keeps. An admiring review distributed by Sulzberger's publisher applauds his ability "to understand that people influence and in many cases determine the flow of events, that they are not the prisoners of . . . impersonal forces." But it is a very special kind of people who give him that understanding. For unlike the great journalists of the past he professes to admire, such as Hemingway and Stephen Crane, Sulzberger is the society reporter who covers the high life of international politics.

[29] Andrew Sarris, "Heteros Have Problems Too," *The Village Voice*, February 11, 1971.

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In spirit, if not in fact, his crowd lives far removed from ordinary mortals on the cloud-enveloped tops of political pyramids. Now the air up there may be clean and rarified—and sometimes intoxicating—but the view one gets tends to be rather unidimensional. It takes in a surrealist landscape populated by the fleeting figures of eminent males in which the so-called masses exist only as intellectual abstractions. And so, as the roving correspondent wings it from pole to pole, as he puts it, he looks back but not down. Guided or misguided, those below his field of vision are conceived essentially as objects rather than subjects in Sulzberger's political universe and perceived in terms of their supposed reflection—the men at the top. We are told a great deal about the ostensible opinions, intelligence, and appearance of the past and present leaders of various countries, but next to nothing about the mood and concerns of the "little people." They appear only for occasional crowd scenes in Sulzberger's view of the play on stage.

The giant and mediocre actors out front are thus the only real players he beholds and the quality of their performance is compared, with little regard for shifting background settings. If socioeconomic factors get short shrift it is evidently because our reporter, like most of the political artists he admires, considers leadership to be the measure of political dynamics. But the world in which Churchill, de Gaulle, and Adenauer felt at home was a flat world of international power conflicts, a world in which the tone was set by statesmen for whom the routine of domestic chores was something of a bore. To mourn the passing of such "giants" is to mourn the passing of their Ptolomaic universe; to downgrade their more prosaic successors is to slight a Copernican revolution in world affairs that makes rather different demands on today's policy makers.

Portrait of a Superstar

In one of his conversations with Charles de Gaulle, Sulzberger asks him what he considers the primary force motivating men. Stalin said it was fear, others had cited religion, nationality, and family. De Gaulle's unhesitating response is that "one must draw a distinction between the individual and the collective masses. For the individual it is ambition and a taste for adventure . . . for the masses it is fear. There Stalin was right. And this applies to masses of all countries."[30]

Fame as the spur for the heroic individual, fear as the spur for the masses, this was the essence of de Gaulle's leadership formula. According to Crozier in *De Gaulle: The First Complete Biography*, he never as-

[80] Sulzberger, *Age of Mediocrity*, p. 189.

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pired to be a Fascist dictator, but sought to gain and exercise control over the people by the will of the people. His posture as the "man of the storms" rested, however, on much the same perception of mass psychology as that of Mussolini and Hitler. Popular support for his self-assigned role as the messianic savior of France required Frenchmen who were enveloped by a sense of disaster and a mood of despair, required a climate of mass opinion that allowed de Gaulle to represent himself as the sole source of hope and rescue. He therefore "appealed almost exclusively to people's fears and anxieties and exploited them stridently, with dismal results."[31]

The French language lacks a word for leadership, as Crozier notes. But Charles de Gaulle was at no loss for words to characterize the heroic leader and fit himself to that image. Indeed, from the beginning to the end the words became flesh in his person, from the imaginative portrait of the hero to come in his first major book to the imaginary hero that was of his memoirs. True to his belief that a great man owes his power to no one but himself, de Gaulle was the chief author of the Gaullist myth of the conquering hero that he left behind as his literary testament for posterity.

The analogy to the theater is particularly apt in the case of de Gaulle. Crozier calls him first and foremost a master performer and others, too, have seen him as a great political artist.[32] Such metaphors as stage, play, role, and drama appear in all of de Gaulle's writings. His carefully staged television appearances and press conferences, his entire political style emphasized that the play was the thing with which he sought to capture the consciences of the masses. For de Gaulle, as for Hitler and Mussolini, the hero played the central actor at moments of high drama on the political stage. He was the superstar who did not follow the customary script but drew his lines from within himself, from his intuitive sense of historical mission, and carried lesser actors and audience along by the expressive momentum of an inspiring performance.

The heroic role de Gaulle assigned himself was set forth in his book, *The Edge of the Sword (Le fil de l'épeé)*, published long before he could make the deed follow the words. There he worshiped the man of destiny, the shaper of history who emerged from conflict and struggle to impose his will on events and ordinary men by sheer strength of superior character. It was a "Plutarchian hero created in the imagination by the values

[31] Stanley Hoffmann and Inge Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur: de Gaulle as Political Artist," in Dankwart A. Rustow (ed.), *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership* (New York, 1970), p. 285.

[32] Crozier, *De Gaulle*, pp. 5, 9, 665; Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," p. 266.

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that create in History the destiny of this hero, and thereby resemble him."[33]

Crozier, like others before him, finds here the voice of prophecy, "all of de Gaulle's master ideas; the exaltation of force, the solitude, grandeur and aloofness of the true leader; the need for boldness, mystery and, at times, silence; disdain for lesser mortals; surprise and cunning in attack; the sadness and loneliness of the great man."[34] But if the words came to be seen as prescient, it was because de Gaulle made them into a self-fulfilling prophecy by rigidly following his chosen path. Twice in his political career that path led to temporary triumph and glory, only to be followed by humiliation and defeat. Inflexibility of purpose served de Gaulle well when others would bend to his will, badly when they would not.

De Gaulle's first opportunity to play the savior of France came his way with the catastrophe of 1940. At the age of fifty, the heretofore obscure military man heard the Times calling loudly for a hero, as Carlyle had it; he responded by undertaking to restore his conquered country to the grandeur of its past. Thanks in no small part to allied propaganda and military support, the leader in exile became the symbol of hope, resistance, and liberation for many, if not most of his countrymen. Like Henry IV some 400 years earlier, de Gaulle returned to Paris in 1945 as a conquering hero. But then, like Shakespeare's Coriolanus, the general found it beneath him to gather votes in "the gown of humility" and observe customary democratic procedures. De Gaulle, as Crozier observes, "could never hide his contempt for the French people, who perennially disappointed him by their patent unworthiness of the country of his vision" and "failed to live up to his 'certain idea' of the motherland."[35]

The part of the hero proved ill suited for the parliamentary party politics of postliberation France and de Gaulle chose to work against rather than within a system that in his eyes did not provide for the "national interest." "I am maintaining my role, that is all. . . ," he proclaimed, "I shall remain the nation's guide . . . I serve France only. I shall always serve France alone."[36] To his disgust he found that for the most part "the masses" were unwilling to follow him on the glory road.

Out of office for some twelve years, an aging savior held himself in readiness for another opportunity to fulfill his perceived destiny before he died. And since the masses failed him in his initial attempt to return to power, he came to rely on fate and conspiratorial plots to promote his cause.

[33] Cited in Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," p. 264ff.
[34] Crozier, *De Gaulle*, p. 668.
[35] Ibid., pp. 664ff, 9.
[36] Ibid., p. 417ff.

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The initial instrument of de Gaulle's ambitions for a second coming was a flash-in-pan populist movement, the Rally of the French People. Designed to exploit political turmoil in postwar France and mobilize mass discontent, this attempt to overthrow the parliamentary system, in Crozier's opinion, almost succeeded. The technique closely resembled the methods of Mussolini and Hitler for creating a power vacuum on the road to power. There were the same overtones of reactionary romanticism, the armed thugs, the appeals to the fears and "charismatic hunger" of distraught "little people." Sulzberger's friend Malraux staged spectacular mass rallies for his superstar that were all too familiar. There were "the giant standards with the Cross of Lorraine, the lofty orator's stand, the impassioned, even hysterical speeches, the cult of the heroic leader, the calls for unity above party, the appeals to nationalism, the shrill exposure of a Bolshevist danger." And above it all there was de Gaulle, haranguing the crowds, switching "with great facility from noble historical perspectives to the demagoguery of fear," denouncing "the weak regime and the little men at its head" who were "incapable of saving the mother-country."[37]

But unlike their Italian and German predecessors, the leaders of the Fourth Republic stood fast and weathered the storm fanned by the "man of the storms." The bid for power proved to be counterproductive and it badly tarnished the reputation of the wartime hero.

Ten years were to pass until a more patient, subtle, and cunning de Gaulle could at long last stage his comeback. A revolt of military men and French colonists in Algeria was taken in hand by a small conspiratorial group of devoted Gaullists and transformed into a full-blown political crisis. The embattled leaders of the Fourth Republic called upon the savior-in-readiness to come to the rescue and he responded to the call of the Times for which he had been waiting. De Gaulle demanded "exceptional powers for an exceptional task at an exceptional time" for the exceptional man, unfettered by "the usual procedures and . . . customary rites of which everybody has now had more than enough."[38] He got what he wanted and put an end not only to the military rebellion, but the parliamentary system as well. Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the "crisis," Crozier notes, was "the general indifference of the French people. . . . "[39]

De Gaulle imposed his personal authority and policies on the country and while he was in charge the new Fifth Republic was in effect de Gaulle's republic, a plebiscitary autocracy. The Algerian problem was

[37] Ibid., p. 423.
[38] Ibid., p. 471.
[39] Ibid., p. 472.

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settled as he deemed best, over the opposition of the very men who had helped to restore him to power; "They shout a lot, but they are cowards," said de Gaulle with his usual contempt for lesser men. And it was such contempt that in the end proved to be his undoing. In Crozier's words, it became "too evident to too many people that in his pursuit of dreams of grandeur, de Gaulle had little or no interest in the France ordinary people had to live in." His "obsessive interest in his foreign policy . . . weakned his power at home" and led him to ignore more prosaic, but politically more critical domestic issues. If Crozier is to be believed, de Gaulle had no premonition of the social turmoil that shook the Fifth Republic in 1968 and ultimately forced his retirement.[40] The man of the storms was finally swept away by a storm he could not master. *Sic transit gloria mundi.*

The Star of Redemption

The ascent of a political superstar cast in the role of a prophetic savior has come to be associated with crisis conditions. At such times, the wise men tell us, ordinary people seek a heroic redeemer who will relieve them of the anxieties and doubts that threaten to overwhelm them. Thus, it has been argued that "It is only in the depth of crisis and despair that the fear of losing one's personality breeds millenial hopes of rescue" by a political messiah.[41] Fest, the Hitler biographer, subscribes to this view, as does Sulzberger. The latter touches, however, on an important distinction when he writes that "political giants are produced by crises—or produce them."[42]

Domestic and international crises have been managed successfully by the sort of leaders Sulzberger labels mediocrities—for instance in post-liberation France. But the would-be giant evidently requires a sense of crisis to realize his political ambitions—it is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition. He must also have the opportunity to shape the perception of a crisis in such a way that he seems to be the only one who can master an otherwise hopeless situation. To appear to be the "man of the hour" demanded by the Times he must be able to persuade other actors who could block his ascent that no other acceptable solution will do.

In the last analysis the much vaunted triumph of the will of the one over the many has usually been due to the ability of a skillful tactician to manipulate the fears and hopes of a crucial few. Lyttleton's study, for

[40] Ibid., p. 590.
[41] Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," p. 286.
[42] *Age of Mediocrity*, p. 2.

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example, makes it all too clear that Mussolini's seizure of power was by no means inevitable. The same applies to Hitler, de Gaulle, Stalin, and other "holy monsters." History had to be given a well-organized push in the desired direction, as Lenin had it. And when push came to shove it was directed first and foremost at irresolute and deluded elites who saw no other way out of a crisis promoted by its eventual beneficiaries. In no case, to my knowledge, did the force of an aroused mass opinion tip the balance and score the critical breakthrough toward the establishment of so-called popular autocracies, as the heroic myths would have it. At most, it was a contributing factor. When democratic "rites" were observed at all, it was after the fact, in the form of more or less artfully rigged referenda and plebiscitary elections that served to legitimate the new regime in the eyes of domestic and foreign admirers.

Still, there is no denying that in times of profound socioeconomic distress and in wartime emergencies the symbolic image of the heroic savior has exercised a wide and powerful psychological appeal in liberal democracies. Note, for example, the recurrent invocation of the role of Lincoln "the liberator" in the folklore of American populism. Consider the "charismatic" qualities attributed to Franklin Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and John Kennedy.

Political style seems all important here. As different as they may have been in other respects, most of the crisis leaders of yesteryear were superb political artists. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Gandhi, for instance, shared a keen sense of timing for dramatic gestures and a gift for inspiring oratory that conveyed their command over the course of events. Like Mussolini, Hitler, and de Gaulle, they were astute and pragmatic politicians who had a feel for the emotional dispositions of their audience—or, at least, of those of its members whose response sustained their performance.

Blind faith in the extraordinary qualities of a liberating redeemer involves the suspension of rational beliefs and a willing surrender to the suggestive powers of masterly performers. Thomas Mann describes it beautifully in his allegory on Mussolini's rise, *Mario and the Magician*. Hitler's followers were hypnotized by his personal magnetism and deferred to his intuition even when reason told them he was wrong. Crozier speaks of de Gaulle as an "illusionist or magician, adept at creating a sense of achievement when nothing, in fact, had been done."[43] The often noted absence of doctrinal content in Fascism, Nazism, and Gaullism appears in this light to be a very deliberate oversight of their progenitors. It left the "man of action" free of the fetters of a confining dog-

[43] *De Gaulle*, p. 5.

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ma and allowed him to make his personal authority the sole source of transcendental redemption.

Like Mann's magician, the authoritarian superstar stands in the center of the stage and has neither peers nor successors. He needs to wrap himself in a mantle of mystery and aloofness that allows no one to suspect that the man of extraordinary vision might be fallible, that the emperor might be naked under his cloak. In short, he plays a role that is diametrically opposed to that which the principles of liberal democracy provide for political leaders.

Stars in Our Eyes

One man's giant is another's mediocrity, for greatness, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder. As a standard of measurement it calls for a referent—greatness with respect to what? If it is goal attainment we might call Hitler a great doer; after all, he was undeniably successful in his extermination policy. If it is vision, Gandhi may be our hero—though his ideals are all but forgotten even in India. If it is style of performance, Truman may be our great man. Some thirty years ago my teachers spoke with contempt of a humble haberdasher from Missouri who was not fit to take Roosevelt's place. To err is Truman the wits would say. Lately the same individual has been hailed as a model hero for our time on the grounds that his courage and decency represented the distillate of "Middle American virtues." In the view of his admirers it is his kind of leadership that we now need to rehabilitate our country from the "spreading sickness of cynicism" in an era "of national dislocation and trauma. . . ."[44]

But what about the men of good or evil genius who are said to have been great because they changed the course of history? If we put it another way, and ask if history changed because of what they did, then the seemingly straightforward standard turns out to be somewhat less than that. It is one of those iffy questions which in the last analysis comes down to conjecture rather than indisputable evidence.

In the end, then, the answer to the question of "where are the political superstars?" depends on one's perspective. We may believe that there is no such thing and that those who pass as such are in fact cardboard giants moved about by hidden forces. We may see them as living right

[44] My sources here are two reviews of Merle Miller's *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* (New York, 1974), which casts the late president in a heroic mold. One is by Eliot Fremont-Smith in the February 4, 1974, issue of *New York Magazine*, the other by Christopher Lehmann-Haupt in *The New York Times* of January 21, 1974.

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among us—even in ourselves—as unsung heroes of common or uncommon civic virtues. And we may, like some of the wise men I have cited, perceive them in our past—and, perhaps, our future—as extraordinary individuals who move nations.

This brings me back to my basic concern: the call for a hero in a time of crisis for liberal democracies. As we have seen, in the view of prominent opinion makers the problems we face demand a firm hand at the helm and inspirational mass leadership that can overcome the threat of disastrous domestic and international conflicts. My fear is that these arguments may prove to be persuasive enough to turn them into self-fulfilling prophecies and that once the bottle has been uncorked the genie will become the master rather than the servant of us all. Take away the constraints which democratic rules impose upon leaders and we are likely to find that, like Goethe's sorcerer's apprentice, we can no longer rid ourselves of the spirits we have summoned to do our work for us.

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The Impact of Watergate on Children's Attitudes toward Political Authority

F. CHRISTOPHER ARTERTON

The question of how children acquire their opinions about their government and the political system in general has been of great concern to political scientists. One of the persistent findings of this research in political socialization has been that an American child's first awareness of the political system is of the president of the United States, and that the role and occupant are idealized to an overwhelming degree.[1] Especially at early ages (grades three, four, and five), the president is seen as benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent, protective, infallible, diligent, likable, and so on. In a 1969 study, after having interviewed more than 12,000 children, political scientists David Easton and Jack Dennis re-

[1] The literature on this point is extensive. For the early discussions see Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 14 (Winter 1960), 632–644; Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," *American Political Science Review*, 54, no. 4 (December 1960), 934–943; Fred I. Greenstein, "More on Children's Images of the President," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Winter 1961), 648–654; David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (August 1962), 229–246; Judith V. Torney, "The Child's Idealization of Authority," M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1962; Robert D. Hess, "The Socialization of Attitudes Toward Political Authorities: Some Cross-National Comparisons," *International Social Science Journal*, 14, no. 4 (1963), 542–554.

The more recent literature treats the topic in considerably more depth; see David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," *Annals of the American*

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marked, "In all our testing and interviewing, we were unable to find a child who did not express the highest esteem for the President."[2]

The potential importance of this finding cannot be overstated, because, it is argued, adult perceptions of the legitimacy of the political system as a whole flow directly from this early tendency to idealize presidential authority. From approximately the sixth grade onward, the child's knowledge of the political system rapidly becomes more extensive and complex. He or she learns to differentiate between the president and the presidency; presidents receive less favorable ratings in personal qualities and attractions, while awareness of the power and importance of the "performance capabilities" of the office remains high.[3] Rather than viewing other institutions and political participants as subordinate to the president,[4] the older child begins to understand the interplay between the president, the Supreme Court, and Congress; to recognize the importance of different levels in the political system; and to differentiate theoretically the processes of legislation from administration and from adjudication. Along with this knowledge comes a more critical awareness of the conflictive nature of politics in the United States (and elsewhere). The president begins to be perceived as a political participant who stands for certain policy positions and maneuvers to attain his desired ends.[5] Nevertheless, Easton and Dennis have argued that from the earlier reservoir of idealism personalized around the president springs a diverse sense of the legitimacy of our political institutions:

> Even though the older child may see authority in more critical and less enthusiastic terms, early idealization may create latent feelings that are hard

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Academy of Political and Social Science, 361 (1965), 41–57; David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System: The Origins of Political Legitimacy* (New York, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven, Conn., 1965); Fred I. Greenstein, "Popular Images of the President," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 122 (November 1965), 523–529; Robert D. Hess and Judith Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago, 1967); and Roberta Sigel, "Image of a President: Some Insights into the Political View of School Children," *American Political Science Review*, 62, no. 1 (March 1968), 216–226.

[2] *Children in the Political System*, p. 177.

[3] This distinction was recognized quite early in the study of children's attitudes toward the president. See, for example, Hess and Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," p. 636ff.

[4] The president is generally the first political authority recognized by children, followed by the policeman. Thus they are said to first become aware of the head and the foot of the political system. When other participants—senators, congressmen, mayors, etc.—are recognized, they are at first seen as subordinate to the president, in the sense that the president tells them what to do. See Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader."

[5] Sigel, "Image of a President."

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> to undo or shake off. This is the major significance of the first bond to the system through the Presidency. The positive feelings generated there can be expected to have lasting consequences.[6]

This proposition should be taken as a theoretical hypothesis to be established by future research, for Easton and Dennis offer no supporting evidence.[7]

The present article examines the contention that legitimacy derives from the early idealization of the presidency. It does so by exploring the ramifications of recent political events in the United States upon the attitudes of children toward the president. Specifically, our point of departure will be an examination of whether the idealistic regard with which children view the president has been shattered by the revelations brought to public attention during the so-called Watergate crisis. If so, we may well have established a nonobtrusive, quasi-experimental, critical test of the Easton and Dennis theory in which the president becomes the variable.

In the first place, we would like to determine whether this pervasive finding of socialization research is susceptible to alteration by actual political events. There is some evidence that subgroups of our population (blacks, Appalachian poor, etc.) may not be as prone to this idealism as the dominant cultural group,[8] yet we do not know whether these attitudes may be epiphenomenal or developmental in the sense of being learned within a whole cultural complex. In other words, we would like to draw some conclusions as to whether these perceptions of the president as benevolent, infallible, protective, and omnipotent are part and parcel of the child's developmental process and therefore fairly impervious to influence from contemporary events or whether they are dependent upon a state of "politics as usual." Second, after determining the answer to this prior question, we should be able to discuss the substantive importance of this theory in relation to the long-range effects of Watergate for

[6] *Children in the Political System*, p. 207.

[7] This assertion has been strongly questioned by Dean Jaros in "Children's Orientations Toward the President: Some Additional Theoretical Considerations and Data," *Journal of Politics*, 29, no. 2 (May 1967), 368–387.

[8] The literature on subgroups of the population developed during the late 1960s as a critique of the assumption of cultural homogeneity of the "main line" studies of socialization. See Edward S. Greenberg, "Political Socialization to Support the System: A Comparison of Black and White Children," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1969; Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture," *American Political Science Review*, 62, no. 1 (March 1968), 64–75; Sandra Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism: A Study of Political Socialization," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970.

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our polity. Given the Easton and Dennis proposition, at stake may well be the extent to which a future generation weighs the legitimacy of our political system's predominant authority structure. While such important considerations cannot be explored empirically today—being "time-lagged"—the injection of current politics as a variable into the measurement of this well-established observation should help determine the certainty with which the Easton and Dennis proposition can be advanced.

Conduct of the Study

On December 5, 7, and 10, 1973, questionnaires were administered to 367 children in grades three, four, and five of the public school system of a high socioeconomic-status suburb of Boston, Massachusetts. Forty-nine items were replicated from the national study undertaken in 1961 and 1962 by researchers at the University of Chicago. Accordingly, in the results reported below, data gathered in the Watergate environment are juxtaposed with data collected during the Kennedy administration, hereafter referred to as the 1962 study.[9] Half of the questionnaire was devoted to the child's cynicism concerning politics, general political awareness, specific knowledge of Watergate personalities, source of information concerning Watergate, and political opinions about the personal involvement of the president in wrongdoing, the role of the press in either fomenting a crisis or bringing malfeasance to light, and the question of impeachment.

Findings

Attitudes toward the President

In the fall of 1973, children express attitudes toward the president of the United States that are not only much less positive (as has been found before only in certain population subgroups),[10] but can be more accurately described as wholly negative. The once benevolent leader has been transformed into the malevolent leader by the impact of current events; and there can be little doubt that these children have come to view the president as a figure to be strenuously rejected.

Easton and Dennis rely heavily upon an item in which children are asked if the president is a favorite of theirs;[11] the comparative percentage answers appear in Table 1. As can easily be seen, the two distribu-

[9] The data from this large research project have been reported in the publications of Easton and Dennis and Hess and Torney; see footnote 1 for citations.

[10] Greenberg, "Political Socialization"; Jaros, Hirsch, and Fleron, "The Malevolent Leader."

[11] Unresolved in any of the materials from the 1962 study is the question of the

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TABLE 1

Comparison of 1962 and 1973 Studies in Rating of the President for "Is the president your favorite?"
(Percent of children responding)

	Mean	1 He Is My Favorite of All	2 He Is Almost My Favorite of All	3 He Is More a Favorite of Mine than Most	4 He Is More a Favorite of Mine than Many	5 He Is More a Favorite of Mine than a Few	6 He Is Not One of My Favorites	N
3rd, 1962	2.36	39%	27%	14%	8%	7%	6%	1,667
3rd, 1973	4.44	8	15	11	4	15	47	111
4th, 1962	2.60	28	30	17	11	7	7	1,732
4th, 1973	5.36	2	5	2	8	13	70	124
5th, 1962	2.83	21	29	21	13	9	8	1,787
5th, 1973	5.21	2	3	8	13	11	64	132

tions of responses are practically mirror images of each other. In 1962, anywhere from 50 to 66 percent of the children responded that the president was their favorite of all or of almost all; but, in 1973, the range responding in this positive fashion varied from 5 to 23 percent. In both studies, the older the children the less positive the assessment.

On the other hand, looking at the negative attidudes expressed in response to the same item, the results are even more striking. In 1962, even at the fifth-grade level, only 17 percent of the children rated the president as "not one of my favorites" or only as "more a favorite of mine than a few." In 1973, this figure jumped to 63 percent in the third grade, 82 percent in the fourth, and 75 percent in the fifth. Treating these responses as a scale, the differences in mean scores between the two studies are large and significant ($p < .01$) for each grade.

The 1962 study asked children to rate the president on a variety of indicators which Easton and Dennis argue can be grouped into five dimensions of the child's image of presidential authority: attachment, benevolence, dependability, power, and leadership.[12] In turn, these five dimensions are said to vary from highly affective in content (e.g., attachment or affiliation) to a high cognitive content (e.g., leadership). The data in Table 1 refer to indicators ("Is he your favorite?") which Easton and Dennis believe to contain the highest degree of affect. Therefore, strong attachment has been transformed into strong rejection on an affective level. But what of the other dimensions of the child's image? Do they also show the impact of Watergate revelations?

Table 2 presents a comparison of the mean responses for twelve different indicators grouped by the five dimensions of authority image. The higher the rating (choices were allowed from six increasingly less positive responses), the more unfavorable the evaluation of the president.[13]

An inspection of these data reveals that under the impact of Watergate, children have come to reject the figure of the president in its affective components but still rate very high the performance capabilities of his office. In attachment, benevolence, and dependability, the president does not merely receive less positive ratings than in 1962, but he receives *negative* ratings. The differences are less pronounced, however, for scales of perceived power and leadership; in these indicators the president still receives positive ratings, though less positive than in 1962.

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meaning of this item to the respondents; that is, favorite what? President? Authority figure? Easton and Dennis appear oblivious to this ambiguity. See *Children in the Political System*, chaps. 7 and 8.

[12] Ibid., p. 188.

[13] Levels of significance were computed by Z-tests, which were based on a reconstruction of the variance of the 1962 data from the relevant tables found in Easton and Dennis, *Children in the Political System*, chap. 8.

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TABLE 2

Comparison of 1962 and 1973 Studies in Mean Ratings of President on Twelve Scales

	3rd Grade 1962	3rd Grade 1973	4th Grade 1962	4th Grade 1973	5th Grade 1962	5th Grade 1973
Attachment						
1. Is he your favorite?	2.36	4.44	2.60	5.36	2.83	5.21
Benevolence						
2. Would he want to help you if you needed it?	1.81	3.83	2.09	4.56	2.70	4.96
3. Does he protect you?	–	4.09	3.10	4.61	3.27	4.52
Dependability						
4.[a] Does he keep his promises?	1.69	3.37	1.85	4.06	1.90	4.30
5. Does he make mistakes?	–	3.10	1.97	3.81	2.16	4.11
6. Does he give up when things are hard to do?	–	2.17	1.19	2.20	1.18	2.19
Power						
7. Can he make people do what he wants?	2.47	2.93	2.55	2.94	2.67	3.06
8. Can he punish people?	–	3.10	2.85	3.17[b]	2.97	2.83[c]
Leadership						
9. How much does he know?	2.07	2.76	2.18	3.19	2.22	3.29
10. Does he make important decisions?	1.71	2.26	1.60	2.18	1.57	2.45
11. Does he work hard?	–	2.24	2.03	2.46	2.04	2.58
12. Is he a leader?	–	2.07	1.69	2.01[b]	1.71	2.16

[a] Scale inverted for comparison.
[b] Significant Z-test at $p < .025$.
[c] Not significant difference.

Furthermore, we find evidence of a small but persistent residue of antagonism toward the president which spills over from the negative affective assessments to those of performance capabilities. This can easily be seen in Table 3, which presents the percentage distribution for ratings of the president as a leader. At least in the third and fifth grades, approximately 10 percent of the students gave the president the most negative rating; and leadership was the indicator which exhibited the *smallest* percentage in the highly negative column. Ratings of power have up to 20 percent of the children in all classes expressing hostile attitudes toward the president. We have opted to present in detail here only the leadership scale because it offers the greatest contrast with the affective scale (Table 1) both in data and content.

Referring back to Table 2, one remaining inconsistency ought to be

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TABLE 3

Comparison of 1962 and 1973 Studies in Rating of President for "Is he a leader?" (Percent of children responding)

Grade, Study	Mean	1 Always Leader	2 Usually Leader	3 More Often Leader	4 More Often Follower	5 Usually Follower	6 Almost Always Follower	N
3rd, 1962	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3rd, 1973	2.07	57%	17%	10%	4%	—	12%	110
4th, 1962	1.69	52	34	10	1	—	2	1,730
4th, 1973	2.01	44	31	13	6	2	3	124
5th, 1962	1.71	48	39	11	1	1	1	1,794
5th, 1973	2.16	48	26	11	2	2	10	127

cleared up. The sixth indicator, "Does the president give up when things are hard to do?" stands in contrast to the other items in the dependability dimension. While the president's rating has diminished from 1962, it is still quite positive in the sense that children believe the president does not easily give up. This can be accounted for in two ways. The less interesting observation is that the indicator may actually belong in the leadership dimension, being undoubtedly a characteristic of what children would think of as a leader. The other element is that quite clearly Mr. Nixon's stand on this particular concern has come through to the children; again and again he has stated that he will not give up, and the children have come to accept that fact.

The 1962 study asked children what they thought was the president's job. Very few differences were observed in the 1973 replies except that they were much less oriented toward the foreign-policy aspects ("to keep us out of war" and "to make friends with other nations"). Only 25 percent of the children mentioned these in 1973, as opposed to approximately 40 percent in 1962. This finding is particularly interesting in view of the fact that the incumbent's most prominent successes have been precisely in these two areas.

Finally, while the children studied in 1973 rated the president almost as powerful as did those in 1962, there is some indication that they have considerably diminished their expectations of what the power of the president *ought* to be. In both studies, children were asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: "If the president does not approve of a law, it should not be passed." Table 4 contains the percentage agreeing with that statement in the three grades. In addition to

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TABLE 4

Comparison of 1962 and 1973 Studies in Agreement with Statement, "If the president does not approve of a law, it should not be passed," by Grade (Percent of children responding)

	3rd Grade	4th Grade	5th Grade
1962 study	83	68	42
1973 study	45	47	34

giving some indication of the inaccuracy of knowledge surrounding the president's prerogatives, these data do show a considerable difference in the lower grades which appears to narrow by grade five. This raises the possibility that the impact of Watergate has been merely to make children aware of the political nature of our system at an earlier point in their lives. We shall return to this in the discussion below.

Systemic Generalization

As one might anticipate, attitudes toward the president cannot exist in a vacuum, and thus it is not surprising to learn that in the fall of 1973 children respond in much less positive ways to items dealing with many aspects of our political system. The results in 1973 uniformly give the impression of cynicism and rejection.

In the 1962 study, children were asked to rate political candidates—"those who try to get elected to public office"—on different scales indicating their relative powerfulness, selfishness, intelligence, honesty, and trustworthiness. The response categories were much like those dealt with above for the rating of the president. As compared to the data reported by Hess and Torney,[14] today's children rate candidates in less approving fashion on every scale except power. Table 5 contains the comparative percentages of children giving the two most favorable replies.

In both studies, approximately one-third of the children believe candidates to be more powerful than almost anyone or than most people. The 1973 results do show that this percentage decreases among older children, a trend which appears later in fifth- through seventh-grade children in the 1962 study. It is remarkable, however, that just as with the ratings of the president, the results in 1973 only approximate those of 1962 when aspects of power are being considered. Children have separated the performance capabilities of the president and politicians in general from their personal qualities. In the latter, enormous differences emerge.

[14] *Development of Political Attitudes*, p. 76.

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TABLE 5

Comparison of 1962 and 1973 Studies in Ratings of Political Candidates as Two Most Positive Answers on Five Scales[a]
(Percent children responding)

	3rd Grade 1962	*3rd Grade 1973*	*4th Grade 1962*	*4th Grade 1973*	*5th Grade 1962*	*5th Grade 1973*
1. Candidates are *more powerful* than almost anyone or than most people.	–	43.9	29.6	35.0	30.2	33.3
2. Candidates are *less selfish* than almost anyone or than most people.	–	42.7	57.7	22.0	54.1	19.8
3. Candidates are *smarter* than almost anyone or than most people.	–	33.0	45.6	32.2	45.1	35.2
4. Candidates are *more honest* than almost anyone or than most people.	–	39.8	60.8	30.6	59.0	29.6
5. Candidates always or almost always keep their promises.	–	38.5	56.4	17.7	51.7	23.8

[a]Data from the 1962 study cited from Robert D. Hess and Judith Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago, 1967), p. 76.

Comparing 1973 and 1962, politicians are seen as more selfish, less intelligent, more dishonest, and less likely to keep their promises. The largest differences were found for selfishness and trustworthiness; the differences were less pronounced for intelligence. Unlike the ratings of the president, however, the responses to these items tend to be normally distributed about the middle of the scale rather than skewed toward a negative (in 1973) or positive (in 1962) assessment. This indicates that there has not been a wholesale shift in children's attitudes toward the referent actor (candidates), but rather that the effects of Watergate (and/or the intervening eleven years) have been a diminished respect for the personal characteristics of individuals who run for public office. Thus, in the transference from president to politicians in general, the negative effects apparently are not as severe as they might have been. However, ultimately, they may be a good deal more serious than is evident at first glance (see the discussion below).

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TABLE 6

Responses to Political Cynicism Items in 1973 Study
(Percent of children responding)

1. "Most politicians are mainly out for themselves."

	Agree	*Disagree*	*Don't Know*	*Total*	*N*
3rd grade	31%	24%	45%	100%	111
4th grade	35	31	34	100	124
5th grade	44	31	25	100	132

2. "Dishonesty seems to be more common in politics than in most other careers."

	Agree	*Disagree*	*Don't Know*	*Total*	*N*
3rd grade	34%	19%	46%	99%	108
4th grade	43	32	24	99	123
5th grade	56	21	23	100	131

In 1973 the children were asked to respond to two rather standard questions which purport to measure political cynicism. The percentage replies to these items appear in Table 6. In both cases, responses indicative of political cynicism (agreement) increase with the school grade: more than 30 to 40 percent agree that politicians are mainly out for themselves; and 34 to 56 percent agree that dishonesty appears more commonly in politics than in other careers. It is also interesting to note that when given items that lead toward a negative assessment of the political system, younger children exhibit a good deal of confusion, as evidenced by the high number responding "don't know." The increase in the percentage of replies indicating political cynicism is accompanied by a decline in this confusion.

Comparative data also were gathered on the child's attitude toward the policeman, a topic given considerable attention in the socialization literature, but which is only tangentially related to our present concerns. The data in this regard show some of the same trends as those for politicians. Ratings of the policeman are less favorable in 1973 than they were in 1962, a deterioration which showed up on all dimensions, including those relating to performance capabilities. The policeman was not seen as unfavorably as the president on indicators of affective content, but certainly he has slipped in the child's estimation since 1962. Again, political disputes have intervened, affecting children's responses. Like the ratings of candidates, the responses for policemen tended to be normally distributed or not skewed as were the president's ratings.

As a final set of data indicating the generalization of negative attitudes to the entire political system which may have come about as a result of Watergate, let us turn to the children's agreement with three

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TABLE 7

Comparison of 1962 and 1973 Studies in Agreement with Three Statements about the Government (Percent of children responding)

	3rd Grade 1962	3rd Grade 1973	4th Grade 1962	4th Grade 1973	5th Grade 1962	5th Grade 1973
1. "The government has too much power."	36	34	19	35	22	42
2. "The government meddles too much in our private lives."	28	42	21	42	17	35
3. "The government should have more power over the people."	22	16	33	7	24	5

broad statements made about the government in general. The comparative percentages of those agreeing with assertions about the power of our government appear in Table 7.

The beliefs that the government has too much power and that it meddles too much in our private lives have become more widespread among children since 1962, and, among today's children, these beliefs gain increasing acceptance with age. These responses should be interpreted with the knowledge that there has not been a great decline in the power of political participants (president and politicians) as perceived by children in 1962 and 1973. Thus, the concern of many adults that, at the very least, Watergate indicates that governmental power has grown beyond reasonable bounds is not lost upon children. They appear to be aware of this as a serious problem.

The Specifics of Watergate

How aware of Watergate events are children of ages seven to ten? What opinions do they hold? How have they learned of the people and actions which make up what the news media has branded the "Watergate crisis"? Partial answers to these questions can be gathered from our data.

In order to obtain an indication of what factual knowledge children possessed about Watergate, we asked five questions in which a major participant was to be identified by the best description from among the following: senator, lawyer, friend of the president, or judge. The coded data from these questions appear in Table 8. A seemingly rather low percentage of children are able to identify correctly the major figures of

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TABLE 8

Political Information: Responses to Five Identification Questions in the 1973 Study (Percent of children responding)

		Correct Answer	Incorrect Answer	Don't Know	Total	N
1. Who is Samuel Ervin?						
	3rd grade	8%	15%	77%	100%	105
	4th grade	24	18	58	100	120
	5th grade	31	27	42	100	132
2. Who is H. R. Haldeman?						
	3rd grade	6	22	72	100	107
	4th grade	10	26	63	99	123
	5th grade	29	26	45	100	132
3. Who is John Sirica?						
	3rd grade	10	19	68	100	107
	4th grade	31	17	52	100	123
	5th grade	36	20	44	100	129
4. Who is Archibald Cox?						
	3rd grade	6	42	52	100	106
	4th grade	18	47	35	100	124
	5th grade	31	40	29	100	130
5. Who is Howard Baker?						
	3rd grade	6	18	76	100	105
	4th grade	18	24	58	100	124
	5th grade	25	18	57	100	130

the Watergate events. It is difficult to interpret these results in the absence of comparative data from an adult population group, but, given the fact that we are dealing with a high socioeconomic-status population, we might conclude that concrete knowledge is quite low. It appears to be somewhat lower than general political knowledge which was measured in part by a request to identify the governor of Massachusetts. Percentages of correct replies to that question for grades three, four, and five respectively, were 8, 40, and 45 percent.[15]

One interesting aspect of the identifications can be uncovered by comparing the responses for Archibald Cox with the other political participants. While the percentage of correct identifications was not greater for Cox than for the others, more children felt they had heard of Cox and so could take a guess at his identification; the percent of "don't knows"

[15] The percentages of correct identifications for the president and vice-president were in the high nineties, even though the latter was in a state of flux. Gerald Ford had been nominated when data collection began, and he was confirmed and sworn in by the time it ended. Even young children were quite aware of this.

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is persistently smaller for Cox. The reader will no doubt recall the inundation of letters and telegrams which reached Washington after Cox's dismissal. Those events may have transformed Cox into something of a hero and boosted his name-recognition above the other Watergate participants. That Cox has become an ephemeral hero is not inconsistent with the data to be presented next.

The opinions of this group of children toward major aspects of Watergate were measured by three questions. In no other part of the question-

TABLE 9

Responses to Three Opinion Items about Watergate Grouped by Class (Percent of children responding)

	3rd Grade	4th Grade	5th Grade
1. Some people believe that the newspapers and television are trying to make Watergate sound worse than it really is, while others believe that they were right in making the American people aware of everything that has gone on. Which do you think is closer to the truth?			
a. The newspapers and television have made Watergate sound much worse than it really is.	20	17	18
b. The newspapers and television were right in making the people aware of everything that has gone on.	40	65	56
c. I don't know which to believe.	22	13	21
d. I don't really know what Watergate is.	17	5	4
	99	100	99
2. Some people say that the president has done some very bad things, while others say that he is being blamed for the things his friends did. Which side do you agree with?			
a. The president did some very bad things.	38	53	42
b. The president is being blamed for things his friends did.	25	21	29
c. I don't know which to believe.	37	26	23
	100	100	100
3. Do you think the president should be impeached?			
a. Yes.	31	49	58
b. No.	15	22	18
c. I don't know what impeach means.	40	18	0
d. I don't know whether he should be impeached or not.	14	12	24
	100	101	100

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naire is the exact wording of the questions so important. For this reason, Table 9 contains the precise format in which the questions were asked together with the various percentage responses for the three classes.

Overwhelmingly these children take an anti-Nixon stand. By a two-to-one margin they believe the president to have been involved in wrongdoing rather than being guilty merely through association with the misdeeds of his staff. By three-to-one in grades four and five, and two-to-one in grade three, children believe that the press has played a valuable role rather than that of manufacturing a crisis in order to "get Nixon." In each of these areas supporters of the president have explicitly attempted to defend him by arguing that he is being blamed by association and that the crisis is a manufacture of the news media. Their arguments have not had much impact, at least on these children.

By margins of two-to-one in the third grade, two-and-a-half-to-one in the fourth, and three-to-one in the fifth grade, today's children believe that the president should be impeached. These are remarkable figures given the fact that these children's parents voted two-to-one for Nixon only a year earlier.

A final set of interesting data can be presented on how children come to learn of major political events. They were asked to remember how they first heard about the Watergate crisis. Approximately 45 percent in all three classes named the news media as their first source of information about Watergate; parents were named in about 30 percent of the cases. All other possible sources (siblings, peers, relatives) were named infrequently; teachers were named by approximately 8 percent of the children. In addition, the children were asked to name the source of information that had been "most important" to them in finding out about the Watergate events. In response to this question the impact of the news media was even greater, and its reported effects increased in percentage with the children's grade: 55, 66, and 72 percent in the three grades respectively. It is also pertinent that among those children naming one form of news media, television was mentioned in about two-thirds of the cases. Yet, among the older children, newspapers command increased attention: of the fifth graders who answered that the news media was most important to them, 40 percent mentioned newspapers.

IMPLICATIONS

Several alternative explanations for the discrepancies between the 1962 data and that collected during the Watergate revelations need to be considered. It is possible that the differences may be attributed to differences in the respective sample: 1962 was a national sample of all socio-economic-status levels and the data reported here was derived from an

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upper-income community in Massachusetts—i.e., a liberal, Democratic environment. Greenstein reports that children from lower socioeconomic-status families have a greater tendency to idealize the president.[16] Although this finding has been somewhat contradicted by the research in specific cultural subgroups which are predominately lower status,[17] we should explicitly note this lack of correspondence between the 1962 and the 1973 respondents. It is difficult, however, to estimate the quantitative effect of this upon the results reported here. First, while both Easton and Dennis and Hess and Torney mention social-class differences to the effect that upper-status children tend to be less favorable in their ratings of the president, nowhere do they present a detailed description of the quantitative differences which emerge in their data.[18] Second, Hess and Torney and Easton and Dennis acknowledge that these differences may in part reflect some partisan feelings;[19] Kennedy, a Democrat, was more likely to appeal to lower-class children and to be rated less positively by children who identified themselves as Republicans. We do know that children are vaguely aware of salient policy positions of the incumbent.[20] Therefore, a Republican administration advocating policies more to the liking of upper-class individuals may partially affect potential differences in approval caused by differences in social class. These children are demonstrably aware of the political positions of their families. Only 21 percent of the children were unable to say how their parents had voted in the 1972 election. Of those who knew, the children reported that 61.8 percent of their parents had voted for President Nixon and 38.2 percent for McGovern (a figure which closely parallels the Nixon national percentage of 61.3 percent). These reports of parental voting appear to be quite valid when compared to the actual percentage of votes for Nixon in the community as a whole (58.4 percent) and in the precincts in which the schools were located (63.8 percent). While it is unlikely that these children are aware of how their precincts or community voted, they are certainly aware of the outcome of the election and the unique position of Massachusetts in that result. Even in the absence of Watergate, the effect of these factors would have to be considered before one could make a judgment of the quantitative differences in results stemming from social-class background.

Nevertheless, the magnitude of the differences in presidential ratings

[16] *Children and Politics*, chap. V.

[17] See footnote 8.

[18] Easton and Dennis, *Children in the Political System*, pp. 343–349; Hess and Torney, *Development of Political Attitudes*, pp. 150–159.

[19] Hess and Torney, *Development of Political Attitudes*, p. 135; Easton and Dennis, *Children in the Political System*, p. 197.

[20] Sigel, "Image of a President."

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allow us to reject this hypothesis. The differences due to social class reported by the Chicago researchers are on the order of 4 or 5 percent, or a difference in mean ratings of around .40 on the six-point scale.[21] Variations of this size are quite marginal compared to the vast differences in children's affective attitudes toward the president when we contrast the 1973 data to that of 1962. The differences in mean ratings in Table 2 for attachment, benevolence, and dependability are on the order of two full points on the six-point scale. Percentage shifts in Tables 1 and 4 are approximately 40 percent or greater.

It may well be, on the other hand, that the differences in mean ratings for the president's performance capabilities (power and leadership) are attributable to the differences in socioeconomic status between the two samples; at least statistical tests were unable to rule out that possibility. But, this does nothing to weaken the interpretation presented above, namely, that the effect of Watergate has been to transform the president into the malevolent leader.

A second possible interpretation of these differences could be based upon the assertion that the effect of Watergate has been to speed up the process of political socialization. Grades three through five were deliberately chosen for this study because earlier research indicated that the idealization of the president would be at its highest level among third-grade children and that the trend toward a fading of the optimistic picture would be clearly apparent by the fifth grade.[22] One might argue that the process has merely been compressed, so that children, observing an enormous crisis of political malfeasance, learn earlier what they would have eventually discovered. Yet, for two reasons, the negative attitudes toward the president displayed by children in 1973 cannot be interpreted merely as a telescoping of the process of a gradual awakening to healthy adult cynicism. First, at no age do the children in 1962 reject the president as a negative affect symbol, but this clearly happens in 1973. Second, we find the same trend toward increasingly negative attitudes in higher grades evident in the 1973 sample alone. In fact, the differences between the 1962 and the 1973 attitudes become more pronounced in the fourth and fifth grades. The responses of children in 1973 indicate an entirely different experience in political socialization from the reports of earlier research. Political events and indeed the president himself do become important variables in the socialization equation, and their present impact should give us cause for great concern. The president

[21] See Easton and Dennis, *Children in the Political System*, pp. 342–346; and Hess and Torney, *Development of Political Attitudes*, pp. 135–137.

[22] Hess and Easton in "The Child's Changing Image of the President," first reported the effects of increased age, and it has been noticed in all the research published since.

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is viewed as truly malevolent, undependable, untrustworthy, yet powerful and dangerous. If the president is the image of political authority and the central mechanism for building diffuse support of a political system, as Easton and Dennis argue, then for this generation of children, conceptions of authority and the political system which they underpin will be markedly different.

A More Optimistic Interpretation

If we accept the Easton and Dennis theory, we find the implications of the 1973 data for the future legitimacy of our political system to be disturbing indeed. Our data, however, provide for a less pessimistic outlook since they also question some major aspects of the Easton and Dennis model of socialization. First, Easton and Dennis argue that children are unable to differentiate between the occupant and the role of the presidency,[23] a proposition which seems less tenable given the marked differentiation we have found between affective responses and perceptions of performance capablities. Second, they propose a "vulnerability" hypothesis,[24] which amounts to a weaker form of the psychological defense mechanism of identification with an overwhelmingly powerful authority.[25] Helplessness produces anxiety which is reduced by idealization. But, in this instance, identification should produce a heightening of the president's positive ratings, since a president exercising his capability of doing great harm should produce ever increasing anxiety. Finally, Easton and Dennis argue that the idealism expressed toward the president is a transference of perceptions of the father to the national collectivity.[26] This "family writ large" hypothesis[27] is not supported by our data. No discernible differences appear between ratings in 1962 and 1973 for "your father" on any of the scales which measured significant changes in attitudes toward the president (data not shown).

There is, of course, the likely possibility that parents have explicitly

[23] *Children in the Political System*, pp. 193–198 and *passim*.

[24] Ibid., pp. 177, 205, and *passim*.

[25] The best statement of this mechanism as used in the study of political socialization is provided by Jaros in "Children's Orientations," p. 373: "The child is patently inferior; the President is a super-power. Such a relationship is potentially dangerous, for the super-power has the capability of doing great harm. This helplessness and vulnerability thus creates an anxiety drive. In order to avoid this anxiety, the child responds by idealizing the President, for a benevolent President will not manifest his harmful potential; anxiety is reduced and psychic tranquillity reigns." Jaros goes on to criticize sharply this proposition.

[26] *Children in the Political System*, p. 372.

[27] I believe Greenstein has coined this term which he probes in *Children and Politics*. For an earlier statement see Easton and Hess, "The Child's Political World."

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commented upon current events, thereby designating the present occupant as an inappropriate model for either transference or identification. But, if these hypotheses lose their inevitability which has been tied to the power of the president, they also lose their explanatory power, for they then lead to the proposition that children idealize only ideal authority figures.

It can be argued that a more satisfactory accounting for both the 1962 and 1973 data can be derived from the moral development work of Lawrence Kohlberg.[28] Children aged six to ten would most likely exhibit the first stage of what Kohlberg calls "preconventional moral thinking," in which actions and actors are evaluated by stark, categorical labels of "good" or "bad" without any grey areas in between. Past studies have been made of children who have seen the president as a morally good authority figure, and, therefore, good without exception on a whole range of evaluative dimensions. In the light of the Watergate revelations, children have placed the president squarely into the "bad" category, and, thus now rate him as completely negative. The effect of Watergate has been to transform the president from a positive, morally good symbol into a negative object to be affectively and morally rejected. If through resignation or impeachment, Nixon were replaced in office, one would anticipate, according to this explanation, that the response patterns would return to something approximating the 1962 distribution, for the president would again become a correct moral symbol.

Can political legitimacy be built on a cognitive structure so susceptible to such variation? It seems more plausible to suggest that the 1962 and 1973 questionnaires are measuring surface-level cognitions rather than basic orientations.

The Kohlberg-derived explanation does have difficulty, however, in accounting for the smaller, but significant, decline in affective ratings toward politicians, policemen, and "the government"; we would have anticipated either no change or a similar massive swing toward negative assessments. Inevitably, we are forced to conclude that the legitimacy of the political system has been impaired by events in the intervening years, to which Watergate, given the 1973 attitudes expressed toward the president, has certainly contributed. It is in this regard that the moderate deterioration in attitudes toward other parts of the political system poses a more serious question for the future stability of our political institutions than does the rapid and complete shift in attitudes toward the president.

[28] Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology," in M. L. Hoffman and L. N. Hoffman (eds.), *Review of Child Development Research*, Vol. 1 (New York, 1964); and Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Child as Moral Philosopher," *Psychology Today*, 1, no. 4 (September 1968).

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We have been able to establish that current events do have an impact upon the political socialization of children, at least in terms of their attitudes toward political authorities. Whether or not one wishes to argue that these attitudes become the origin of beliefs in the legitimacy of the political system, one must recognize that politics do have an impact on the attitudes children hold. In some sense then, in accounting for the views children have of the president, the incumbent himself is a relevant variable to consider. We do not find a spontaneous and automatic mechanism whereby children idealize all authority simply because it is powerful. Still to be established is the relevance of the attitudes of children—positive or negative—to their political behavior as adults; but that is a connection which has not yet been demonstrated by any research in the political socialization field.

Conclusion

The political scandals collectively called Watergate have provided researchers with a critical test of a major tenet of political socialization. Only the passage of time can resolve the question of whether these instruments are measuring merely a surface manifestation of an underlying developmental process which will in the long run produce much the same result as would have occurred in the absence of the Watergate events or rather a fundamental change in children's images of political authority which will find ramifications in the absence of adult political legitimacy. The beginnings of an answer to the contradictions our data provoke between Easton and Dennis, on the one hand, and Kohlberg, on the other, may become evident shortly after the Watergate crisis is resolved. If the Kohlberg-based explanation holds true, we should see a rapid turnaround in the assessments of the president back to pre-Watergate conceptions. In that case we will have lost one of our most firmly supported hypotheses in political science. On the other hand, should Easton and Dennis' arguments prove the more adequate explanation of children's attitudes in the long run, then for a generation we should see a substantial impairment of the legitimacy upon which the stability of our political system is based. We will have upheld a social science theory, but the costs of Watergate will be with us for a very long time.*

* The author would like to express his appreciation to Stephen Chilton, Michael Lipsky, and Jeffrey Pressman who read and commented on an earlier draft of this article.

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"Guilty Yes; Impeachment, No": Some Empirical Findings

PATRICK J. McGEEVER

In late September and early October of 1973, over 1000 individuals in a major midwestern metropolitan area were asked a series of questions about their attitudes on the Watergate affair. The purpose was not so much the ostensible one of determining (again!) what people believed about the break-in and cover-up, but to explore a seeming inconsistency that kept cropping up in the national opinion polls: apparently, the great majority of Americans believed President Nixon to be guilty of knowing about or participating in the break-in or cover-up; but the great majority of Americans did not want President Nixon to resign or to be impeached. We found, in a nutshell, that a significant portion (not a majority, however) of those interviewed did not want their president to be punished—even when they believed him guilty of major derelictions—for reasons connected with partisanship, class, and (in perhaps a surprising manner) age. This finding in turn raised some fundamental questions about citizen attitudes in the United States: Do we, as a nation, wish our political leaders to be subject to the rule of law in the same way as presumably are other citizens, or do we feel implicitly that these leaders should somehow be above the law?

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire, a brief one, was divided into three parts. The first series of questions attempted to ascertain the degree of guilt the respondents at-

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tributed to President Nixon in the Watergate matter, the second series to discover the action (if any) the respondents felt should be taken against him, and the remainder dealt with other, mostly independent, variables which we would attempt to relate to the above responses.

Degree of Guilt

The first variable, degree of guilt, was measured by a series of three questions: (1) "Do you believe President Nixon knew in advance about plans to break into the Democratic headquarters at Watergate?" (2) "Do you believe he later participated knowingly in a cover-up?" (3) "Do you believe he was too lax in supervising the reelection campaign?" The interviewers were instructed to proceed from the first to the second or from the second to the third question only upon receiving a negative or noncommittal response. As soon as any positive response was received, this line of questioning was terminated. The rationale was that if the respondent attributed to the president a larger degree of culpability (e.g., knowing in advance about the planned break-in), then it was immaterial whether he or she believed the president to be guilty of a lesser offense (e.g., participating in the cover-up).

Degree of Punishment

A parallel set of three questions was asked next: (1) "Do you feel that President Nixon should be impeached and removed from office?" (2) "Do you feel he should resign voluntarily?" (3) "Do you feel he should be censured by a vote of Congress?" Again the interviewers were instructed to terminate the line of questioning with the first positive response, in order to ascertain only the most severe punishment the respondent would advocate.

Other Variables

The remaining questions inquired about the respondent's rating of President Nixon's job performance, whether and how the respondent had voted in the 1972 presidential election, and how the respondent would vote if that election were to be held today. In addition, the interviewer recorded the respondent's sex, approximate age (within three broad ranges: their twenties; thirties or forties; and fifties or older), and the apparent economic level of the respondent's neighborhood (poor, middle class, or affluent).

Due to limitations on time and other resources, it was not possible to draw a random sample of the metropolitan area, but the door-to-door in-

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terviews were to an extent stratified with respect to income, with 82 interviews (7.3 percent) conducted in poor neighborhoods, 738 (65.9 percent) in middle-class ones, and 107 (9.6 percent) in wealthier neighborhoods—and with an additional 193 (17.2 percent) interviews or questionnaire administrations coming from university students.

It was the large number of interviews (1120) more than the basis of the sample selection which led us to believe that our results would be comparable to those of the professional national polling organizations—an assumption which, as will be seen, proved correct.

Of the respondents, 61.3 percent were female—a preponderance probably due to the considerable amount of daytime interviewing which was done. As to age, 39.4 percent were estimated to be in their twenties, 35.7 percent were in their thirties or forties, and 24.9 percent were in their fifties or older.

Findings

We found that 40.4 percent of the respondents believed that the president knew in advance about the Watergate break-in, and an additional 28.2 percent believed that he participated knowingly in a cover-up. We found that 18.4 percent believed that President Nixon's only failure along these lines was a lax supervision of the reelection campaign (a charge to which he had himself pleaded guilty), and 13.0 percent did not believe him guilty on any of these counts. The first two findings are quite comparable to those of the Gallup Poll in early September—when 39 percent believed Nixon planned or knew about the bugging, and 33 percent felt that he tried to cover it up.[1]

When questioned about the appropriate punishment (if any), 20.9 percent of the respondents said he should be impeached, 15.7 percent believed he should resign voluntarily, 18.7 percent advocated censure by Congress,[2] and a large minority of 44.7 percent opposed all of the above measures. These results are again similar to findings of the national surveys in September—prior, as were Gallup's, to the firing of Special Prosecutor Cox and to the announcement of the missing tapes and erasure.

Thus we found what other surveys had found—that two-thirds and more of those interviewed believed the president to be seriously culpable in the Watergate affair, but that only about one-third of the entire sample wanted him punished in a way that would interrupt his tenure in office.

[1] *New York Times*, September 23, 1973.

[2] There may have been a tendency for respondents to avoid advocating this, simply because they were unfamiliar with the word "censure." Interviewers were instructed to explain that the term implied Congress would express disapproval of the president's actions, without removing him from office.

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TABLE 1

Cross-tabulation: Degree of Guilt Imputed to President, and Degree of Punishment Advocated (Number of respondents in parentheses)

Degree of Punishment	Degree of Guilt: Knew in Advance		Participated in Cover-up		Lax Supervision		None		Total	
Impeachment	16.9%	(189)	3.5%	(39)	0.1%	(2)	0.3%	(4)	20.9%	(234)
Resignation	9.8	(110)	5.4	(60)	0.4	(5)	0.1	(1)	15.7	(176)
Censure	5.9	(66)	7.9	(88)	4.2	(47)	0.6	(7)	18.7	(208)
None	7.8	(87)	11.5	(129)	13.6	(152)	12.0	(134)	44.7	(502)
TOTAL	40.4	(452)	28.2	(316)	18.4	(206)	13.0	(146)	100	(1,120)

TABLE 2

Modified Cross-tabulation: Degree of Guilt with Degree of Punishment (Number of respondents in parentheses)

Degree of Punishment	Degree of Guilt: Serious		Light or None		Total	
Severe	35.5%	(398)	1.1%	(12)	36.6%	(410)
Light or None	33.0	(370)	30.4	(340)	63.4	(710)
TOTAL	68.6	(768)	31.4	(352)	100	(1,120)

To study this interesting relationship between guilt imputed to the president, and punishment advocated, we can turn to a cross-tabulation of the two variables (see Table 1). It may be an aid to analysis at this point if we further aggregate the guilt variable responses into *serious guilt*, including the responses "knew in advance" and "participated in cover-up"; and *light or none*, including the responses "lax supervision" and "none." And we can similarly chunk the punishment variable into *severe*, including "impeachment" and "resignation"; and *light or none* including "censure" and "none" (see Table 2).[3]

The interaction of the two variables will now be clear. Aside from the 1 percent who found Mr. Nixon relatively blameless in Watergate, but still impeachable—presumably on other grounds—the respondents are divided into three approximately equal categories: 35.5 percent believed Mr. Nixon was seriously guilty and should be severely punished; 30.4 percent thought he was not seriously guilty and thus should not be severe-

[3] It is, of course, not meant to imply that congressional censure is a mild measure—only that it is much less serious than impeachment.

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ly punished; and 33.0 percent—almost exactly one-third—believed Mr. Nixon was indeed guilty but did not want to see him seriously punished.

It is this final group which made possible the finding last September (in the major polls) that a great majority of Americans found their president guilty of serious involvement in Watergate, but that a great majority also did not want that president to leave office. And it is this group which was a principal focus of our study. Why did this very sizable group of people—not a majority, but a significant minority—wish their president to go virtually unpunished for those offenses of which they considered him guilty? Why, in other words, would they allow him to be above the law?

Possible Interpretations

There are, of course, many reasons why Americans might be opposed to President Nixon's departure from office, and we heard some of them in the course of the interviews, such as: "He's innocent of serious involvement," or "The evidence isn't conclusive." But the respondents in the final category did not argue in either of these ways; they had concluded that he was indeed guilty of serious involvement. Another line of reasoning ran: "He's guilty in *my* opinion, but a case can't stand up in court." This might (or might not) preclude impeachment and conviction, but would not bar resignation—which these respondents also failed to advocate. Still another group argued that: "He's guilty, but all politicians are crooks," or "He's done a good job in general," or "Anything to keep the McGovernites out," or, conversely, "Why let the GOP off so easily?" While such lines of argument were clearly suasive for some, it is to be noted that their common denominator is cynicism, or the willingness to subordinate, in one way or another, the rule of law to partisan consideration. Finally, some argued along only slightly different lines: "Impeachment is too frightening; Americans aren't ready for it," or "The whole system might fall apart." These apparent *raisons d'état*, however accurate in describing the individual respondent's view, are, when projected upon the nation as a whole, either another and perhaps deeper form of cynicism, or an expression of fear and insecurity.

We were not able to interview respondents in depth about their reasoning (or rationalizations). But we were able, by comparing their responses with other items recorded, to rule out some possibilities and to come up with some perhaps less obvious clues as to why many were willing to retain in office a president whom they considered seriously guilty.

Our method was first to divide respondents into three categories: (1) those who considered Mr. Nixon seriously guilty, and who wanted him to

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TABLE 3

Guilt/Removal Cross-tabulation with Presidential Job Rating
(Number of respondents in parentheses)

Job Rating	Guilt/Removal: Guilty-Yes/ Remove-Yes	Guilty-No/ Remove-No	Guilty-Yes/ Remove-No	Total
Excellent	1% (2)	24% (80)	5% (18)	9% (100)
Good	4 (17)	53 (181)	34 (127)	30 (325)
Fair	41 (163)	19 (65)	47 (173)	36 (401)
Poor	54 (216)	4 (13)	14 (50)	25 (279)
TOTAL	100 (398)	100 (339)	100 (368)	100 (1,105)

$x^2 = 451.53$
signif. = .001

leave office ("Guilty-Yes/Remove-Yes"); (2) those who considered him innocent of serious wrongdoing, and who wanted him to remain in office ("Guilty-No/Remove-No"); and (3) those who considered him seriously guilty, but still wanted him to remain in office ("Guilty-Yes/Remove-No"). We excluded from further consideration the 1 percent who wanted him to leave office, although believing him innocent of Watergate-related misconduct. Then we cross-tabulated these three categories with the remaining variables to see what significant patterns would emerge.

Job Rating

The total sample rated Mr. Nixon's performance of his overall job as follows: excellent, 9 percent; good, 30 percent; fair, 36 percent; poor, 25 percent (see Table 3). These findings again are comparable to those of Gallup in September (with 35 percent approving and 55 percent disapproving).[4] But it will be clear that the most unfavorable evaluation comes from those respondents who want Mr. Nixon to leave office (95 percent disapproval), while the only high approval comes from those who believe Mr. Nixon not guilty (77 percent approval). And the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-No" group is in between, with 39 percent approving and 61 percent disapproving—statistics exactly paralleling the overall sample figures (although only 5 percent of this group rate his performance as "excellent," as against 9 percent overall). Thus it would appear that while one's assessment of Mr. Nixon's total performance does correlate with one's opinion about his guilt and removal from office, the willingness of the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-No" group to overlook the guilt they attribute to Mr. Nixon is *not* based upon an especially favorable evaluation of his

[4] *New York Times*, September 23, 1973.

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TABLE 4

Guilt/Removal Cross-tabulated with 1972 Presidential Vote (Number of respondents in parentheses)*

1972 Vote	Guilt/Removal: Guilty-Yes/ Remove-Yes	Guilty-No/ Remove-No	Guilty-Yes/ Remove-No	Total
Nixon	35% (106)	92% (254)	73% (207)	66% (567)
Other	65 (194)	8 (22)	27 (75)	34 (291)
TOTAL	100 (300)	100 (276)	100 (282)	100 (858)

*Nonvoters excluded.

$X^2 = 216.23$
signif. = .001

performance in office. Among only those who believe him guilty, however, the less favorable their evaluation of his performance, the more likely they are to call for removal.

The 1972 Vote

In 1972 the voters in the overall sample had cast their ballots for Richard Nixon by a margin of two-to-one (see Table 4). Among those who now wish Mr. Nixon to leave the presidency, this ratio was almost exactly reversed. The ranks of those who find him innocent of serious wrongdoing are drawn almost exclusively (92 percent) from among those who had voted for him—only twenty-two in the entire sample voted for another candidate in 1972 and now consider Mr. Nixon innocent. Finally, the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-No" respondents had voted for the incumbent by a three-to-one margin as compared to the ten-to-one of the "Guilty-No/Remove-No" and the almost two-to-one against Nixon of the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-Yes." Apparently, then, the way the respondents had voted in 1972 is a better clue to their present opinion than is their assessment of the president's performance since 1972.

The 1973 Vote

It may be of general interest to note that if the election had been held in 1973 rather than in 1972, despite their general belief that Richard Nixon was guilty in Watergate, our respondents would have returned him to office (albeit without a majority) over George McGovern or any other suggested candidate (see Table 5).

Again, the correlation of partisanship with one's beliefs about Watergate and impeachment is clear—although it is impossible in this case even to begin to separate cause from effect. Those who want Mr. Nixon

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TABLE 5

Guilt/Removal Cross-tabulated with Presidential Vote If Held Today
(Number of respondents in parentheses)

	Guilt/Removal			
1973 Vote	*Guilty-Yes/ Remove-Yes*	*Guilty-No/ Remove-No*	*Guilty-Yes/ Remove-No*	*Total*
Nixon	5% (18)	82% (237)	43% (137)	40% (392)
McGovern	42 (158)	5 (14)	23 (74)	25 (246)
Other	53 (203)	13 (37)	34 (111)	35 (351)
TOTAL	100 (379)	100 (288)	100 (322)	100 (989)

$x^2 = 415.76$
signif. = .001

to be impeached or to resign would contribute strongly to both the McGovern vote (64 percent) and the vote for other candidate(s) (58 percent) —with a larger number, interestingly, preferring another candidate. Those who consider Mr. Nixon innocent give him a huge majority (82 percent) of their vote. And those who find Mr. Nixon guilty, but want him to stay on the job, give Nixon a plurality, although still quite short of a majority of their total votes.

Sex and Age

Sex proved not to be a significant variable. Approximately one-third of each category was male and two-thirds female, in line with the makeup of our total sample.

The age variable in some cases caused a surprising result (see Table 6). Those who want the president to be removed from office are drawn dis-

TABLE 6

Guilt/Removal Cross-tabulated with Age
(Number of respondents in parentheses)

	Age			
Guilt-Remove	*Younger (20s or under)*	*Middle-Aged (30s, 40s)*	*Older (50s, over)*	*Total*
Guilty-Yes/Remove-Yes	43% (176)	33% (124)	25% (65)	35% (365)
Guilty-No/Remove-No	18 (74)	35 (129)	50 (128)	32 (331)
Guilty-Yes/Remove-No	39 (160)	32 (119)	25 (65)	33 (344)
TOTAL	100 (410)	100 (372)	100 (258)	100 (1,040)

$x^2 = 74.25$
signif. = .001

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proportionately from the young (43 percent of the young vs. 33 percent of the middle-aged and 25 percent of the older respondents). This is not surprising, as younger citizens are known to be unfriendly to the Nixon administration and thought to be more insistent on high standards of public probity in their officialdom. But among those who believe the president guilty, the size of the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-No" category is not significantly larger among the young than among the other age groups, making something of a hash of the accepted wisdom about youth's high moral standards. Put another way, of those young people who find Mr. Nixon guilty, only a slight majority (176 to 160) wish him to leave office. A similarly close majority of the middle-aged group would concur (124 to 119) while the older respondents who perceived Mr. Nixon guilty would split evenly (65 to 65) on the matter of his removal. The significant finding about the older respondents, however, is that they do *not,* except by the barest majority, find Mr. Nixon guilty—50 percent of them show up in the "Guilty-No/ Remove-No" group, far out of proportion to that group's share of the total. The middle-aged respondents, by way of contrast, contribute to each of the three groups in close harmony with the totals.

Economic Status

When we took into account the economic level of the neighborhood in which the respondent was interviewed, it proved that each of the three economic levels had a distinctive response pattern (see Table 7). The poorer neighborhoods' respondents fell overwhelmingly (82 percent) into the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-Yes" bracket; those from wealthier neighborhoods went quite strongly (60 percent) into the "Guilty-No/Remove-No" cate-

TABLE 7

Guilt/Removal Cross-tabulated with Economic Status of Neighborhood
(Number of respondents in parentheses)

	Economic Status							
Guilt-Removal	*Poorer*		*Middle Class*		*Wealthier*		*Total*	
Guilty-Yes/Remove-Yes	82%	(65)	34%	(250)	20%	(21)	37%	(336)
Guilty-No/Remove-No	1	(1)	33	(239)	60	(61)	33	(301)
Guilty-Yes/Remove-No	17	(13)	33	(245)	20	(21)	30	(279)
TOTAL	100	(79)	100	(734)	100	(103)	100	(916)

$x^2 = 110.05$
signif. = .001

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gory; and the large number of respondents from middle-class neighborhoods were divided almost equally among the three categories.

Summary and Conclusions

Returning to our original question, then, of why a president perceived by most of his constituents as guilty of serious misconduct also had broad popular support for staying in office, we can now list the following clues: (1) It is not because he is thought by those surveyed to have a good overall record in office; only that minority which considers him innocent gives him a favorable job rating. (2) The partisanship of 1972 plays a role; very few of those who voted for him in 1972 now want him removed. (3) This partisanship of 1972 would have been reaffirmed (if less convincingly) in the fall of 1973, more than a year after Watergate: again, only those who want Mr. Nixon to leave office would fail to give him at least a plurality of votes. (4) Many older people refuse to see Mr. Nixon as culpable; the vast majority of younger people take the opposite view, but split almost evenly on his removal from office. (5) The more affluent find him innocent; the poor want him out of office; and the broad middle class, while far from unified in its opinions, shows a noticeable willingness to retain in office a president it perceives as guilty.

Perhaps the clearest conclusion to emerge from the survey is that the process of public-opinion formation on Watergate and Mr. Nixon's role therein has been highly political. Perceptions and judgments on his guilt or innocence, removal from or retention in office, depend largely on one's partisanship, age, and economic circumstance. Public opinion on Watergate is not operating as a dispassionate judge or jury, but as a sounding board for a myriad of hopes, fears, and grievances which frequently have little or nothing to do with the facts of the case.

A second conclusion is that it was a significant minority—about one-third of those questioned—who believed the president was guilty, but still wished him to remain in office. This particular group, aside from being disproportionately young or middle-aged and a bit disproportionately middle class, seems undistinguishable from other respondents with more consistent viewpoints. Since the time of our interviews there has, it is true, been a drift in public sentiment in the directions of attribution of guilt and advocacy of impeachment. But the differential between the percentage who think Mr. Nixon guilty of impeachable offenses and the percentage who advocate impeachment or resignation still consists of approximately one-third of those interviewed in the national polls. Gallup reported in March 1974 that a total of 74 percent of respondents considered Mr. Nixon guilty of planning the Watergate break-in (11 percent), knowing

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about it in advance (28 percent), or covering it up (34 percent). He also reported that a total of 43 percent of all respondents favored either impeachment or resignation.[5]

Finally, it seems to this observer that the survey data point to a new, or at least newly formalized cynicism or fearfulness in the American body politic. It is, to be sure, part of popular political wisdom in this country that politicians are crooks, and that they rank near used-car salesmen in trustworthiness. But beneath this sometimes jocular understanding there was a conviction that the *system* somehow worked, somehow rose above the venalities and stupidities of the politicans who staffed it. In the wake of Watergate, it is this latter belief which seems to have vanished, or at least to have fallen on hard times. Many who think Mr. Nixon guilty of what the writers of the Constitution might have called "high crimes and misdemeanors," also find the sole constitutional remedy of impeachment inapplicable because it would not improve things, or undesirable because it is too frightening. The system, they seem to be saying, cannot work as designed in our present situation—or they might say that whether it would "work" or not is quite irrelevant.

It is not possible at this writing to predict with certainty the outcome of impeachment proceedings in Congress. But it can be said that if Mr. Nixon ever is impeached and removed from office, it will not be because the court of public opinion mandated the sentence. That court, having reached a verdict of guilty, merely shrugged about what the punishment, if any, should be.*

[5] *Gallup Opinion Index*, No. 105, March 1974, pp. 4–5.

* Participants in this study include: Mohammed Abdullah, Roger Gombert, Oseye Hardeman, Phil Hines, Richard Huber, Carol Hubbard, William Lutholtz, Barbara Munchel, Mark Smith, Syomara Tindera, Helga Wehner, and in particular Ken Reese.

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Impeachment and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: A Comment on "Guilty, Yes; Impeachment, No"

GERALD B. FINCH

It can safely be said that Watergate will preoccupy political scientists for some time to come. While its permanent political effects, if any, remain to be seen, it is possible to monitor Watergate's short-term political impact and to speculate about its likely influence in the near future. In "Guilty, Yes; Impeachment, No," Professor McGeever has presented a detailed description of Watergate's effect on public opinion. Accordingly, it seems worthwhile to examine his data for evidence of possible trends in public sentiment on impeachment and for clues to the probable electoral repercussions of Watergate.

McGeever's sample consists of two polar groups on the question of Nixon's guilt and removal from office—those who think him guilty and want him removed, and those who think him innocent—and a third, rather ambivalent group—those who think him guilty but oppose his removal from office. Are the members of the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-No" group incorrigible cynics willing to sacrifice political justice for political stability? There is no doubt that McGeever's data fit that interpretation. But the dynamics of public opinion suggest another interpretation: that a sizable portion of these apparent cynics are in fact experiencing attitudinal "cross-pressures,"[1] that their apparently inconsistent attitudes toward

[1] For a discussion of social cross-pressures see Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1944), and Bernard R. Berelson,

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Nixon's guilt and tenure in office are incompatible and will eventually be changed to achieve attitudinal consistency. Since consistency between opinions is established over time, processes of opinion formation involving cross-pressures are difficult to detect in a cross-sectional survey. Still, the effort is worthwhile, for public opinion on impeachment may be far from crystallized if we are dealing more with cross-pressures than with hardened cynicism.

A few fragments of McGeever's data are consistent with a fairly unsettled and incomplete process of opinion formation on impeachment. As Table 1 indicates, Nixon's support as a candidate fell 30.9 percent from

TABLE 1

Guilt/Removal Cross-tabulated with Support for Nixon Candidacy in 1972 and 1973 (Number of respondents in parentheses)

	Guilty-Yes/ Remove-Yes	*Guilty-Yes/ Remove-No*	*Guilty-No/ Remove-No*
Percent who voted for Nixon in 1972	35.3% (106)	73.4% (207)	92.0% (254)
Percent who would have voted for Nixon in 1973	4.7 (5)	42.5 (137)	82.3 (237)
Change, 1972–1973	−30.6	−30.9	−9.7

1972 to 1973 among members of the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-No" group, a change that can reasonably be attributed to their agreement on Nixon's guilt. Nixon's support in the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-Yes" group declined an almost identical 30.6 percent, compared to only a 9.7 percent drop in the "Guilty-No/Remove-No" group.

The crucial question is whether the 30 percent drop in Nixon's popularity as a candidate indicates that some members of the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-No" group will join the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-Yes" group in advocating Nixon's removal from office by *nonelective* means. The lowest level of Nixon support in 1972 came from the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-Yes" group, which is consistent with the interpretation that this group came most quickly to advocate Nixon's removal from office because they were least favorably inclined toward him in the first place. Thus, the higher level of Nixon support in 1972 among the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-No" group could mean that these respondents will be slower to accept

Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954). Attitudinal cross-pressures are discussed in Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York, 1960).

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removal as a solution, but that many will accept it in the end; their previously more favorable disposition toward Nixon may constitute too formidable a barrier for them to achieve immediate attitudinal consistency. If feelings about removal from office lag somewhat in their consistency with evaluations of guilt, the impeachment opinions of the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-No" group could be far more malleable than they appear cross-sectionally.[2]

The uncertainty about Watergate's probable electoral consequences is only partly attributable to the electorate's indecisiveness about impeachment. Watergate comes at a time when both "parties in the electorate" are in comparative disarray.[3] The increased volatility of American presidential voting since 1960 has paralleled a sharp increase in the proportion of voters identifying themselves as independents. Thus, the most important question about the electoral dimension of Watergate is whether it is likely to stop the American electorate's drift toward dealignment—whether it has sufficient power to mobilize this large pool of independents.

Professor McGeever's data are silent on the realigning potential of Watergate, since it is not clear to what extent the shrinking Nixon constituency bodes ill for the Republican party in general. It seems reasonable to suppose that the fit between the impeachment strategy of congressional Republicans and the distribution of public opinion on impeachment will bear on the party's ability to dissociate itself from Watergate. Likewise, a unified Democratic party must carefully politicize Watergate to benefit electorally. The fact that any list of the party's likely presidential nominees for 1976 must include Jackson, Kennedy, Mondale, and Wallace suggests how heterogeneous the Democrats have become and how difficult it will be for them to unify, either in the electorate or in the party organization, around any issue or candidate. No candidate is likely to satisfy all factions of the party, and defections could easily take the form of a third-party movement.

As McGeever's Table 5 shows, McGovern was not the sole beneficiary of the public's withdrawal of support from Nixon; McGovern failed to win a majority in the 1973 "election" even among the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-Yes" group. It is only when McGovern's support is pooled with that for "other" candidates in 1973 that Nixon's supporters are a minority in a choice between two alternatives (40 percent, as opposed to 60

[2] In all probability the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-No" group contains both cynics and cross-pressured Republicans. Since some Nixon voters are to be found in the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-Yes" group and some non-Nixon voters in the "Guilty-Yes/Remove-No" group, cross-pressures alone cannot account for the latter group's existence.

[3] For a recent summary of contemporary trends in American electoral behavior see James L. Sundquist, "Whither the American Party System?" *Political Science Quarterly*, 88 (December 1973), 559–581.

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percent for McGovern and "other" candidates). However, lumping McGovern support with "other" support probably overestimates the Democratic share of the two-party vote that would have come from McGeever's sample in 1973. Assuming that the "other" candidates are a diverse group of Democrats, it is by no means certain that running only one of these "others" against Nixon in a two-way race would yield a 60 to 40 percent Democratic victory. Even with the help of Watergate the Democrats are not likely to find a candidate who can encompass all the factions in the Democratic electorate.

Although these imponderables will weigh heavily in Watergate's future as an electoral issue, it is worth noting that Watergate itself—considered apart from economic malaise and the energy crisis—has none of the properties that realigning issues typically possess. The "social issue" and America's grim economic future are still more promising candidates to spark a realignment. Unlike these issues, Watergate is susceptible to solution in a peculiar sense. One reason why the "social issue" is a more recalcitrant problem than Watergate is that social cleavages are less subject than impeachment to congressional resolution. More important, Watergate is not an issue rooted in intense social, economic, or ideological conflict. The "social issue" of the late 1960s affected voters directly. Crime, bussing, and the draft were not abstract questions of political morality; they pressed upon the daily lives of voters in a way that Watergate does not. Although realignment is not simply an epiphenomenal manifestation of social and economic conflict, only conflicts of such scope and intensity will require parties to recognize and adapt themselves to emerging political struggles. Narrowly political issues like Watergate may temporarily hold the electorate's attention, but they do not provide the enduring basis for political conflict that is necessary to sustain an electoral alignment.

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France and the Vietnam Peace Settlement

MARIANNA P. SULLIVAN

In the wake of the 1973 cease-fire accord, France has attempted to chart a new course for its relations with its former colonial subjects in Vietnam. The parameters of French policy in Southeast Asia in the decade ahead have been fixed by recent events, in particular by French policy during the four-year negotiations held in Paris to end American participation in the Vietnam conflict. As these talks lingered on, the French maintained a public posture of impartiality befitting their role as hosts. A changing scenario in Vietnam complicated French attempts to placate all the parties to the talks so as to permit the possibility of French participation in the negotiating process and in the future of Vietnam. It was only after the settlement was concluded (with only minor French participation) that the French, liberated from the confines of their role as hosts, indicated the new thrust of their policy in Vietnam. France's choices for the future can only be understood in light of the evolution of its policy which took place between 1968 and 1973.

French Policy toward United States Involvement in Vietnam

Prior to 1968, France had been strongly critical of the involvement of the United States in Vietnam. This criticism reflected President Charles de

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Gaulle's intention to dissociate France from American policies with which he disapproved; a similar intent affected his attitude toward the 1967 Middle East war. In turn, these diplomatic positions paralleled French criticism of America's strategic conceptions which precipitated the French withdrawal from NATO in March 1966 and adoption in January 1968 of the strategic doctrine, *defense tous azimuts* (defense in all directions), by which French defenses were geared for an attack from the west as well as the east.[1] De Gaulle's criticism of United States policy in Southeast Asia culminated in a dramatic speech in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on September 1, 1966, in which he called for a unilateral American withdrawal from Vietnam.

After the Paris negotiations began in 1968, French criticism of United States policy in Vietnam was severely modified in line with a general improvement in French-American relations. A moderate rapprochement between France and the United States began in 1968 after the opening of the Paris negotiations on Vietnam and after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was accelerated as a result of new leadership in both countries—the accessions of Richard Nixon to the American presidency in January 1969 and of Georges Pompidou to the French presidency in June of that year.

The change in France's appraisal of American intentions in Vietnam resulted chiefly from the American decision to negotiate. General de Gaulle responded positively to President Johnson's announcement of a partial pause in American bombing of North Vietnam on Sunday, March 31, 1968. On Wednesday, April 3, before the North Vietnamese reaction to Mr. Johnson's announcement was known, de Gaulle congratulated the American president for "an act of reason and of political courage."[2] As of this time, official French criticism of United States policy in Southeast Asia decreased, and was never resumed with the same ferocity as before.

Thus the Vietnam war was no longer a contentious issue between France and the United States. De Gaulle told R. Sargent Shriver, when

[1] For an explanation of this doctrine see the article by the late French chief of staff General Charles Louis Ailleret, "Defense in All Directions," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, IV, no. 1 (Spring 1968), 17-25. For a discussion of France's diplomatic nonalignment see Raymond Aron, "From Independence to Neutrality," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, VI, no. 2 (Summer 1968), 267-269; and Edward A. Kolodziej, "France and the Atlantic Alliance: Alliance with a De-aligning Power," *Polity*, II, no. 3 (Spring 1970), 241-266.

[2] "Statement at the close of the Cabinet Meeting on April 3, 1968," *Chronology of the Major French Statements on Vietnam since August, 1963* (New York, French Embassy, Press and Information Service, No. 1155, 1968), p. 41. De Gaulle himself had no knowledge of the North Vietnamese reaction, according to *Le Monde*'s diplomatic correspondent Maurice Delarue.

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the latter presented his credentials as American ambassador on May 25, that differences between the two countries were "events of the moment" and that another war would find them "together again."[3] It is significant that de Gaulle made this statement three months before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

After Richard Nixon replaced Lyndon Johnson as United States president, relations between the American and French heads of state warmed considerably. The Johnson-de Gaulle relationship had been aggravated by de Gaulle's harsh public criticism of Johnson's Vietnam policy and Johnson's cold indifference to de Gaulle. On the other hand, de Gaulle's relations with Nixon seemed to be characterized by cordiality and mutual respect since, "with Nixon de Gaulle thought more things might be possible."[4] Shortly after his inauguration in 1969, the thirty-sixth United States president traveled to Europe stopping first and staying longest in Paris. It is probably no surprise that the two leaders got along well.

This high-level personal rapport deepened after Georges Pompidou became president of France in June 1969. The Nixon administration emphasized cooperation with America's European allies in the bilateral framework which France prefers. For instance, President Nixon conferred with European leaders individually before his trip to Peking in 1972; and, during his meeting with Pompidou in the Azores he announced the devaluation of the American dollar, a move the French had long been advocating. Thus, it is with some reason that, recently, French officials describe their relations with the United States as "normally good" and stress the absence of crises between the two countries.[5] This improved climate had some effect with regard to France's attitude toward United States involvement in Vietnam.

Furthermore, France's attitude shifted with the changed circumstances caused by American troop withdrawals and the ongoing peace negotiations. In an era of escalating American involvement in Vietnam, the French found much to criticize in American behavior. On the other hand, an entirely different response was called for by the situation from 1968 until 1973 when the United States was withdrawing its ground troops and participating in negotiations to end the conflict. French demands for a bombing pause and for American troop withdrawals became superfluous as the Nixon administration implemented these two policies. Moreover, the North Vietnamese offensive in the spring of 1972

[3] *New York Times*, May 26, 1968, p. 43.

[4] Interview with Rene de Saint Legier, Paris, July 5, 1972. M. the Marquis de Saint Legier de La Sausaye is director of the American Division at the French Foreign Ministry and was General de Gaulle's diplomatic counselor from 1964 to 1969.

[5] Ibid.

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clearly placed the remaining United States troops and those of the Saigon government on the defensive. The French sympathized with the American position in these circumstances.

A crucial element in France's more favorable assessment of United States policy in Vietnam after 1968 was the conviction that the United States truly intended to extricate itself from the war. Less than one month after his meeting with President Nixon early in 1969, President de Gaulle met with his ambassador to Peking, Etienne Manac'h, former director of the Asian Division at the French Foreign Ministry. De Gaulle told Manac'h to convey to the Chinese two points: first, that the Americans had firmly decided to withdraw from Vietnam and negotiate a peace settlement; and second, that President Nixon intended to seek an improvement in United States relations with China.[6] Manac'h conveyed these facts directly to Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai on several occasions and, presumably, played some role in convincing the Chinese of their veracity.

Pompidou shared de Gaulle's belief that President Nixon intended to end United States participation in the Vietnam conflict. During a visit to the Soviet Union in October 1970 he said, "President Nixon . . . has convinced me of his desire to withdraw from Vietnam and to end the war."[7] The public expression of such sentiments by the French president in a Soviet city in Asia impressed President Nixon who, according to former French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann, "spoke of it many times to me."[8]

France's belief that the United States planned to negotiate a settlement in Vietnam explains the mild French reaction to American actions which might have been viewed as escalatory, such as the Cambodian crisis in the spring of 1970. The French were alarmed when Lon Nol overthrew Prince Sihanouk and when, shortly afterward, United States and South Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in support of the new regime. First, the French were worried about their economic interests in Cambodia and, second, they were apprehensive about the widened war. Nevertheless, they refrained from any direct criticism of the United States. In September 1966 at Phnom Penh, General de Gaulle had ac-

[6] An account of de Gaulle's meeting with Manac'h is given by James Reston in the *New York Times*, August 1, 1971, p. 11E. Reston's version was confirmed by Ambassador Manac'h in an interview in Paris on July 27, 1972.

[7] *La France et le Vietnam: Recueil des Principales Declarations Françaises, Août 1963-Novembre 1971* (New York, French Embassy, Press and Information Service, 1972), p. 110.

[8] Interview with Maurice Schumann, Paris, July 6, 1973.

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cused the United States of "increasingly extensive escalation in Asia";[9] in May 1970, a terse French statement (which referred to the "principles" of the Phnom Penh address) merely regretted "that which aggravates, prolongs and widens the conflict."[10] There was no mention of who was responsible for these effects, nor was there any direct comment by the president of the French Republic. Pompidou himself did not refer publicly to the United States action until July 2, the day after American troops withdrew from Cambodia. At that time he made the following reference to his speech before the United States Congress on February 25, 1970:

> I cannot help repeating what, by the way, I have already said to the United States Congress, that is, that there will be prospects for peace in Indochina only when the United States has taken, by itself, and voluntarily, the firm resolution to evacuate Indochina.[11]

The discreet timing and mild tone of this admonition indicates the progress of French-American relations from the days when General de Gaulle was charging the United States with primary responsibility for the continuation of the Vietnam conflict. French policy no longer required the sharply critical attitude with which General de Gaulle had greeted previously escalatory moves by the United States in Indochina.

Similarly, French protests of American bombing raids over North Vietnam in 1972 were noticeably restrained. Although the French explain their reticence in terms of the discretion required of them as hosts to the peace talks, a more severe reaction might have been expected when the United States bombed targets in Hanoi itself. During one of these raids, the French diplomatic mission was damaged and the French delegate-general to North Vietnam was mortally wounded. While the French delivered a routine protest to the United States, they did not seize this occasion to object to American policy on humanitarian grounds. Such an objection need not have prejudiced the negotiations. However, it would have angered the United States and, clearly, the French were reluctant to do so. The evolution of France's attitude toward United States policy in Vietnam in the years 1968-1973 was the result of three factors: President Johnson's decision to halt the bombing in 1968; the high degree of personal rapport between Nixon and Pompidou; and

[9] "Speech by General de Gaulle in Phnom Penh, September 1, 1966," *Chronology of the Major French Statements*, p. 20.

[10] "Communique des Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (Intervention Americano/sud-vietnamienne au Cambodge) 1 Mai, 1970;" *La France et le Vietnam*, p. 93.

[11] Press conference, July 2, 1970 (New York, French Embassy, Press and Information Service, No. 1413, 1970), p. 13.

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the French conviction that the United States was committed to withdrawal from the conflict.

France and the Peace Negotiations

Host to the Peace Talks

The French also tempered their earlier criticism of American policy in Southeast Asia because they believed that, as hosts to the peace talks, they were required to act impartially. This meant, for example, balancing off comments favorable to one party with remarks favorable to the others. Military and political developments in Vietnam complicated the task of maintaining impartiality. Hence, French policy was not entirely acceptable to any of the four parties to the Paris talks. Conversely, each approved some elements of France's stance.

One example of impartiality was France's refusal to consider any change in the 1968 level of diplomatic representation each of the four parties maintained in Paris. Although the NLF/PRG (the National Liberation Front, or, after 1969, the Provisional Revolutionary Government) was permitted to open an information office in October 1968 in accord with previous negotiations, there were no other exceptions. Hanoi's permanent representative in Paris was a delegate-general (accredited to the French premier) and Saigon retained its consular representation. The United States was the only one of the four to have a permanent diplomatic mission at the ambassadorial level.

The French were less successful in their efforts to provide a neutral atmosphere for the talks by limiting demonstrations protesting the war. Public manifestations against United States policy had occurred frequently in Paris during the period of major American escalation in Vietnam and some American officials accepted the French capital as the site for the negotiations only with great reluctance. The opening of the peace talks coincided with the outbreak of a student-worker revolt in Paris and the French government had a double reason for frustrating public displays—reasserting its own authority domestically and providing a peaceful climate for the negotiations. Therefore, the French invoked an old regulation of October 1935 which prohibited street demonstrations that threatened the public order. The ban was defied in November 1969 and the police broke up a demonstration organized by several leftist groups, detaining 2651 people. From that time, demonstrations were "tolerated" although those that risked upsetting the public order were not "authorized."[12] The Interior Ministry, which normally would

[12] This is the explanation I received from the press section of the French Foreign Ministry in Paris. French officials were understandably reluctant to discuss this policy.

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have assumed a hard line with dissenters of any sort, took the more "liberal" position on demonstrations so as not to give political ammunition to the Communist party, the Gaullists' best-organized opposition.[13]

During the five-year negotiations, the French were largely successful in confining demonstrations and rallies to locations indoors or outside of Paris. However, occasional gatherings were noisy enough or close enough to the conference site to annoy United States officials who routinely protested them. As one American official who requested anonymity said: "Periodically, the United States needed to remind the French of their responsibility to remain impartial." The most important lapse in this regard occurred before the formal signing of the cease-fire accord on January 27, 1973. A group of noisy demonstrators, who were allowed very close to the entrance of the old Hotel Majestic, where the ceremonies were held, cheered the arrival of the North Vietnamese and PRG contingents and booed the American and Saigon delegations. The Paris police were quite capable of restricting access to the sidewalks in front of the hotel, as they had throughout the four-year meetings. However, they were reluctant to use repressive measures which might give the opposition parties an issue in the legislative elections to be held in March 1973. Both the American embassy and the Saigon consulate protested this incident.

American and South Vietnamese diplomats did not regard the French government's policy on demonstrations as the most convincing proof of its impartial stance. Since the demonstrations were directed against them, they would have preferred a complete prohibition. However, the French did not attempt a total ban because of the domestic political considerations mentioned above, and because a more restrictive policy would have incurred the resentment of Hanoi and the PRG. The French thus found it impossible to please all sides on this issue of demonstrations.

Similarly, the French tried to maintain impartiality in their public comments about the war. The Pompidou government also wished to retain its fidelity to the policy initiated by General de Gaulle. This was important for two reasons: first, domestically, Pompidou was dependent on the political support of the Gaullists; second, France's important role as host to the talks resulted from de Gaulle's Vietnam policy which had made Paris, capital of an American ally, acceptable to Hanoi and the NLF/PRG. It was difficult for Pompidou to deviate from de Gaulle's Vietnam policy without bringing charges from both the Gaullist majority and the opposition (who sympathized with Hanoi and the PRG) that he was not being faithful to the late French president. Nevertheless, the evolving situation in Indochina necessitated an adaptation of

[13] The leader of the French Communist party, George Marchais, occasionally chided Pompidou for not remaining faithful to de Gaulle's policy regarding Vietnam.

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French policy to new conditions, which the Pompidou government sought to do while avoiding a sharp departure from the Gaullist past.

Pompidou's emphasis on continuity between his Vietnam policy and that of de Gaulle necessarily tempered France's more positive attitude toward American policy after 1968. The French repeated their view that the United States bore the responsibility for ending the conflict and their belief that the settlement should be consistent with what they saw as the political realities in Vietnam and the requisites of its future independence. These French assessments did not always coincide with those of the United States. Thus, while their comments may have been less harsh than previously, the French did not abandon their well-known views about the war. In the words of Henri Froment-Meurice, chief of the French Foreign Ministry's Asian Division: "We didn't sacrifice our character, our personality, our interests."[14]

Private and public French support for a settlement more in line with the demands of Hanoi and the PRG than with those of the United States or Saigon, prompted mistrust of France among American and South Vietnamese diplomats. "The French think they are neutral," one American source told me, leaving no doubt that United States diplomats thought otherwise. When asked to describe the French role in the peace negotiations, another American official said it was "to encourage Hanoi to hold out for its demands."

Ultimately, the French advocated publicly a political solution in South Vietnam similar to that suggested by the PRG. In remarks before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly on May 18, 1972, Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann said:

> South Vietnam ought to have an independent government, which means one including representatives of the P.R.G., of the present team and of the independent and neutralist faction.[15]

Although this statement is consistent with the earlier Gaullist argument that South Vietnam must have a regime more representative of the political spectrum than the existing government, never before had the French so clearly identified themselves with the specific proposals of the PRG.

Subsequently, the French thought better of Schumann's statement which had evidently been made without specific clearance by the president's advisors and which, in the words of one knowledgeable French official, may have been "too precise." Both the United States and the

[14] Interview with Henri Froment-Meurice, Paris, July 4, 1973.

[15] Commission des Affaires Etrangeres, Assemblee Nationale, Seance du Jeudi, 18 Mai, 1972, Paris, p. 2.

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Saigon representatives in Paris believed that this statement indicated continued French partiality for the Hanoi/PRG position (the United States persisted in its belief that the PRG was not an entity separate from Hanoi). Also, sometime in the summer or fall of 1972, the decision was taken by Hanoi and the PRG to negotiate a settlement which would leave General Thieu in power. Thus, it would appear that French support for the coalition government idea had come too soon. Hence, in a press conference on September 21, 1972, President Pompidou declined to take a position on a three-part government and said, instead, that there were two South Vietnamese *governments* (Saigon and the PRG) and three South Vietnamese *sides* (these two plus the uncommitted or neutral side).[16]

French statements from 1968 to 1973 were not entirely pleasing to Hanoi and the PRG either. Six months before their espousal of the PRG's proposal for a coalition government in South Vietnam, the French supported President Thieu's claim that South Vietnam is an independent state by referring to the "four states of Indochina." President Pompidou first used this phrase on October 25, 1971, in remarks at a dinner in Paris honoring visiting Soviet Party Chairman Brezhnev. References to the four states of Indochina contrast with previous French statements which only named three and which upheld the Geneva principle of Vietnamese unity. This French formulation is different from the Hanoi and PRG position which insists on the country's essential unity. While not inconsistent with earlier French statements, which regarded the problem of South Vietnam's government as distinct from the question of reunification,[17] it is an explicit avowal of the legitimacy of an independent South Vietnam. If this represented France's educated guess that a peace settlement would preserve this independence, the 1973 accord proved this view to be correct.

The French clearly recognized both American reluctance to abandon its Saigon allies and the latter's strength as long as they remained in power. As of 1974 the regime which began under the leadership of Ky and Thieu in 1965 has equaled the life span of the longest government in the short history of the Republic of Vietnam, that of President Diem who held power from 1954 until 1963. Recent French statements acknowledge this staying power.

Nevertheless, the French analysis of the Indochinese situation as illustrated in French statements and actions from 1968 to 1973 corre-

[16] "Excerpts on Foreign Policy from the Press Conference by Georges Pompidou, President of the French Republic at the Elysée Palace, September 21, 1972" (New York, French Embassy, Press and Information Service, No. 72/148), p. 7.

[17] See, for example, de Gaulle's letter to Ho Chi Minh of February 8, 1966.

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sponded precisely to neither the American nor any of the three Vietnamese views. The French tried to respond to the events that occurred during this period in a manner least offensive to all concerned. The fact that each of the four parties to the Paris talks subjected France to criticism at one time or another indicates the government's success in maintaining an impartial stance.

French Diplomatic Maneuvers

As hosts to the negotiations, the French provided conference facilities and security for the public and some of the private meetings, and offered what one French official described as good offices *sur le plan pratique*.[18] They executed all the necessary arrangements with strict impartiality and complete discretion, to the satisfaction of all the delegations. They were particularly proud that there were no leaks regarding the secret meetings between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho during the two-and-one-half years (from August 1969 until January 1972) that they were held. French discretion in this matter was possible because the arrangements were made at the highest level and involved only a few individuals including Jean Sainteny, former French delegate general to Hanoi; Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, then an aide to President Pompidou; former Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann; and Pompidou himself.[19]

France's political role was not unimportant. Etienne Manac'h, presently France's ambassador to Peking and, from 1960 to 1969 director of Asian affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, was an active participant in the maneuvers both before the Paris talks began in 1968 and during the first eleven months of deliberations. Ambassador Manac'h's understanding of the Vietnam situation and his ability to be useful were enhanced by his participation (as an aide to former Socialist Premier Guy Mollet) in contacts between General de Gaulle and the Algerian National Liberation Front prior to the settlement of the Algerian war in 1962. His views on Indochina paralleled those of General de Gaulle, to whom he had direct access while he was at the Foreign Ministry. His role in the preconference maneuvers consisted of frequent meetings with Mai Van

[18] Interview with Michel Rouganou, deputy director, Press Office, Bureau de la Presidence de la Republique, Paris, June 22, 1972.

[19] The process by which initial secret contact between Americans and North Vietnamese was arranged by Jean Sainteny, a private French citizen, is described below. One month after the first meeting in August 1969, Kissinger met French Foreign Minister Schumann in New York and requested the cooperation of the French government in the logistical arrangements surrounding future meetings. Former Foreign Minister Schumann described this, his first meeting with Kissinger (and with President Nixon), in an interview in Paris on July 6, 1973.

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Bo, chief of North Vietnam's general delegation in France from 1961 to 1970 and Hanoi's highest-ranking diplomat permanently stationed in the West. Many would-be peace feelers between Hanoi and Washington were transmitted through Mai. Manac'h's regular contacts with Mai and with John Dean of the American Embassy (now American ambassador to Cambodia) enabled him to help move the two sides toward the conference table.[20]

Manac'h acted on his own initiative and he and de Gaulle understood that he was at no time to assume the post of mediator on behalf of the French government. De Gaulle realized that the parties could talk directly to each other if they were willing to settle and, in his words, "if they don't want to settle, why should we get involved?"[21]

Jean Sainteny, who had served as French commissioner for Tonkin and North Annam from 1945 to 1947 and as French delegate-general to North Vietnam from 1954 to 1958, also played an important role. Sainteny had personally negotiated with Ho Chi Minh the agreement signed on March 6, 1946, which permitted the French to return to the northern section of Vietnam, controlled by the Vietminh. In June 1966 Sainteny, then a private citizen, returned to Southeast Asia to complete arrangements for de Gaulle's visit later that summer. As was his custom whenever he visited Vietnam, Sainteny met at length with his old friend Ho Chi Minh. He came away convinced of North Vietnam's firm determination to resist United States intervention.

Several weeks after seeing Ho, Sainteny met for the first time with Richard Nixon, then a private citizen who was traveling in Europe; Sainteny conveyed to Nixon his impressions after his meetings with Ho. His acquaintance with the future American president, and his longer friendship with Henry Kissinger, who became Nixon's chief foreign policy advisor,[22] plus his relationship with Ho Chi Minh placed Sainteny in a unique position when the Nixon administration assumed power.

In July 1969 Sainteny met with Nixon and Kissinger in Washington and helped draft a letter which Nixon asked him to deliver personally to Ho Chi Minh. However, the North Vietnamese denied him permission to visit Hanoi and he passed the letter to their general delegation in Paris. Sainteny theorizes that he was not allowed to visit North Vietnam because he would have detected Ho's failing health; the North

[20] Accounts of Mai Van Bo's involvement in peace feelers appar in David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory, *The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam* (New York, 1968).

[21] Quoted by Jean Sainteny, Paris, August 23, 1972.

[22] Sainteny met Dr. Kissinger several years ago when Madame Sainteny was a summer student at Harvard.

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Vietnamese leader died shortly afterward, on September 3, 1969. Sainteny believes that Ho's death profoundly affected Hanoi's policy.

A second commission which Nixon and Kissinger gave to Sainteny was to arrange a secret contact between Kissinger and the North Vietnamese. Sainteny set up the first meeting in the series of private talks at his Paris home. He emphasizes that his role was merely to bring the two sides together after which, in his words, "I showed them where the whiskey was and then withdrew."[23] Sainteny's frequent meetings with his Vietnamese and American friends provided him with the opportunity to assure each of the other's credibility; however, he purposely stayed out of the negotiations. The significance of his participation was in arranging the initial private contact which ultimately led to an agreement.

Officially, French diplomats such as former Foreign Affairs Minister Maurice Schumann and Manac'h's successor as director of the Asian Division, Henri Froment-Meurice, operated somewhere on the periphery of the negotiating process. They held frequent conversations with all the parties and conveyed their informed observations about the situation without advancing any specific proposals.

The French had more frequent contacts with members of the Hanoi and PRG missions to the talks than with either the Saigon or the American delegations.[24] The American delegation kept itself at a distance from the French and insisted that the latter deal with regular embassy personnel. Nevertheless, Pompidou's rapport with Nixon led to important though irregular contact between Kissinger and French officials at both the French Foreign Ministry and the president's Elysée office. The Saigon government considered French policy inimical to its interests and thus was less eager to confer with the French. This did not affect France's role because the South Vietnamese, by their own admission, were not always knowledgeable about what was happening in the negotiations.[25]

The particulars of the negotiating process, especially the private talks between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, are not known. It is, therefore, impossible to estimate precisely the degree of French participation. The French admit that they were not always kept informed of the progress of the private negotiations. However, they apparently presented to each side their interpretation of the general bases for settlement and the

[23] Interview with Jean Sainteny, Paris, June 26, 1972.

[24] One American official spoke scornfully of Madame Binh's practice of rushing to the French Foreign Ministry whenever anything disturbed her.

[25] Interview with Nguyen Trieu Dan, spokesman for the Saigon delegation to the peace talks, Paris, July 5, 1973.

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particular points to which the opposite party might agree. To a very limited extent, this may have involved playing the advocate of one side before the other. The French, however, emphasize that they were not "the fifth party to the negotiations."[26]

In the final days before a preliminary accord was reached in the fall of 1972, Foreign Minister Schumann conducted conversations with all concerned. He specifically denies having played the role of mediator or messenger; rather, in his words, he was merely "present at the creation" of the preliminary accord. Schumann believes that he was able to speak with some authority to both sides. The North Vietnamese knew him to be sympathetic to their cause; in May 1972 Schumann had espoused the three-part government solution proposed by the PRG for South Vietnam. The Americans were somewhat receptive to his views, Schumann believes, because President Pompidou's public statements of faith in President Nixon's intention to withdraw from Vietnam had won for Pompidou "a credit with Nixon."[27]

The crucial meetings in which Schumann participated occurred in September and October 1972. In Washington, he met with Henry Kissinger on September 22, and then with both Kissinger and President Nixon on September 29. On his return to Paris, Schumann met secretly on October 6 with Le Duc Tho and Vo Van Sung (Hanoi's delegate-general in France). On October 8, according to Dr. Kissinger's public statements, the breakthrough occurred. Schumann believes that his conversations with the parties at the moment when their positions thawed were useful. For example, Schumann argued against continued United States bombing of North Vietnam, telling Nixon and Kissinger that, if he were North Vietnamese, he would more likely reach an accord during a bombing pause than while the bombing continued. In his words, "the Vietnamese are a proud and courageous people who would not want it to be said that they were afraid to die. They are not afraid to die."[28] Nixon responded that he could not risk a total bombing pause at the time of the United States presidential election but that if the other side showed signs of good will he might halt the bombing by stages as agreement progressed. Subsequently, Le Duc Tho indicated to Schumann that the North Vietnamese would be receptive to a phased cessation of the bombing.

Because he felt privy to the final negotiations, Schumann says, he and Pompidou refrained from public comment on the events of October 1972

[26] Interview with Henri Froment-Meurice, op. cit.

[27] The preceding and succeeding description of Schumann's role is based on an interview with him in Paris on July 6, 1973.

[28] Ibid.

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through January 1973 when the discussions broke down and the United States engaged in intensive bombing of North Vietnam. Schumann explains that the French did not wish to jeopardize a delicate situation which they believed would ultimately result in agreement. Nevertheless, President Pompidou did express his personal regrets about the resumed bombing in a secret letter to President Nixon a few days after Christmas 1972.

In the final analysis, this role of interlocutor for the parties to the peace conference seems to have fulfilled French expectations. The discretion with which they acted throughout the five years of the conference reflected their realization of the limitations under which they operated. Some American officials remained unconvinced of a change in France's position despite Pompidou's sympathetic view of United States policy in Asia; Saigon's diplomats shared this scepticism. The French were necessarily prudent with all three Vietnamese delegations lest they be charged with neocolonialism. Finally, the French were unable to be effective (and therefore reluctant to act) in the absence of a willingness of all the parties to reach an accord.

Future French Diplomatic Policy in Vietnam

Relations between Paris and Saigon

The late French president, Charles de Gaulle, often referred to France's desire to extend economic cooperation to the former states of French Indochina during the postwar period. In a telegram to the leaders of North Vietnam offering condolences on the death of Ho Chi Minh, de Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, explicitly promised that France would participate in the reconstruction of North Vietnam.[29] French economic aid and technical assistance to South Vietnam was also to be expected in view of the considerable French business interests there.

Shortly after the peace agreement was signed, the French began their postwar dealings with Vietnam by announcing their decision to send ambassadors to Hanoi and Saigon. The French took this action despite the fact that the break in relations between France and South Vietnam was originated by Saigon. Thus, it represented an overture to the Thieu regime. Significantly, the PRG's status remained unchanged.

Hanoi and the PRG understandably were displeased with France's action. In their view, a prudent French policy would be to insist upon fulfillment of the terms of the 1973 accord dealing with the establishment of a new government in South Vietnam, rather than to lend recognition to one of the two contending regimes. The North Vietnamese

[29] *Le Monde*, September 20, 1969.

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twice previously have had cause to reproach the French for not living up to their international commitments. Although the French are not committed to the 1973 agreements as directly as they were to those concluded in 1946 or 1954, nor are they as capable of influencing the situation, they might have chosen to await future events before renaming an ambassador to Saigon. Instead, the French have given the Saigon regime the right to declare that the PRG "is nothing to France but a group representing a political view . . . (with) no official status."[30]

The French argue that they recognize states, not regimes. Moreover, they seem to have concluded that the Paris accords left the Saigon government in power until such time as elections are held. This argument is unacceptable to the North Vietnamese on two counts: first, they reject the notion that there are two Vietnamese states and, second, they believe that the 1973 accord recognizes the existence of two governments in South Vietnam. In the latter sense, especially, both the PRG and Hanoi feel that France's action prejudges their case.

Nevertheless, the pressures on France to adopt such a course were persuasive. France and South Vietnam are potentially important trading partners. The figures (in million of francs) for 1972, 1968, and 1960 are as follows:[31]

	1960	1968	1972
French exports to South Vietnam	223	90	166
French imports from South Vietnam	170	35	30

The sharp decrease after 1960 was a result of the war which inhibited the operation of South Vietnam's rubber plantations, and of the restrictions on trade with France set by the Saigon government in 1964 which were lifted in 1969, resulting in a slight increase of South Vietnamese purchases of French goods. Continued fighting has kept the volume of South Vietnamese sales to France low. Also, French sales to Saigon have fallen off as a result of the role of the United States as key supplier to South Vietnam.

Nevertheless, French economic interests in South Vietnam remain important. In 1972, France ranked fifth as a supplier of South Vietnam and second as a destination for exported Vietnamese goods. France received 25 percent of South Vietnam's total sales abroad (35 percent went to Japan, which replaced France as South Vietnam's number one supplier in 1972). French sales to South Vietnam represent 5.6 percent of the lat-

[30] Interview with Nguyen Trieu Dan, op. cit.

[31] French Foreign Ministry, Economic Section; and, Centre National du Commerce Exterieur, a quasi-governmental organization based in Paris.

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ter's foreign purchases (after 46 percent from the United States, 19 percent from Singapore, 18 percent from Japan, and 6 percent from Formosa).[32]

Private French investments are very important in the South Vietnamese economy. French companies have a near-monopoly in terms of ownership of private enterprise. Neither the Vietnamese themselves nor other foreigners own a considerable portion of the Vietnamese economy. There is almost no private American investment. Most important among French-owned enterprises are the rubber plantations which yield South Vietnam's main product. Eight societies owned by French interests account for 90 percent of all the rubber production in South Vietnam and 95 percent of all its rubber exports. Assuming the war situation would permit these to return to full operation and assuming they escape nationalization, exports to France in this area would rise, as would France's importance in the Vietnamese economy. The future of these plantations is uncertain since some are in areas controlled by the PRG. The French also own coffee and tea plantations in South Vietnam.

In the industrial sector, the French have substantial holdings in the production of tobacco, matches, beverages, shoes, soft drinks, liquid gas, tires, building materials, automobiles, public works, and pharmaceuticals. Financially, the French are also important; three French banks (two subsidiaries of the Banque d'Indochine and the Banque Nationale de Paris) account for 17 percent of all financial activity and retain 19 percent of the deposits. In transportation, Air France and UTA (Union des Transports Aerienne) handle almost all the air traffic between Vietnam and Europe and an important part of that between Saigon and other Asian cities. Moreover, French shipping nearly monopolizes Saigon-Europe traffic and, interestingly, handles 35 percent of the traffic between the United States and Saigon.[33]

It is remarkable that French economic interests persist in South Vietnam nineteen years after the Geneva accords ended France's colonial domination there and despite massive American involvement in the country's affairs. It remains to be seen whether the French can retain this important place in South Vietnam's economic life in the years ahead. However, there are several reasons to believe that this might be so. It might seem desirable from South Vietnam's viewpoint to maintain commercial and financial links with France in order to diversify its foreign investors and customers. The French argue that past ties, including habits of buying French goods of a certain quality, might induce the Saigon gov-

[32] Interview with Jacques Mer, a French Foreign Ministry official occupied with France's economic relations with Indochina, in Paris, July 9, 1973.

[33] Ibid.

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ernment to favor sustained or increased dealings with France.[34] This reaction, in turn, may be dependent on measures taken by the French government to encourage increased trade with Saigon. The extension of substantial economic aid consisting of long-term loans at low interest rates to finance reconstruction of the country and of balance-of-payments aid in the form of grants to offset the purchase of French goods are indispensable to the increase in economic dealings between the two countries. Also, private interests might be willing to increase their activity in South Vietnam if the French government would in some way insure these investments.

In June 1973, the French dispatched to Vietnam an exploratory mission headed by Gaullist legislator François Missoffe to report on future economic cooperation between France and South Vietnam.[35] Based on his report, the two governments signed an agreement on December 6, 1973, whereby France would supply 100 million francs in economic assistance to South Vietnam. The French envision a major effort to increase their trade with Asia in the next decade and Vietnam is the focal point. President Pompidou's trip to China in September 1973 was also important in this regard.

The considerations affecting France's decisions in this area are not strictly economic. There are two key noneconomic elements regarding foreign investment: the host government's stability and its attitude toward private enterprise. Foreign investors are attracted by stable political conditions in which the threat of government expropriation is minimal. If the Saigon regime remains stable and continues its capitalist orientation, it might provide a suitable partner for French business interests. On the other hand, if it is replaced by a less stable coalition government or one which is more revolutionary in ideology than the present regime, conditions would be less hospitable to private investment from France or anywhere else.

Thus, French business interests would seem to have most to gain from a policy in support of the present Saigon regime. These business interests do not determine France's foreign policy, but they are an influence in French politics. "While one cannot yet speak of a lobby," a French official told me, "there are strong pressures from interests in France who wish to resume and replenish French commerce with Indochina." Some of the companies with interests in Vietnam, such as Michelin, are very

[34] Ibid. Also, interview with Madame M. Parent, an official at the Direction des Relations Economiques Exterieurs of the French Finance Ministry, July 1973.

[35] M. Missoffe has had varied experience in Asia. As a young lieutenant in 1945, he was attached to the China-based mission directed by Jean Sainteny whose aim was to restore French authority to Indochina as quickly as possible. Later, he served as France's ambassador to Japan from 1964 to 1966.

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powerful. Furthermore, there is that intangible but important network of ties between government and business which is always a crucial factor in French political life. The father of the present finance minister, Valery Giscard d'Estaing is a director of one of the large companies with interests in Vietnam. The late father of the Foreign Ministry's expert on Asian economic affairs, M. Tessier du Cros, served on the board of another. (M. Tessier du Cros accompanied M. Missoffe to Vietnam in June 1973.) Hence, the potential influence of the business community on France's policy toward Vietnam is not negligible.

The prognosis for the success of France's future efforts to enhance its economic dealings with South Vietnam depends not only on the attitude of the Saigon government but also on the evolution of relations between Saigon and the United States. South Vietnam will require substantial American economic assistance in the future and this will result in continued American influence on the Saigon government and the South Vietnamese economy. Thus, the United States will be in a position to affect indirectly France's fortunes in South Vietnam. In the future, France and the United States may be placed in reinforcing roles in Southeast Asia.

Of ultimate importance to France's future policy in Vietnam is the development of the military-political situation. If cease-fire violations continue or if large-scale fighting breaks out, it is foolish to speak of economic progress. Even if there is only a persistence of guerrilla attacks which impair the activities of the Saigon government to any degree, foreign investors will be discouraged. For all these reasons, the future of economic relations between France and South Vietnam remains very uncertain.

Relations between Paris and Hanoi

The prospects for increased economic contacts between France and North Vietnam differ radically from the South Vietnamese picture. After the French defeat in 1954, the North Vietnamese confiscated all of the considerable industrial interests in French hands and trade between the two countries shrunk. In the last few years, due partly to the wartime conditions in North Vietnam, its trade with France totaled only about one-half million dollars annually. The commercial agreements which the two countries had signed every year since 1955 were not renewed in 1971 but were replaced by a vague agreement which does not itemize preferential products or mention specific arrangements to encourage commercial exchanges. Several proposed French projects of technical assistance to North Vietnam also fell through because the financial terms were

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not favorable enough to the North Vietnamese. The future of trade between France and North Vietnam depends heavily on French aid, particularly in the area of payments, since the North Vietnamese are not in a position to finance imports of French products.

The French have taken the first step in this regard; on December 22, 1973, a Franco-North Vietnamese accord was signed which provided for French aid totaling 100 million francs, an amount identical to that awarded South Vietnam. Nevertheless, the prospects for increased future trade between France and North Vietnam are unclear. North Vietnam is a socialist country whose trade relations are determined through negotiations between governments rather than through the operation of private business interests in response to governmental stimulus. Thus, the decisions regarding future trade between Hanoi and Paris are more manifestly political in nature than is the case with South Vietnam.

The French have probably concluded that the future of their enterprise in areas controlled by the PRG is most uncertain. Their reluctance to upgrade the PRG's diplomatic representation in Paris represents their view of the realities at present. Aside from humanitarian aid, it is improbable that the French will channel any substantial aid through the PRG, whom they have not recognized as a government.

The French profess a desire to contribute to the reconstruction of the two halves of Vietnam "on an equal footing north and south," according to the chief of the French Foreign Ministry's Asian Division. However, he added, "what private French interests choose to do is another matter."[36] The latter will most likely seek to improve relations with South Vietnam. Nevertheless, the French government's decision to aid both parts of Vietnam equally is an attempt to maximize its opportunities in Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

France's relations with the United States, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam during and immediately after the Paris peace negotiations underwent significant modifications. In particular, the French became more sympathetic to American policy in Vietnam after 1968. This new sympathy was related to a general improvement of French-American relations and to de-escalatory moves by the United States in Vietnam. President Johnson's decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam and begin negotiations and the later personal rapport between President Nixon and both General de Gaulle and President Pompidou fostered the belief

[36] Interview with M. Henri Froment-Meurice, op. cit.

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among France's leaders that the United States truly intended to end its participation in the Vietnam war. France's attitude toward United States involvement in Vietnam was tempered by this conviction.[37]

Furthermore, France's position as host to the five-year peace negotiations imposed restrictions on French policy. After 1968, de Gaulle and Pompidou refrained from public positions which might alienate any of the four delegations to the talks. Their response to events in Indochina was more muted than earlier French comments and displayed a high degree of flexibility. The French were ultimately successful in maintaining a fairly balanced position and their conversations with all the parties involved them in the negotiating process.

Since the Vietnam peace settlement, France has moved quickly to chart a future course in Vietnam; extending full diplomatic representation to North and South Vietnam was the first step. Initial French actions in this regard were characterized by the same spirit of neutrality which was adopted during the peace negotiations. Thus, in late 1973, France extended economic aid in equal amounts to North and South Vietnam. In view of the unresolved military and political situation in Vietnam, the French desire to keep open future options is understandable. Furthermore, this flexible policy is the approach most likely to increase France's political and economic influence in Southeast Asia.

[37] For an account of France's hostile attitude toward United States involvement in Vietnam during the mid-1960s see, M. P. Sullivan, "French Policy toward the Second Indochina War," in Gene T. Hsiao (ed.), *The Role of External Powers in the Indochina Crisis* (Edwardsville, Ill., 1973).

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1972 Democratic Convention Reforms and Party Democracy

JUDITH A. CENTER

> The Democratic National Convention of 1968 already has settled into the folklore of American politics. Its mere mention evokes the vision of tumultuous floor debate, bloodshed and tear gas in the streets, demonstrators and delegates standing together, arm-in-arm, in confrontation with the police. To some it also evokes the image of rigged procedures, of a political party assembled to reach predetermined decisions. The convention became the shame of the Democratic Party, and in all likelihood assured its defeat in the November following. Wherever politicians meet—wherever Americans meet—they agree that the Convention imposed such a strain on the democratic system of government that a repetition would be intolerable.[1]

This description and warning appeared in a January 1970 *Harper's Magazine* article by Senator George McGovern. Entitled "The Lessons of 1968," the essay was both a comprehensive indictment of the rules governing delegate selection and convention procedure in the Democratic party in 1968, and a brief catalogue of the reforms initiated by the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (popularly known as the "McGovern Commission"). At the center of McGovern's argument was the explicit assumption that the reforms which would so profoundly transform the party in the next few years had been prompted—even necessi-

[1] George McGovern, "The Lessons of 1968," *Harper's Magazine*, January 1970, pp. 43–47. All McGovern quotes used in this article are taken from this source.

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tated—by the dissent, the fratricidal violence, the bitter disharmony that was Chicago 1968. This idea was echoed in *Mandate for Reform*, the official report of the McGovern Commission, which declared that "the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago exposed profound flaws in the presidential nominating process; but in doing so it gave our party an excellent opportunity to reform its ways and to prepare for the problems of a new decade."[2]

And the party did indeed reform its ways between 1968 and 1972. We can take the reformers at their word that the events of the 1968 convention stimulated their efforts; but this does not mean that we must accept the belief, expressed in a September 10, 1970, *New York Times* editorial, that the McGovern Commission "grew out of the debacle of Chicago."[3] Was Chicago really a debacle? We can ask this question not simply for purposes of iconoclasm, but rather as a point of departure to examine the philosophy, motivations, goals, and the immediate and long-term consequences of the Democratic party reform movement.

The 1968 Democratic National Convention nominated a candidate who very nearly won the presidency in November. Since the *raison d'être* of American political parties has always been the election of its candidates to public office, and the traditional function of national party conventions has been the selection of candidates most likely to win office, then the 1968 convention cannot be considered an abysmal failure in this regard. The reformers, however, declined to judge the party's experience in 1968 in terms of the usual criteria of political success and failure, for they held radically different ideas about what ought to be the nature, purposes, and operating principles of a political party. This study examines the meaning and implications of post-1968 Democratic party reform from the perspectives of these differing conceptions of American politics and party democracy.

The Strange Case of 1968

Certainly the demographic composition of the 1968 Democratic National Convention appeared to reinforce the traditional image of national convention delegates as a convocation of middle-aged, white, upper-income males. *Mandate for Reform* noted that at the 1968 convention, sixteen state delegations contained no voting members under the age of thirty, and thirteen others had only one delegate each from that age group. Eight

[2] The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committee, A Report of the Commission, *Mandate for Reform* (Washington, D. C., April 1970), p. 9.

[3] Editorial, *New York Times*, September 10, 1970, p. 30.

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states claimed an average delegate age of over fifty years. According to the commission report, only 5.5 percent of the 1968 delegates were black (although figures from the *Joint Center for Political Studies Guide to Black Politics '72* indicate that blacks numbered 209 out of 3084, or about 6.7 percent of the total convention delegates).[4] Median delegate income was over $15,000, and only 13 percent of the voting delegates were women.

Such a cursory appraisal of demographic data can easily yield up an unsavory specter of cigar-smoking Elks Clubbers (epitomized forever in the minds of most reformers—and most television reviewers—by Mayor Daley and his Illinois chorus) gathered in Chicago in the name of conviviality, self-interest, and political expediency. But these statistics deserve closer examination; indeed, they are particularly uninformative when pulled out of the general context of pre-1968 Democratic party reform, or divorced from the actual events and issues of the 1968 convention.

Consider, for example, one of the several demographic categories that the reformers have deemed "critical." It is easy to overlook, from within the crucible of debate over current reform, the very significant progress the Democratic party achieved in securing greater black participation and representation within its ranks by the end of the 1960s. The 1952 convention was only 1.5 percent black, and by 1964 that percentage had not substantially increased: at Atlantic City blacks held only 2.2 percent of the full delegate positions, and seven southern and border states had no black delegates at all.

The dramatic and conscience-pricking challenge of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party, however, stirred the 1964 convention to append an antidiscrimination requirement to the call for the 1968 convention, demanding that each state party "assure that voters in the state, regardless of race, color, creed or national origin, will have the opportunity to participate fully in Party affairs."[5] This commitment to equal opportunity was more than mere rhetoric or campaign atmospherics. In January 1965 the Democratic National Committee (DNC) created the Special Equal Rights Subcommittee in order to implement the 1964 convention's directive.

After receiving testimony and considering a number of proposals for increasing black delegate representation, the subcommittee (chaired by New Jersey Governor Richard Hughes) issued some vigorous directives to the state parties. Violation of the 1964 convention's equal opportunity

[4] Joint Center for Political Studies, *Joint Center for Political Studies Guide to Black Politics '72. Part I: The Democratic National Convention* (Washington, D. C., 1972), p. 73.

[5] *Congressional Quarterly*, Weekly Report, XXVI, no. 23 (June 8, 1968), 1343.

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mandate in the 1968 delegate selection process of the Democratic party of any state, warned Hughes, would prompt his subcommittee to "recommend that the Credentials Committee declare the seats to be vacant and fill those seats with a delegation broadly representative of the Democrats of that State."[6] Hughes also distributed among the state organizations a list of six general principles to guide their efforts in eliminating discrimination in their party affairs. The DNC gave some authority to the Hughes guidelines by adopting them as a policy statement and including them in the official 1968 Convention Call.

Brooding upon the lessons of the 1968 Democratic convention, Senator McGovern noted correctly that "this Convention was governed essentially by the same rules which nominated Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy." Which is to say, there were very few rules, at least rules formulated by the national party and binding upon the various state organizations. The delegate selection process in the Democratic party, particularly since the institution of the first primary in 1904, has been extremely complex and recondite. Most states selected all or part of their delegations at state conventions; others chose their representatives by party committees; while at least two states allowed their governors to name their delegates. Still other states directly elected their delegations in primaries. And in 1968 there was a profusion of traditional state party practices, usually couched in state law (which *Mandate for Reform* would later dryly christen "procedural irregularities"), such as the unit rule, proxy voting, and arbitrary quorum requirements.

Pre-1968 reform had not appreciably disturbed the idiosyncratic, labyrinthian character of the delegate selection institutions and processes of the Democratic party; the party remained essentially a confederation of more-or-less distinctive and autonomous state parties. The Hughes subcommittee guidelines were designed to correct discriminatory abuses, and state parties needed only to take measures to promote equal opportunity for participation within their existing delegate selection frameworks, or to be prepared to lose their convention seats.

The credentials of fifteen state delegations were in fact challenged, in whole or in part, at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. The antidiscrimination provision of the 1968 Convention Call requiring the "opportunity to participate fully in party affairs," provided a major basis for two kinds of challenges: southern delegation disputes squarely raised the issue of black participation and representation in the party systems of those states; and a number of McCarthy supporters argued for proportional delegate representation on several northern delegations, challenging certain methods of allocating delegate votes within the states and ways of selecting delegates at the state and local levels.

[6] Ibid.

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Although the convention seated the challenged delegations in all but the Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama cases, the northern challengers nevertheless secured a significant advantage from the proceedings, for the convention eventually adopted a Credentials Committee resolution that the 1972 Convention Call instruct state parties to guarantee that all Democrats in their states have a "meaningful and timely opportunity" to participate in the delegate selection for the 1972 convention. The majority report concluded that "the deliberation of this Committee suggests that we can and should encourage appropriate revisions in the delegate selection process to assure the fullest possible participation and to make the Democratic Party completely representative of grass-roots sentiment."[7] Furthermore, the committee recommended the creation of a special committee under the aegis of the DNC to study state systems and suggest changes in them to the 1972 convention.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Rules and Order of Business was also grappling with the issue of reform. The full Rules Committee accepted a subcommittee's recommendation not to enforce the unit rule at the 1968 convention, but rejected two other subcommittee proposals to prohibit the use of the unit rule at all levels of the Democratic party in 1972, and to guarantee that all national convention delegates would be selected within the convention calendar year.

A covey of Rules Committee liberals, however, submitted a minority report to the convention, which adopted it by a narrow roll-call vote of 1350 to 1206. The resolution specified that the 1972 Convention Call declare that:

> It is understood that a State Democratic Party, in selecting and certifying delegates to the National Convention, thereby undertakes a process in which all Democratic voters have had full and timely opportunity to participate. In determining whether a State Party has complied with this mandate, the Convention shall require that:
>
> 1) The unit rule not be used in any stage of the delegate selection process; and
>
> 2) All feasible efforts have been made to assure that delegates are selected through Party primary, convention, or committee procedures open to public participation within the calendar year of the National Convention.[8]

This, then, was the "mandate for reform"—the only one of the many mandates and resolutions adopted since 1964 which explicitly required certain changes in delegate selection practices and procedures. The adoption of the minority report of the Rules Committee formalized the shift of emphasis that had profoundly transformed the nature and purposes of the Democratic party reform movement.

[7] *Mandate for Reform*, p. 52.
[8] Ibid., p. 53.

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Increasingly, in the years between the 1964 and 1968 conventions, the attention of party reformers turned from the issue of racial discrimination toward the more general subject of the procedural and structural aspects of delegate selection. The nuances of phraseology reflect this change. For example, the 1968 Convention Call demanded that all Democrats "have the opportunity to participate fully in Party affairs," but the 1972 Convention Call required that each state party establish "*a process* in which all Democratic voters have had a full and timely opportunity to participate." The Richard Hughes special subcommittee's guidelines designed to end discrimination and achieve "broadly representative" delegations were followed by the 1968 Convention Credentials Committee's appeal for measures "to assure the fullest possible participation," which was, in turn, almost immediately succeeded by the minority report of the Rules Committee's outright abolition of the unit rule and mandate for more extensive reform of delegate selection systems. There was a shift in conception and policy from a negative to a positive emphasis. Just as desegregation and integration are two fundamentally different ideas, so it is one thing to mandate or legislate the absence of restraint, to open up a system to the free flow of people, but quite another to change that system so as to secure, or at least greatly facilitate the participation of those previously excluded.

But it was obvious that most of the liberal, antiwar, McCarthy-supporting reformers ultimately were concerned not about people, but rather about ideas and issues. The matter of the protection of the political rights of racial minorities had dissolved into the consideration of candidate and issue minorities. McGovern said it himself: "The issue which brought the convention to the edge of chaos . . . was not race but Vietnam." The reformers desired more blacks, more Chicanos, and more Puerto Ricans at the next national convention. But more important, they wanted more antiwar delegations, more antiwar candidates, more antiwar planks and resolutions—and more antiparty-establishment delegates.

Many McCarthy, McGovern, and Kennedy delegates seemed hell-bent on viewing the turmoil of the Chicago convention as the inevitable consequence of rigged preconvention and convention procedures. The Harold Hughes Commission, an ad hoc study group of prestigious liberals assembled by the then-governor of Iowa, urged on reform by citing "widespread cynicism about the capacity of the parties, especially the Democratic Party, to accommodate the aspirations of emergent social forces."[9] McGovern concluded that "the Convention imposed such a strain on the democratic system of government that a repetition would be intolerable." The McCarthyites and their antiwar brethren seemed to have assumed

[9] *The Presidential Nominating Conventions* (Washington, D. C., 1968), p. 195.

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that they were the only legitimate representatives of the party rank-and-file, and that their inability to determine the outcome of the convention could best be explained in terms of the corruption of the democratic process.

McGovern's analysis of the 1968 convention illustrates this conviction. "In the primaries," McGovern maintained, "Democrats had spoken out unmistakably against the war, yet now the party machinery was treating them with contempt. No wonder so many of them felt that the party had lost touch, perhaps forfeited its very right to exist. . . ." He conceded that "if anything, the rules in 1968 provided for more popular participation than in 1964, when the delegates were warned that delegations would not be seated unless chosen without regard to race"—a remark that is somewhat ironic in light of McGovern's enthusiastic support of the quota system. Yet the senator insisted that "the war exposed the profound flaws in the American convention system. It showed that institutions which work satisfactorily in times considered normal may be unequal to periods of stress."

What exactly did McGovern mean by these statements? Perhaps he believed that the majority of Democratic party voters agreed with the McCarthy position on the war. No one could deny that Democrats registered a good measure of genuine antiwar sentiment in their presidential primaries. But primary results may have offered up a distorted impression of the magnitude, pervasiveness, and nature of antiwar, antiadministration feeling. For one thing, the American electorate does not vote at primaries; voting studies indicate that primary vote averages about 51 percent of a party's general election vote for president.[10] Moreover, this small primary electorate possesses special characteristics: primary voters tend to have higher levels of political interest, and they appear to be more concerned with issues and ideology than are nonvoters.[11] One might expect, then, that voters who held deep and active convictions about Vietnam would exert a disproportionate influence at the primary polls.

One could argue, however, that the primary results did not even provide an accurate index of the views of the primary voters themselves. Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, in their book *The Real Majority*, suggest several reasons why the 1968 primary electorate may not have been as dovish as it appeared to be. For example, a University of Michigan Research Center poll taken at the time of the New Hampshire primary sheds revealing light upon the nature of the voters' perceptions of policy alternatives. The results of that poll, Scammon and Wattenberg

[10] Harry Zeidenstein, "Presidential Primaries—Reflections of the Peoples' Choice?" *Journal of Politics*, 32 (November 1970), 827.

[11] Frank Sorauf, *Party Politics in America*, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1972), p. 224.

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report, "show that three out of five *of the McCarthy supporters* in New Hampshire believed that the Johnson administration was wrong in Vietnam because it was not hawkish *enough*, not because it was *too* hawkish."[12] Although the Johnson candidacy seemed to offer voters a choice between things as they were, or against things as they were:

> Even that choice was not a clear and simple sort of choice: Johnson did not actively campaign, and the non-Democratic candidates who were also against things as they were were not really yet in the race; Wallace was not in the primaries, and Nixon was running unopposed in Republican, not Democratic primaries. But when Johnson announced his decision not to run, McCarthy and Kennedy essentially were fighting it out only for those who would hold the "against" banner on the left side of things as they were. . . .[13]

Scammon and Wattenberg emphasize that the McCarthy-Kennedy confrontations were essentially "intramural" matches, for Humphrey's name did not appear on any presidential primary ballot.

Neither did national public opinion polls support the conclusion that Democrats "had spoken out unmistakably against the war." Gallup polls conducted in March, in the aftermath of the Tet offensive, indicated that the doves and the hawks were then flying neck and neck; a concurrent Harris poll showed that 54 percent of the American people favored the administration war policy.[14] Harris polls of two candidate nominee preferences among Democratic voters revealed that Humphrey gained popularity as the convention approached (from 48 percent in June to 56 percent in August).[15] Gallup's results indicated that Humphrey lost ground during the summer, but still remained four percentage points in front of McCarthy at convention time.[16]

It might be interesting, in light of this evidence, to examine the delegate vote on the hotly debated Vietnam plank. The 1968 convention rejected the antiwar minority report (which called for an immediate cessation of bombing in North Vietnam and the negotiated withdrawal of troops) by a vote of 1567¾ to 1041¼; that is, the McCarthy-McGovern plank received the support of 39 percent of the convention.

McGovern's observation that "institutions which work satisfactorily in times considered normal may be unequal to periods of stress" suggests that the reformers, in their outrage and frustration, appeared to have confused the right to be heard with the right to determine outcome. More-

[12] Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York, 1970), p. 91.
[13] Ibid., pp. 122–123.
[14] Ibid., p. 28.
[15] Ibid., p. 327.
[16] Ibid.

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over, McGovern seems to have intimated that effective democratic processes should work to forestall a rancorous convention. One might ask: Should not stressful times, times of challenge and dissent, produce in a democratic milieu situations of civilized confrontation and debate? But the reformers consistently condemned Chicago as a perversion of democracy, even as they were successfully bringing attention and action to some of their protests and demands.

The 1968 convention was bitter, convulsive, and violent; but 1968 was a bitter, convulsive, and violent year. The paroxysms of Chicago more faithfully mirrored the divided temper of the nation than did the halcyon aura of the Republican beachfest. And the party had done much to execute the mandate that had been forged in the struggle to extend equal opportunity to all Democrats. The percentage of black delegates had almost tripled since 1964; 6.7 percent (or 5.5 percent, for that matter) is not a particularly impressive figure, unless one recalls that just four years earlier, only 2.2 percent of the national convention delegates were black.

In 1964, the issue was race. In 1968, the issue was war. In both years, the Democratic party confronted itself, debated, deliberated, and resolved. But in authorizing the transformation of delegate selection systems, the 1968 convention set the party on a new course. This reform was not to be simply more of the same; it was something radically different in conception, scope, strategy, and purpose from previous reform.

The New Rules

Early in 1969, in accordance with the narrow mandate of the convention, DNC chairman Fred Harris appointed two twenty-eight-member commissions to consider reforms. Harris named George McGovern chairman of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (McGovern resigned from this post in January 1971 upon announcing his presidential candidacy, and was succeeded by liberal Minnesota Representative Donald M. Fraser). Michigan Representative James G. O'Hara, another congressional liberal, became head of the parallel Commission on Rules.

The McGovern Commission was the body most directly concerned with developing, issuing, and implementing the rules that would govern the processes of delegate selection for the 1972 convention. Although one might think that a group assuming such broad-ranging responsibility should reflect fairly the diverse major interests of the party constituency —including labor, moderates, and conservatives as well as liberals and New Politics advocates—the commission was top heavy with liberals, reformers, and grass-roots political activists. Chairman Harris gave labor a few token voices in the persons of I. W. Abel, United Steel Workers

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president, and William Dodds, United Auto Workers community action director, but Abel, at least, rapidly became disenchanted with the commission work.[17] And interestingly enough, the group that would later approve quotas for female representation was itself surprisingly free of women; there were only three women on the McGovern Commission.

The reforms, which had been formulated in less than nine months, were specific and comprehensive measures designed to introduce some degree of uniformity into the crazy-quilt pattern of delegate selection systems and increase decisively the political influence of those who in the past had had only marginal impact upon party policy making and candidate selection. The commission divided the guidelines into two groups: one group consisted of eighteen specific changes that would be required of state parties, while the other included several steps that the commission deemed "desirable" and "urged" the state parties to take.

The first guideline ordered the state parties to "adopt explicit written Party rules governing delegate selection." It was followed by eight "procedural rules and safeguards" which the commission demanded be applied in the delegate selection process. Specifically, the states were henceforth to forbid proxy voting; forbid the use of the unit rule and related practices such as instructing delegations; require a quorum of not less than 40 percent at all party committee meetings; remove all mandatory assessments of delegates and limit mandatory participation fees to no more than $10; ensure that party meetings in nonrural areas were held on uniform dates, at uniform times, and in places of easy access; ensure adequate public notice of all party meetings concerned with delegate selection.[18] For the most part, these changes were of a limited nature and consistent with the moderate suggestions of the Special Equal Rights Subcommittee.

The unit rule was a particular *bête noire* of the reformers, who were fond of hailing its abolition as a great victory for more democratic party government. The unit rule, which *Mandate for Reform* defines as "a practice by which a majority of a meeting or delegation can bind a dissenting minority to vote in accordance with the wishes of the majority,"[19] has had a long and controversial association with the Democratic party. But by the time the 1968 convention formally expunged the unit rule from all phases of the party's delegate selection process, the device had already lost favor among most state party organizations. *Mandate for Reform* estimates that only fifteen states used one form or another of the unit rule in delegate selection for the 1968 convention.[20]

[17] R. W. Apple, "Democratic Panel Changes Plot for Making of President 1972," *New York Times*, December 8, 1969, p. 40.

[18] *Mandate for Reform*, p. 34.

[19] Ibid., p. 22.

[20] Ibid.

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If the abolition of the unit rule was somewhat superfluous, it was also irrelevant in one very important respect. The object of unit rule reform was to bring to the surface—to provide for the representation of—submerged minorities. Another of the commission's "participatory" reforms, however, managed to choke voting minorities much more effectively than did the archaic and enfeebled unit rule.

Alexander Bickel has observed that "to permit successive majorities to govern the process is to achieve precisely the effect of the unit rule."[21] That is, instead of *forcing* all of the delegates from a county or congressional district to vote the same way, the party can simply allow local majorities under winner-take-all rules of the game to *elect all* of the delegates to the national convention in the first place. The commission did not require that all of the delegates be chosen at the local level (although it did recommend this), but commission guideline B-7 did direct that the state parties, "in convention systems, select no less than 75 percent of the total delegation at a level no higher than the congressional district."[22]

The commission was apparently convinced that taking delegate selection decision making down to the "grass roots" would produce fairer representation of candidate preferences. This happy result, however, would not necessarily be the case. Paul David, Ralph Goldman, and Richard Bain note that "the selection of delegates through procedures that maintain district autonomy has the effect of permitting a series of small all-or-none contests. . . . Separate district elections avoid the high stakes inherent in state-wide winner-take-all elections, but offer potential rewards for those who mobilize and campaign actively."[23] A hegemonic majority, mustering the most votes at party meetings or primaries, can walk away with the whole clutch of district delegates. This "participatory" reform, therefore, possesses an inherent majoritarian bias, even though it admittedly was exquisitely designed to promote the interests and representation of activist minority groups.

The commission also demanded that the state organizations "select no more than 10 percent of the delegation by state committee," "prohibit the ex-officio designation of delegates to the National Convention," and "designate the procedures by which slates are prepared and challenged."[24] These guidelines specified conditions for delegate selection which magnified the influence of those groups most motivated and most able to participate, namely, the activist groups within—and outside—the party. One

[21] Alexander Bickel, *Reform and Continuity: The Electoral College, the Convention, and the Party System* (New York, 1971), p. 61.

[22] *Mandate for Reform*, p. 35.

[23] Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Richard C. Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (Washington, D. C., 1960), p. 201.

[24] *Mandate for Reform*, p. 45.

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of the reform's effects was to divest elected party officials and representatives—men and women by pragmatic necessity responsive to a broad party constituency and responsible for the party's success or failure—of all prerogatives in the delegate selection process. The McGovern Commission, in an ostensible effort to "open up" the system, stated that "Party membership, and hence opportunity to participate in the delegate selection process, must be open to all persons who wish to be Democrats and who are not already members of another political party."[25] Thus the 1972 convention replaced Mayor Daley's Illinois delegation with a set of challengers led by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, who was not a registered Democrat (although neither was he a registered Republican). Ironically, the reformer emphasis upon "openness" seemed to slam the door on those who lacked the time, resources, or motivation to sustain an activist campaign. For example, Penn Kemble and Josh Muravchik, in their December 1972 *Commentary* article, pugently describe some aspects of slate-making reform that seemed to sanction disruptive tactics and mischievous horseplay:

> [T]he reformers' remedy exceeded the proper cure. It required that no group or individual could devise a slate to be submitted to the electorate without holding a publicly announced slate-making meeting in which anyone could participate, whether or not he shared the political outlook of those advancing the slate and, in fact, even if he was not a Democrat! A labor slate, by this logic, could not be formed without a public meeting allowing participation by management, a liberal slate without permitting the participation of conservatives, or a law-and-order slate without the meeting being open to H. Rap Brown and Jerry Rubin.[26]

The commission's apportionment requirements also reflected the reformers' inability to answer two hard questions: What is a political party, and who composes it? Not able to embrace fully, at least for apportionment purposes, the notion of the "open party," the commission announced that henceforth delegate apportionment within the states was "to be based on a formula giving equal weight to total population and to the Democratic vote in the previous Presidential election."[27] Apparently, by this logic, everyone is (potentially at least) a Democrat, but some people are more Democratic than others.

These guidelines, however, represented but one prong of the commission's design for the establishment of a "full and timely" opportunity to participate. Harking back to the antidiscrimination resolution of the 1964

[25] Ibid., p. 47.

[26] Penn Kemble and Josh Muravchik, "The New Politics and the Democrats," *Commentary Magazine*, December 1972, p. 82.

[27] *Mandate for Reform*, p. 45.

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convention, the National Committee's adoption of the Special Equal Rights Subcommittee guidelines, and the incorporation of the 1964 resolution into the 1972 Convention Call, the commission declared that "these actions demonstrate the intention of the Democratic Party to ensure a full opportunity for all minority group members to participate in the delegate selection process." Whereupon the commission ordered the state party organizations to "overcome the effects of past discrimination by affirmative steps to encourage representation on the National Convention delegation of minority groups, young people and women in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the State."[28] Clearly cognizant of the implications of such a requirement, the commission included in the guidelines a footnote emphasizing that "It is the understanding of the Commission that this is not to be accomplished by the mandatory imposition of quotas."[29] Many of the subsequent actions of the commission, however, appeared to belie this disclaimer.

The commission adopted the "reasonable representation" guidelines in November 1969 by the margin of a single vote. Following the narrow decision, commission chairman McGovern revealed his strategy to a reporter from the *National Journal:* "The way we got the quota thing through was by not using the word 'quotas.' We couldn't have gotten quotas."[30] Whatever the subtle semantic distinctions involved, the compliance directives of the commission indicated that the state parties would be expected to show the results of their efforts to "overcome the effects of past discrimination." For example, on October 15, 1971, the commission issued a notice to all state party chairmen which, in the words of the commission's final report, "suggested examples of 'affirmative steps' that state parties could take to encourage the participation of women, young people and minority group members in the delegate selection process," such as the "balancing" of delegate slates.[31]

The following month, in a letter to national chairman Lawrence O'Brien, new commission chairman Fraser explained the possible consequences of a state party's failure to assemble a "representative" national convention delegation:

> We believe that state parties should be on notice that whenever the proportion of women, minorities and young people in a delegation offered for

[28] Ibid., p. 34.

[29] Ibid., p. 40.

[30] Judith G. Smith (ed.), *Political Brokers: People, Organizations, Money, Power,* by the editors and reporters of *National Journal Magazine* (Liveright, N. Y., 1972), p. 244.

[31] The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committee, Final Report of the Commission, *The Party Reformed* (Washington, D. C., July 1972), p. 6.

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> for seating in Miami is less than the proportion of these groups in the total population, and the delegation is challenged on the grounds that Guidelines A-1 and A-2 are not complied with, such a challenge will constitute a *prima facie* showing of violation of the Guidelines, and the state Democratic Party along with the challenged delegation has the burden of showing that the state party took full and affirmative action to achieve such representation including an *effective* affirmative action program along the lines outlined in our policy statement adopted on October, 1971.[32]

O'Brien included the Fraser letter in a December memorandum to the state chairmen and other party leaders, declaring that he wished to "underscore those points in Congressman Fraser's letter that emphasize the importance of each state taking specific, affirmative action to encourage the representation and involvement of women, minorities and young people in the selection of delegates."[33] Obviously, then, to require the state parties to "*encourage* representation on the National Convention delegation of minority groups, young people and women" meant, according to the commission's interpretation of its guidelines, to *require* such representation.

The increasingly forceful interpretation of the quota guidelines reflected the commission's—and the reformers'—definition of the legal status of the guidelines as a whole. Although the majority report of the Credentials Committee adopted by the 1968 convention had ordered that the "Special Committee" to be established by the DNC "report its findings and recommendations to the Democratic National Committee," the official report of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection maintained:

> Because the Commission was created by virtue of actions taken at the 1968 Convention, we believe our legal responsibility extends to that body and that body alone. We view ourselves as the agent of that Convention on all matters related to delegate selection. Unless the 1972 Convention chooses to review any steps the Commission has taken, we regard our Guidelines for delegate selection as binding on the states.[34]

Democratic National Committee counsel Joseph Califano advised Chairman O'Brien that the commission was correct in assuming that only the national convention could amend the guidelines. Thus the Democratic National Committee's unanimous adoption in February 1971 of the guidelines into the 1972 Preliminary Convention Call was of only ritualistic significance. According to *New York Times* correspondent R. W. Apple, "The party conservatives said nothing as the McGovern proposals were

[32] Ibid., p. 8.
[33] Ibid.
[34] *Mandate for Reform*, p. 36.

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approved. In fact, many of those at the meeting, which was held at the Mayflower Hotel, were unaware that they had been voted on."[35] Twenty-eight men and women, deriving their authority from a self-defined and unlimited mandate, had created an entirely new structure of party law, and it was extremely unlikely that the 1972 convention delegates—the great majority of whom would owe their seats to the reforms—would substantially modify the commission's handiwork.

The controversial quota guidelines, however, provoked many more questions besides those concerning legality or legitimacy. One of the most important arose from the fact that the commission did not choose to elaborate on just how the institution of quotas would work to create more participation and representation. Several observers perceived a quandary in the quota requirements and the reformers' emphasis upon increased participation. Will Davis, former chairman of the Texas State Democratic Committee, reminded the commission that "it's not possible to have such a provision and still maintain the mandate to elect more delegates."[36] Similarly, Judith Parris has written that "demographic demands may clash with the objective of wide participation. In order to achieve descriptive representation of social groups, each state party would have to draw up a balanced ticket of delegates; but this would violate the principle of broad participation by ordinary partisans in delegate selection." It may also conflict with the principles of fair representation of voter preferences, because "at any political level, it is impossible to ensure that the convention delegation simultaneously will reflect the presidential preferences of the party rank-and-file and be a perfect microcosm of the state's population or of its party voters."[37]

One of the most immediate issues that sprung from the commission's quota requirements was a widespread confusion about what exactly constituted a "reasonable relationship." The commission declined to provide a precise definition, and seemed content to leave the problem to the 1972 Credentials Committee, which in turn simply concluded that the great majority of the state parties had complied satisfactorily. One could argue, however, that most of the states sent more representative delegations—at least with regard to race—to Chicago in 1968 than to Miami Beach in 1972. Twenty-eight states in 1968 assembled delegations whose percentages of black delegate strength corresponded more closely to the states'

[35] R. W. Apple, "Democrats Reform Rules on Convention Delegates," *New York Times*, February 20, 1971, p. 1.

[36] John S. Saloma, III, and Frederick H. Sontag, *Parties: The Real Opportunity for Effective Citizen Politics* (New York, 1973), p. 21.

[37] Judith Parris, *The Convention Problem: Issues in Reform of Presidential Nominating Procedures* (Washington, D. C., 1972), p. 76.

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black population figures than did those of their reformed 1972 delegations. For example, 3 percent of Arizona's delegation at the 1968 convention was black; in 1972, 8 percent of the Arizona delegates were black. Massachusetts is also 3 percent black, and in 1968, 3.1 percent of its delegation was black; by 1972, its black delegate representation had soared to 11.8 percent.[38] As the *Joint Center for Political Studies Guide to Black Politics '72* noted approvingly a month before the 1972 convention, "In over 30 states black delegate representation is proportionately greater than the state's total black population."[39]

The commission had established a quota system, but it was amorphous and exceedingly ill defined; if anything, the criteria seemed to suggest that overrepresentation was acceptable evidence of "reasonable representation," whereas underrepresentation (and possibly even nearly proportional representation) was not. Those who challenged Mayor Daley's Illinois delegation called attention to the fact that the state's black delegate percentage fell below that of the population—Illinois is 12.8 percent black, and Daley's dismally unrepresentative delegation was only 10 percent black. Oregon, on the other hand, was frequently praised by the reformers as a "model" delegation; with a 1.3 percent black population, Oregon had selected a delegation which was 5.9 percent black.

The quotas were meant to prove a point, to lend credence to the rhetoric of the "open party." A number of delegates thus won their seats primarily by virtue of the color of their skin, or their sex, or their age; how representative they were of the candidate preferences of the party members of their district or state was but a secondary consideration. The reformers apparently lost little sleep pondering the possibility that a superabundance of delegates chosen in compliance with quota requirements might effectively deprive other groups, such as lower middle-class, blue-collar citizens, of their rightful share of representation. The reformers—waist deep in compliance charts and delegate demographic data—were intensely concerned with the *how* of delegate selection, and with *who* the delegates were in terms of biological categories. One wonders why they did not judge worthy of their attention the questions: "*By whom* are the delegates selected?" and "*For whom* do they speak?"

More New Rules

Although the work of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection seized most of the attention and controversy surrounding the

[38] *Guide to Black Politics '72*, p. 21.
[39] Ibid., p. 19.

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party reform, James O'Hara's Commission on Rules was simultaneously formulating changes in convention preparation and practices.[40] The Rules Commission decided to increase convention size to 3000 delegate votes (there were 2622 delegate votes at the 1968 convention) and increase the size of the standing committees by 50 percent. Ostensibly these changes were intended to stimulate greater participation by and representation of the body politic, but they exacted a sacrifice in delegate participation and effectiveness. Procedural reforms included a ban on floor demonstrations, strict rules on the interruption of vote, and limitation of debate on any question to a total of twenty minutes. (The last was intriguingly similar to the "gag rule" so beloved by the conservative Rules Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives.) The new rules were designed to facilitate decorous and businesslike proceedings. They were, however, somewhat superfluous at the 1972 convention. The delegates came not to argue or harangue or protest; they came to ratify.

The Predictable Results

The Democratic party was indeed reformed. But what were the consequences of these changes? The convention whose delegates had been chosen under the provisions of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, and whose procedures were governed by the rules of the O'Hara Commission was very different from its unreformed predecessor of 1968. The 1972 convention, compared to the 1968 convention, was remarkably homogeneous and tame, in spite of its touted diversity. There were more black and brown and young and female faces, of course, but the great majority of the delegates were well educated, relatively affluent, liberal, and pro-McGovern.

As Arthur Schlesinger observed with apparent satisfaction, "For a convention that threw out Mayor Daley and put down Governor Wallace, Miami Beach turned out to be a surprisingly amiable, even benign affair."[41] In 1968, there had been vigorous and substantive debate over platform and rules; in 1972, the platform was adopted with scant discussion (only the abortion and gay liberation planks provoked a measure of controversy), and consideration of rules was largely confined to the tactical context of McGovern's quest for California's and Illinois' disputed votes. And there was no meaningful contest for the presidential nomina-

[40] A description of the work of the Rules Commission is included in the commission report *Call to Order* (Washington, D. C., June 1972), p. 11.

[41] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "How McGovern Will Win," *New York Times Magazine*, July 30, 1972, p. 28.

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tion at Miami Beach. (McCarthy, at least, had remained in the running to oppose Humphrey in the balloting at the 1968 convention.) The new delegate selection guidelines were admirably suited to an activist, issue-oriented campaign such as that of McGovern. The outcome of the convention was certainly a foregone conclusion by Tuesday of convention week, following the credentials vote on California.

It is ironic that the reform movement, ostensibly born out of dissent and debate, culminated in such a cut-and-dried affair. If one of the purposes of reform was, as *Mandate for Reform* claimed, to invigorate the convention, to produce "the face-to-face confrontations of Democrats of every persuasion, in a mass meeting . . . productive of healthy debate, important policy decisions . . . reconciliation of differences . . . ,"[42] then it failed utterly in this regard.

At the 1972 convention, there were not many differences to resolve. The reforms had succeeded in transforming 1968s substantial delegate minority into 1972s overwhelming delegate majority. Yet not only did that majority's candidate lose the presidential election by a large margin, but surveys taken after the November election indicated that as many as 36 percent of Democratic voters cast their ballots for Nixon.[43]

The 1972 delegates had been elected by Democrats who cared deeply about the issues of war and broad social change, who cared enough to make it to the primary polls, to the precinct, district, and county caucuses, to select delegates who would register these beliefs about the need for change in the political order. If Six-Pack Joe and the machinist's wife from Dayton preferred to stay home, so be it: they had forfeited their right to representation. But, so went the reformer rationale, at least the reformed Democratic process would offer them, and all Americans, a real choice in November.

Toward a More Responsible Party?

The McGovern-style reformer conception of democracy has much in common with certain precepts of the theory of responsible party government. The notion of effective party government—which is derived, in part, from the British parliamentary experience—has received a great deal of attention in the past few decades from a number of prestigious political scientists, including E. E. Schattschneider, Austin Ranney, and others. Ranney, in *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government* (1954), discusses what he believes are the basic assumptions of responsible party theory. "The doctrine of party government," he writes, "rests upon the belief

[42] *Mandate for Reform*, p. 12.

[43] Jack Rosenthal, "Desertion Rate Doubled," *New York Times*, November 9, 1972, p. 1.

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that, in a modern, thickly populated society like that of the United States, democracy should be conceived of as popular *control* over government, and not as popular *participation* in the day-to-day activities of government."[44] According to Ranney's interpretation, what is needed to achieve this democratic control is popular choice between two more-or-less ideological and sharply differentiated political parties.

Before parties can clarify and promote certain policy positions, however, they must achieve "sufficient coherence and discipline for their members to display solidarity on all great questions of public policy."[45] Just how this consensus is to be realized has been a matter of debate among party government theorists. The late E. E. Schattschneider, for example, maintained that ideas of mass participation in party affairs must be discarded if a party is to be able to assert unified, coherent positions on the issues.

Other party theorists have disputed Schattschneider's thesis. *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, a report prepared in 1950 by the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, agreed that responsible parties demand a great deal of internal cohesion, but argued that "such a degree of unity within the parties cannot be brought about without party procedures that give a large body of people an opportunity to share in the development of the party program."[46] The committee thus concluded that intraparty and interparty democracy, far from being irreconcilable, are necessarily complementary, and that party discipline can be enforced only when there is widespread democratic consensus within the party electorate.

The committee report in turn has not been without its critics.[47] A host of political scientists have conducted empirical studies that demonstrate conclusively that only a small minority of citizens are motivated to participate actively in political affairs, and indeed, only a bare majority of those eligible bother to vote in general elections, let alone vote in primaries or attend party caucuses. However, an even thornier problem for the responsible party theorists who view the legitimacy of party policy in terms of democratic consensus arises from the question of majority rule versus minority rights.

[44] Austin Ranney, *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government*, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. XXXIV, no. 3 (Urbana, Ill., 1954), p. 10.

[45] Ibid., p. 16.

[46] The Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York, 1950), p. 1.

[47] One interesting assessment of the committee report is former committee member Evron M. Kirkpatrick's retrospective critique, " 'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System': Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo-Science?" *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December 1971), 965–990.

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The essence of responsible party theory lies in the principles of majoritarian democracy. Responsible party theory, if it is to be clear and explicit, must not incorporate and reflect a significant measure of concession and compromise. In the words of the committee, "A stronger party system is less likely to give cause for the deterioration and confusion of purposes which sometimes passes for compromise but is really an unjustifiable surrender to narrow interests."[48] And this strict majoritarian intraparty democracy is echoed in the majoritarian interparty democracy that operationalizes responsible party government: if half-plus-one of the voters are dissatisfied with the performance of the party in control of government, they can replace that party in the next election. Ranney writes that this conception of democracy:

> is concerned only with the location of ultimate political power in the community and with the process by which that power is made effective. The nature of the particular decisions made by such a government do not make it more or less democratic so long as the framework within which they are made exhibits the same characteristics. In short, party government is a proposal for implementing majority rule, no matter what the majority may decide to do with its power. Any decision made in accord with the majority's wishes is, by definition, a "democratic" decision. . . .[49]

This procedural majoritarianism seems to be responsible for several of the paradoxes and unresolved dilemmas of post-1968 reform. For instance, is the reformed party really "open" to all Democrats, or only to the small percentage of Democrats who are willing and able to participate in the currently in vogue delegate selection process? McGovern appeared to realize that participation is not an automatic thing, conceding in "the Lessons of 1968" that "there is a long way to go. I know that the vitality of the Democratic party will probably involve more than mere structural changes. Participation will increase only as people see the political parties as responsive to their needs and concerns." But, in the meantime, according to McGovern's grass-roots prescription, "as a first step, we must immediately open the door to all those people who are or may be inclined to use political parties to serve the ends they seek." There was scant possibility, however, that the activists would make the party more responsive to the needs and concerns of those who preferred not to participate in the first place.

By securing majorities, or at least pluralities, in county and district caucuses and primaries, by virtue of much hard work and inspired organization, McGovern activists won control of the party they had helped

[48] *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, p. 20.
[49] Ranney, *Responsible Party Government*, p. 11.

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reform. Because the legitimacy of their majority rested upon a procedural, one-half-plus-one of those who participated definition of democracy, and not upon the breadth of interests it encompassed and served, it should not be surprising that the 1972 convention was so incomparably lifeless and dull. In past campaigns, candidates had arrived at conventions with delegate majorities, but these were often fragile, tenuous things pieced together with promises, bargains, and barter, susceptible to flux and erosion in the supercharged convention atmosphere. Most pre-1972 delegates were not elected directly by partisans of particular candidates or policy views; more likely, they won their seats by virtue of party loyalty, service, and diligent personal efforts. And because of their manners of selection, they were usually not bound—either by law or by conviction—to the outcome of a preconvention decision-making process. These delegates were not greatly concerned about how the party voted in March or April, but rather about how the national electorate would vote in November. In 1972, however, the delegate majority was solid, committed, and immovable; there was very little place for the traditional processes of national convention consensus building. As the reformers saw it, the will of Democrats (at least of Democrats who counted, i.e., those who could be counted) was self-evident, and that mandate was not to be sullied by crass political expediency.

Larry O'Brien was probably right when he pronounced the work of the reform commissions to be "the greatest goddamn change since the two-party system."[50] Reform had shucked away the complexes of party traditions, old saws, and unwritten bylaws that had evolved and persisted since Andrew Jackson's time, and replaced them with a streamlined package of national party decision-making rules. And in doing so, it challenged the ancient wisdom that has held that the purpose of a political party is to mobilize majorities to win general elections, and that compromise and accommodation are eminently acceptable and valuable means to that end. The Democratic reformers—like all reformers—were obsessed with rules, imbued with the notion that if you can change the rules, you can cure the beast. They therefore seized upon the most obvious and most sanctified tool of democracy, majority or plurality vote, and applied it everywhere within the party, sincerely convinced that they were bringing the party closer to true democracy.

But democracy, as is any idea that addresses itself to the needs and desires of human beings, is a complex thing. As Carl Cohen has written,

> Good decision-making rules serve and support the democratic process by making it effective, but they are not the whole of that process. This may be shown by considering the relations of the rules to dimensions of democracy

[50] Smith, *Political Brokers*, p. 253.

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other than breadth. The employment of any decision-making rule is, at best, only the culmination of a participatory process that is continuing rather than intermittent, involves discussion and debate as well as commitment, and is manifested in a host of ways only one of which is the casting of votes. The desire for specificity, and the impelling need to make some verifiable judgments, results in a widespread tendency to identify democracy with its decision-making rules. This is a mistake, reducing democracy to only one of its dimensions, breadth, simply because it is breadth that lends itself to quantitative analysis.

At the stage of the democratic process when decision-making rules are applied, the question has become, in effect: "Now that we have discussed the matter, what actions shall we take?" Proposals are made, and a vote in some form is taken. Reaching decisions demands some definite and publicly verifiable measurement of community opinion, so there must be resort to what is measureable—ballots cast, hands raised. We hope the rule will be fair, wise, justly administered. But no rule, however wise and consistent with democracy, can measure all aspects of the democratic process; its application can never reflect the depth of the participation of those voting.[51]

Commission chairmen O'Hara and Fraser's proposed "Charter for the Democratic Party of the United States," showed how intent many of the reformers were upon creating a nationalized, policy-oriented party. The charter, which urged the restructuring of the Democratic party along the lines of the responsible party model, recommended that the national party set up "categories" of formal dues-paying membership, and permit only enrolled members to participate in party affairs. It also suggested doubling the size of the Democratic National Committee, and proposed that a 3000-delegate National Policy Conference meet in even-numbered years between presidential elections to formulate explicit policy programs and elect the national chairman. A National Executive Committee would carry on the real work of the party in off-years.[52]

The 1972 convention, although it did not endorse the document in toto, adopted several provisions of the O'Hara-Fraser charter; for example, it called for "additional National Committee members with a total vote of 150 apportioned to each state on the basis of that state's representation on the Standing Committees of the 1972 Democratic National Convention."[53] The convention authorized the new Democratic National Committee to appoint a special commission to recommend a permanent party charter, and suggest the size, composition, and manner

[51] Carl Cohen, *Democracy* (Athens, Ga., 1971), p. 64.

[52] A copy of the O'Hara-Fraser charter is included in the Rules Commission report *Call to Order*, pp. 133–143.

[53] The Democratic National Committee, "Resolution Adopted by the 1972 Democratic National Convention" (mimeographed), p. 1.

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of delegate selection to a 1974 national policy and organization conference.

Neither did the subject of national convention delegate selection escape the convention's attention; presumably in response to the confusion surrounding the interpretation and implementation of the 1972 reforms, the 1972 delegates mandated the creation of a new commission to "review the guidelines for delegate selection incorporated into the Call of the 1972 Democratic National Convention, for the purpose of making appropriate revisions of such guidelines after due consideration of their operations in 1972. . . ."[54]

In October 1973 this new commission—christened, in a curious inversion of its predecessor's title, the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure—unanimously approved and submitted to the DNC a new set of delegate selection guidelines that contained several revisions of the McGovern-Fraser reforms. For example, the commission dropped the infamous "reasonable representation" guideline, and replaced it with a provision stating that the party's goal is to encourage the participation of women, youth, and minority groups "as indicated by their presence in the Democratic electorate." The new guideline declared that the fuller participation "shall not be accomplished either directly or indirectly by the party's imposition of mandatory quotas at any level. . . ." (The language is strikingly reminiscent of the McGovern Commission's solemn disavowal of a quota system.) Compliance under the revised rules would not be determined by the presence or absence of a "reasonable number" of women, young, or minority delegates, but rather upon how "vigorously" state parties attempted to increase the participation of these groups.[55]

Despite these changes, an examination of the new rules suggests little more than token retrenchment from the McGovern-Fraser reforms. The revised guidelines, for example, may remove some features of the quota system most objectionable to party moderates and conservatives. But the compliance activities of the McGovern Commission demonstrated what flexible interpretations can be given to such difficult concepts as participation and representation. It is not inconceivable that the new commission would conclude—like its forebear—that the most convenient way of assessing the "vigor" of state party efforts to ensure greater participation is to look at the results they produce, in the form of more delegate repre-

[54] The Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure to the Democratic National Committee, Final Report of the Commission, *Democrats All* (Washington, D. C., December 1973), p. 5.

[55] Ibid., p. 21.

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sentation of women, young people, and minorities (and perhaps certain socioeconomic groups as well).

The new commission also endorsed a system of proportional representation of candidate preferences, in keeping with the 1972 convention's decision to ban winner-take-all primaries. According to the new formula, a candidate who obtains an electoral majority or plurality in a precinct, congressional district, or state would not win all of the delegates, but would share them proportionately with other candidates receiving at least 10 percent of the vote. The provisions of this guideline, however, apply not only to primary states, but also to those that select their delegates through caucus and convention systems. Penn Kemble has predicted that local-level proportional representation will either force local party leaders to commit themselves to a candidate very early in the election year, or organize into independent "constituency" slates—into labor or black caucuses, for example—that "will increase the tendency toward ideological and group conflict within the party" and produce a "political convention which is made up of an array of hardened minority factions. . . ."[56]

The Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure reaffirmed most of the "participatory" McGovern guidelines, including those requiring local selection of delegates and prohibiting ex-officio representation. Although state committees were given the right to elect up to 25 percent of their state delegations, the commission attached severe limitations to this prerogative: members of state committees so selecting delegates were required to be elected through "open processes in conformity with the basic procedural guarantees utilized for delegate selection," and delegates elected by state committees had to "reflect the division of preference of the publicly selected delegates."[57]

On March 1, 1974, the Democratic National Committee officially adopted the commission report with only minor revisions. The DNC did, however, raise the cut-off threshold for proportional representation from 10 percent to 15 percent of the votes cast in primaries, caucuses, and conventions.

Significant as the implications of the delegate selection reform are, the most important discussion of the long-term goals and purposes of the Democratic party has been focused on the work of the Charter Commission, charged with preparing a formal constitution to be submitted for ratification at the party's December 1974 Charter Conference. The debate over the content of the charter has crystallized into two broad alternatives: should a new national party structure be created which would derive its

[56] Penn Kemble, quoted in David S. Broder, "Democrats: The Unquota," *Washington Post*, February 10, 1974, p. B6.

[57] *Democrats All*, pp. 18–19.

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authority directly from Democratic voters, or should the traditional federative, coalitional processes of the party be cultivated more effectively? The reformers, for instance, have argued that a mid-term policy conference would be a valuable injection of participatory democracy, providing Democrats with a direct opportunity to influence party policy formulation. Others have questioned the wisdom of incorporating a policy conference of popularly elected delegates into the charter; the Coalition for a Democratic Majority has maintained that:

> The genius of the Democratic Party has lain in its frequent ability to put forward national leaders who, by stressing those particular issues which appeal to a broad variety of constituency groups, and by seeking compromises among such groups on the issues that may divide them, have been able to win national elections. It is hard to understand how this difficult process would be served by bringing large numbers of the representatives of such groups together at a time when there is no national campaign to unify them, for a mid-term convention which will be tempted to hammer out positions by majority vote on a wide range of public issues.
>
> This is assuming, of course, that the authentic representatives of the major Democratic voting blocs would be chosen to such a mid-term policy conference in the first place. The likelihood is that they would be gravely underrepresented. The elections for delegates to a mid-term convention would simply not attract the ordinary voter. . . . The mid-term convention would probably be dominated first by the more affluent, educated voters with strong patterns of participation, and second by activist, ideologically committed minorities. . . .[58]

The subject of Democratic party reform is not simply a matter of alternative models of delegate selection, or differing conceptions of party structure and policy making. It is, rather, a sustained, critical dialogue that attempts to resolve which of two political ideals—participation or representation—should be the primary criterion of legitimacy in American party democracy.*

[58] The Coalition for a Democratic Majority, *Unity Out of Diversity: A Draft Position Paper on a New Charter for the Democratic Party of the United States* (Washington, D. C., 1973), p. 7.

* This paper owes much to the patient advice and helpful criticism of Dr. Herbert Waltzer, of Miami University's Department of Political Science.

FORTHCOMING: In the September *Political Science Quarterly*, Jeffrey L. Pressman and Denis G. Sullivan will present a different evaluation of the McGovern Commission convention "reforms" and of the likely impact of the

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new delegate selection rules adopted by the Democratic National Committee on March 1, 1974. This article is based in part on evidence collected for their recently published book, *The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention 1972*.

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Ethno-Cultural Interpretations of Nineteenth-Century American Voting Behavior

RICHARD L. McCORMICK

Beginning in the early 1960s, and especially within the past half-dozen years, historians have offered strong evidence that the most important determinants of voting behavior in the American past have been the ethnic and religious identifications of citizens. Indeed, an ethno-cultural "school" of American political history has emerged, and its members have produced an impressive body of historical research and writing.[1] In search of a grass-roots understanding of past politics, the ethno-culturalists have applied quantitative methods and behavioral theory to the political history of the United States. They have studied the complex relations between local and national orientations in politics, between leaders and masses, and between economic and cultural issues. More broadly, they have asked and answered questions about political salience: What are the sources of voter motivation? How do issues become politicized?

[1] The term "ethno-cultural" is used here—often interchangeably with "ethno-religious"—to denote the feelings and habits, the likes and dislikes, which were associated with the national origins and religious affiliations of nineteenth-century American voters. The precise specification of which cultural attributes were "ethno-cultural" and the definition of the exact relationship between ethno-cultural factors and political ones are two problems with which much of the present essay is concerned. See the sections "Three Theories of Ethno-Cultural Voting" and "Religious Values and Party Identity."

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While ethno-culturalists share a common commitment to the study of the social and cultural bases of mass behavior, they are not in full agreement on the relationship between ethnic and religious identifications and political affiliations. A close reading of their works suggests that these historians have put forward three distinct, though not necessarily incompatible, theories to explain how cultural impulses become political ones: (1) negative reference group antagonisms, (2) conflicts of custom and life-style, and (3) differences in religious values and world views. Moreover, ethno-culturalists do not agree completely on such political concerns as the linkage between voter mobilization and policy making. While no general appraisal of ethno-cultural history is yet possible, it is time for at least an interim evaluation of the contribution made by these historians to our understanding of past political behavior.[2]

Political History as Social History

Ethno-cultural history represents, in part, a response to earlier schools of historiography. An interpretation of political behavior based upon ethnic and religious antagonisms is an explicit alternative to the "progressive" view that conflict in American history has been predominantly

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The major works considered in the present essay are: Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case* (Princeton, 1961); Ronald P. Formisano, *The Birth of Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827-1861* (Princeton, 1971); Michael F. Holt, *Forging a Majority: The Formation of the Republican Party in Pittsburgh, 1848-1860* (New Haven, 1969); Richard Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896* (Chicago, 1971); Paul Kleppner, *The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900* (New York, 1970); Frederick C. Luebke, *Immigrants and Politics: The Germans of Nebraska, 1880-1900* (Lincoln, Neb., 1969); Samuel T. McSeveney, *The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893-1896* (New York, 1972).

All of these titles focus on the nineteenth century. For ethno-cultural works on twentieth-century politics, see the bibliography in Joel H. Silbey and Samuel T. McSeveney (eds.), *Voters, Parties and Elections* (Lexington, Mass., 1972).

[2] Previous evaluations of ethno-cultural history include: Robert P. Swierenga, "Ethnocultural Political Analysis: A New Approach to American Ethnic Studies," *Journal of American Studies*, Vol. 5 (April 1971), 59-79; Walter Dean Burnham, "Quantitative History: Beyond the Correlation Coefficient: A Review Essay," *Historical Methods Newsletter*, Vol. 4 (March 1971), 62-66; Paul Kleppner, "Beyond the 'New Political History': A Review Essay," *Historical Methods Newsletter*, Vol. 6 (December 1972), 17-26; Robert P. Swierenga, "Clio and Computers: A Survey of Computerized Research in History," *Computers and the Humanities*, Vol. 5 (September 1970), 1-22; Joel H. Silbey, "Clio and Computers: Moving into Phase II, 1970-1972," *Computers and the Humanities*, Vol. 7 (November 1972), 67-79; Samuel T. McSeveney, "Ethnic Groups, Ethnic Conflicts, and Recent Quantitative Research in American Political History," *The International Migration Review*, Vol. 7 (Spring 1973), 14-33.

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socioeconomic. By the same token, ethno-culturalists concur with "consensus" historians who deemphasized ideological and economic divisions between Americans.[3] Despite the reliance on the consensus tradition, there is nothing "homogenizing" about ethno-cultural history. These historians have argued that there were real differences between the major political parties and that voters responded to issues and images that had deep meaning for them. Indeed, in some respects, the ethno-culturalists have gone the progressives one better in the search for conflict in the American past. So long as the emphasis was on economic issues and on class as a determinant of voting behavior, it appeared that for long periods in United States history there were no significant differences between the major parties. But if cultural concerns are brought front and center in an explanation of partisan allegiance, then real distinctions between the parties appear, regardless of whether differences on economic issues were significant.

Fundamentally, ethno-cultural political analysis begins not with an attack on earlier patterns of historical writing, but with a particular view of what political history ought to be. Samuel P. Hays, the first of the recent ethno-culturalists, has most successfully articulated and spread the new viewpoint. In four major articles between 1960 and 1967 Hays called for political history as a kind of social history and illustrated it by the example of his own work on the 1880 to 1920 period.[4] Historians

[3] For the best brief account of the contributions of the "progressive" historians, see John Higham, *History* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965), especially pp. 171-212. This group of historians, including preeminently Frederick Jackson Turner, Charles A. Beard, and Carl Becker perceived, in Higham's words, a nation "constantly in flux, full of real and vital conflicts between contending groups" (p. 173). Beginning in the late 1940s, with the publication of Richard Hofstadter's *The American Political Tradition* (New York, 1948), American historians became increasingly sensitive to continuity and consensus in the past. Daniel J. Boorstin and Louis Hartz have been among the most important in this group of historians, and in the 1950s and 1960s the notion of consensus permeated a great deal of writing in American history.

Among the ethno-cultural historians, Lee Benson most clearly articulates both the break with a socioeconomic conflict interpretation and the application of consensus concepts; see pp. 123-164 and 270-287. Also see Formisano, pp. 31-34; and Kleppner, *The Cross*, pp. 17-19. For the clearest statement of the view that class and ethno-religious factors jointly affected voting, see Richard Jensen, "The Religious and Occupational Roots of Party Identification: Illinois and Indiana in the 1870s," *Civil War History*, Vol. 16 (December 1970), 325-343. Michael F. Holt contends that in the late 1840s and early 1850s, economic, ethnic, and religious factors all helped to shape Pittsburgh voting but that by the late 1850s party lines were determined by religion only: pp. 74-79, 215-218, and 303.

[4] "History as Human Behavior," *Iowa Journal of History*, Vol. 58 (July 1960), 193-206; "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, Vol. 55 (October 1964), 157-169; "Political Parties and

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of past politics, he contends, "should focus on patterns of human relationships in the political system rather than on the succession of outcomes of political decisions."[5] The titles of two of Hays's articles indicate the new perspective: "History as Human Behavior" and "The Social Analysis of American Political History." Virtually all of the ethno-cultural historians, many citing Hays, have adopted his opinion that political history ought to have a social orientation.[6]

Although "the social analysis of political history" could mean many things in conjunction with the ethno-culturalists' determination to study grass-roots behavior, it has come to mean exploring how national origins and religion shaped voters' perceptions of issues and their party loyalties. While political historians have traditionally studied party coalitions by focusing on leaders, the ethno-cultural historians have approached the problem from the perspective of the voters and their motives. Of course, Hays's label "the social analysis of political history" may be too broad for this subject. Certainly, ethnic and religious identifications were not the only social factors relevant to party loyalties. Moreover, social forces impinged upon political processes other than coalition making. Finally, there is more to political history than the study of the sources of popular voting behavior. But these cautions aside, there are sound reasons to approve the particular subject to which the ethno-culturalists have directed their attention.[7]

What distinguishes the ethno-cultural historians from others who have long sought to decipher the riddle of partisan choice is their concurrence with the proposition, advanced in 1960 by Hays, that "Party differences in voting patterns were cultural, not economic." "Ethno-cultural issues," he says, "were far more important to voters than were tariffs, trusts, and railroads. They touched lives directly and moved people deeply." Thus issues like prohibition, nativism, and English language instruction in the public schools affected voters and voting alignments more profoundly than economic and class issues. "In fact," Hays

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the Community-Society Continuum," in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.), *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development* (New York, 1967), pp. 152-181; "The Social Analysis of American Political History, 1880-1920," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 80 (September 1965), 373-394.

[5] Hays, "Community-Society Continuum," p. 152.

[6] Holt, p. 2; Luebke, pp. 5-6; Kleppner, *The Cross*, pp. 1-4; Formisano, p. 4.

[7] A justification for the coalitional perspective is offered in Samuel Lubell's *The Future of American Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1965), especially, p. 196. Critiques of the traditional emphasis in American political history on leaders and on national issues and forces include Hays, "The Social Analysis"; Thomas C. Cochran, "The 'Presidential Synthesis' in American History," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 53 (July 1948), 748-759; Joel H. Silbey, "The Civil War Synthesis in American Political History," *Civil War History*, Vol. 10 (June 1964), 130-140.

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suggests, "one can argue that the only violent shifts in voting behavior came when such issues were present."[8] In 1961, Lee Benson generalized Hays's hypothesis: "at least since the 1820's . . . ethnic and religious differences have tended to be *relatively* the most important sources of political differences."[9] Benson's *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy* was the first full-scale ethno-cultural study, and Benson stands with Hays as an originator of the school and a vigorous proponent of new methods and concepts for studying the political past.

For several years after the appearance of *The Concept*, the progress of ethno-cultural history was slow. Benson had rebutted an economic interpretation of party coalitions, and while others echoed his attack on using a class perspective to interpret political behavior, only a few scholars took up the ethno-cultural alternative which Hays and Benson had proposed. In 1962, George H. Daniels' study of Iowa immigrants in 1860 concluded that, contrary to the traditional view, Germans opposed the party of Lincoln and voted instead for "the [Democratic] party which consistently promised them liberty from prohibition and native-American legislation."[10] The next year, Stanley B. Parsons argued that religion was a crucial determinant of Populist voting patterns in Nebraska, though the distinction between immigrants and native-born voters was not significant.[11] Robert P. Swierenga's 1965 account of Dutch politics in Iowa confirmed Daniels' earlier finding that immigrants cast their ballots for the Democrats to oppose liquor regulation and nativism.[12] And in 1966, Paul Kleppner's study of the foreign vote in Pittsburgh in 1860 offered support both to the Swierenga-Daniels view that cultural issues influenced party choice and to Parsons' contention that in the nineteenth century religion was a more important political determinant than ethnicity.[13] The next year Joel Silbey's synthesis of political change from 1840 to 1860 combined an ethno-cultural explanation of party realignment with an account of economic and sectional cleavages, thereby integrating the Hays-Benson perspective with traditional factors in a widely studied period of American political change.[14]

[8] Hays, "History," p. 196; "Community-Society Continuum," p. 158; "History," p. 197.

[9] Benson, p. 165.

[10] "Immigrant Vote in the 1860 Election: The Case of Iowa," *Mid-America*, Vol. 44 (July 1962), 142-162. Quoted in Silbey and McSeveney (eds.), p. 149.

[11] "Who Were the Nebraska Populists?" *Nebraska History*, Vol. 44 (June 1963), 97.

[12] "The Ethnic Voter and the First Lincoln Election," *Civil War History*, Vol. 11 (March 1965), 41.

[13] "Lincoln and the Immigrant Vote: A Case of Religious Polarization," *Mid-America*, Vol. 48 (July 1966), 176-195.

[14] *The Transformation of American Politics, 1840-1860* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1967), pp. 1-34.

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By the late 1960s, ethno-cultural explanations became almost commonplace. In 1968 Roger E. Wyman's study of the 1890 election in Wisconsin claimed "solid evidence in support of the contention that ethnicity was a primary determinant of voting behavior in the late nineteenth century."[15] Michael F. Holt's book on the formation of the Republican party in Pittsburgh appeared in 1969 and represented the first full-length study in support of Silbey's assertion regarding ethno-cultural factors in the pre-Civil War decades. That same year, an analysis of German voting in late nineteenth-century Nebraska by Frederick C. Luebke assigned to cultural issues and ethnic identifications a strong role in determining party loyalties. In 1970, Paul Kleppner's account of midwestern politics traced the persistence of ethno-religious voting alignments from the 1850s to the 1890s; Richard Jensen's 1971 book told a similar story. Ronald P. Formisano's study of Michigan from the 1820s until 1861 and Samuel T. McSeveney's account of Middle Atlantic state politics in the 1890s appeared in 1971 and 1972, respectively, and joined the now-impressive shelf of ethno-cultural histories.[16]

Most of these works concentrate on northeastern and midwestern politics in the 1850s and 1890s—those regions and eras in which European immigration and burgeoning cultural heterogeneity had decisive demographic, social, and economic consequences. Further research is needed to establish whether theories of political behavior applicable to the relatively highly urbanized northeastern quadrant of the United States are generalizable to other geographic areas. Despite the chronological limitations, it is not surprising that the 1850s and 1890s should attract attention from historians concerned with problems of coalition making. These decades were not only peak eras of immigration but were also the great periods of partisan realignment in the nineteenth century. Both periods, however, witnessed unusual economic and section crises. Ethno-cultural interpretations of realignment depend on successful efforts to demonstrate that local cultural concerns had at least as much impact upon the regrouping of voters as national economic and sectional issues.

Calling explicit attention to the divisions between politics at the national and local levels and between economic and cultural issues, ethno-cultural historians make what is perhaps their most important contribution to the study of American political behavior: they explain how those divisions are bridged. They believe that the economic programs of state and national leaders are related to the aspirations of culturally oriented voters at the grass-roots level with the image, aura, or character a political party projects.

[15] "Wisconsin Ethnic Groups and the Election of 1890," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Vol. 51 (Summer 1968), 283.

[16] Citations to the work by Holt, Luebke, Kleppner, Jensen, Formisano, and McSeveney appear in note 1.

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The implication of "party character" is that voters respond most basically to party symbolism, not policies. According to Hays, party "ideologies are frequently instruments of mass communication which mobilize local impulses for national, cosmopolitan objectives."[17] While most ethno-culturalists have shied away from the word "ideology," they have pursued Hays's suggestion that parties employ specialized strategies to activate voters on national issues. The linkages, however, are not policy positions, but the images which party leaders project. In Benson's words, "Aside from the principles and policies it adopts and advocates, a party radiates an aura that influences the way the electorate appraises and responds to its principles and policies. A useful distinction can be made, therefore, between a party's *program* and its aura, or *character*."[18] Kleppner similarly suggests that "It is the mode of treatment, the 'style' component of the issue, that provides the link between public policies and leadership activities on one hand, and grass-roots voter concerns on the other."[19]

Formisano suggests that "The actions of leaders and parties . . . probably came to have symbolic meaning for many voters."[20] Even party rhetoric on particular economic issues could convey to voters a message about where the party stood on cultural issues close to their daily lives. Thus, according to Kleppner, in the 1890s midwestern Democrats pressed the tariff reduction issue with "the argument that the tariff was simply another example of Republican paternalism and, as such, was equivalent to the usual kinds of sumptuary [temperance] legislation that Republicans advocated."[21] Jensen similarly points to the way in which Republicans used the currency issue in 1896: "Sound money thus became the symbol of the economic and cultural pluralism that . . . [McKinley] knew would sweep the cities and the immigrants into an invincible coalition."[22] In analogous ways, almost all the ethno-cultural historians have examined party propaganda for its stylistic and symbolic appeals to voters' cultural impulses. Central to the ethno-cultural historians' view of American politics is the idea that partisan appeals are carefully constructed bridges between leadership goals and grass-roots aspirations. It is a party's character and image, and not its formal policy proposals, which attract voters and maintain their loyalty.[23]

[17] "Community-Society Continuum," p. 161.
[18] Benson, p. 216.
[19] Kleppner, *The Cross*, p. 150.
[20] Formisano, p. 97.
[21] Kleppner, *The Cross*, p. 154.
[22] Jensen, *The Winning*, p. 305.
[23] Some of the ethno-cultural historians have explicitly adopted the concept of party character, while others have only implied it. Formisano explores the idea at some length: pp. 56-80. Luebke strongly suggests that it was the character of the Democratic party, rather than its policy proposals, that attracted Nebraska Germans (pp.

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Assuming party loyalties are fashioned in response to the images which parties project, and not in response to policy programs on national issues, two essential questions arise. First, what kinds of ethnic and religious impulses do political leaders exploit in the creation of partisan affiliations? Put another way, *how* do ethno-cultural identifications become political ones? Second, if voters are primarily motivated by cultural concerns, then from where do economic policies come? And what do the processes of coalition making and policy formation have to do with one another? To the first question, ethno-culturalists have offered strikingly diverse answers; on the second question, they are surprisingly ambivalent.

Three Theories of Ethno-Cultural Voting

So long as explanations of party affiliation were based on socioeconomic class differences, they were of limited complexity. Most people voted to advance the material insights of their own class, though a few (like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s George Bancroft)[24] were moved by sympathy for economically oppressed groups other than their own. A theory of the motivations underlying partisan allegiance is self-evidently part and parcel of an economic interpretation of politics. An ethno-cultural theory, by contrast, embodies no intrinsic or obvious explanation of motives for party voting. Lacking formal church or nationality parties in the United States, an almost limitless range of factors could, in theory, transform ethnic or religious identities into political ones. Whatever the objective truth of recent historians' assertions that ethno-cultural identities were the principal determinants of party affiliation, a wide range of motivations could account for that determination. The connections between culture and politics, however firm, are not simple.

Although there is no theoretical limit to the ways in which ethno-cultural identifications could be conceived to have political significance, close attention to the recent work of ethno-culturalists reveals that they rely on three sorts of hypotheses to account for the translation of cultural differences into political ones. One explanation is that negative reference group feelings are the determinants of party affiliation. Voters cast their ballots principally to oppose those ethnic and religious groups whom they

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61 and 115) and that Germans rejected Populism in response to that party's perceived nativist character: pp. 58-59 and 144-145. Holt does not explicitly adopt the notion of party character, but like Kleppner and Jensen, he holds that economic issues could be politicized in a culturally symbolic manner: pp. 243 and 258. McSeveney in *Politics of Depression* develops the perception that a party's image could differ at the national and local levels: pp. 186 and 210.

[24] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (New York, 1945), chapter 13, especially pp. 161-162.

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dislike. A second hypothesis is that ethno-cultural groups often seek political means of extending the dominion of their own cultural practices, or of protecting those practices from attack. Issues like temperance, English language instruction in the schools, and Sunday observance stimulate partisan divisions. A third explanation is that political affiliations reflect differences in religious beliefs and world views. Each major party directs its appeals to devotees of one of two clusters of religious values, usually described as evangelical, pietistic, or puritan on one hand, and nonevangelical, liturgical, or ritualistic on the other. The evangelical or pietistic religious orientation emphasized an intense personal faith in God and stressed moral standards of individual behavior. The liturgical or ritualistic religious perspective emphasized belief in traditional doctrine and adherence to historic religious customs and practices.[25]

Samuel P. Hays's explanation of party realignment before the Civil War embodies all three theories of how cultural differences become political differences. He writes "In the form of Prohibition, nativism, and antislavery . . . [evangelical Protestantism] produced both a sharp realignment of voting behavior and a cultural unity for the Republican party. The Democratic party, in turn, combined Catholics and German Lutherans and nonevangelical Protestant native-born Americans in a common hostility to evangelical imperialism and the negative reference groups espousing it."[26] These sentences contain several easily distinguishable theories about the role of culture as a source of voting behavior. First, at the level of religious belief, Hays finds conflict between evangelicals and nonevangelicals. Second, at the level of life-style, Hays suggests that the efforts of one group to promote its own cultural practices, especially in regard to liquor, met resistance and that the conflict found expression in opposing political affiliations. Finally, at the level of group perceptions, Hays says that groups voted against each other because they took one another as negative referents. These impulses are theoretically compatible with one another, if indeed, they operate jointly as Hays implies. But they represent fundamentally different conceptions of the motivation for voting behavior. Religious beliefs, conflicts of custom and habit, and group hatreds may be intertwined, and yet they are distinct ways of specifying the relationship between culture and party affiliation.

Lee Benson's account of native-American voting patterns in New

[25] The best concise definition of the two contrasting groups of religious values is given by Kleppner; see *The Cross*, p. 73. See section "Religious Values and Party Identity," for discussion of how different ethno-cultural historians have used these terms to denote politically salient religious values.

[26] "Community-Society Continuum," pp. 158-159.

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York's Rockland County during the Jackson period bears close comparison to Hays's analysis of the bases of realignment before the Civil War.[27] While all groups of native voters "tended to be relatively evenly divided" between the Whig and Democratic parties in New York State as a whole, Benson discovers that Rockland Yankees (descendants of New Englanders) and Yorkers (natives whose ancestors settled first in New York) sharply polarized against one another.[28] He writes, "In areas where the Dutch [a principal Yorker group] and Yankees came into more or less direct contact, we can reasonably infer from the voting statistics that social and cultural antagonisms found political expression." The Dutch in such a situation tended to be disproportionately Democratic, while their Yankee antagonists were heavily Whig. Each group took the other as a negative referent and "shape[d] their voting behavior accordingly."[29]

Group traditions and beliefs reinforced these reference group antagonisms, according to Benson. The Rockland Dutch "tilled their ancestral fields much as their ancestors had tilled them and they abided by their fathers' faith in state rights and negative government." While the Dutch were thus "likely to respond to the [Democratic] party that preached the doctrines of the negative liberal state and state rights," Yankees traditionally demanded "precisely the kind of activist, collectivist state most repugnant to those 'Dutchmen,' " and so voted for the Whigs.[30] Just as Dutch and Yankee voters responded to party images on matters of government activism, they also reacted to perceived moral differences between the parties. According to Benson, "pious Yankees tended to respond to . . . Whig appeals for state-guided and state-enforced 'moral reformation.' " By contrast, "though the Dutch did not lack piety or respect for ecclesiastical authority, their conception of the church 'was by no means as vivid and embracing as that held in New England.' "[31]

Reference group perceptions, tradition, and religious values all work in harmony in Benson's account. While these impulses may have been jointly operative in Rockland County, producing heavily Democratic voting by the Dutch and strong Whig allegiance among Yankees, Benson's explanation is too good and too airtight to account for his own estimate that in New York State both Yankees and Yorkers divided pretty evenly between the parties.[32] By selecting for close observation a county where

[27] Benson, pp. 293-304.

[28] Ibid., pp. 184 and 301.

[29] Ibid., pp. 301 and 303.

[30] *Ibid., pp. 298, 299, and 303. For Benson's concept of the "negative liberal state,"* see ibid., pp. 86-109.

[31] Ibid., p. 300.

[32] For evidence that Benson is aware of this problem to some degree, see ibid., p. 293.

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so many ethno-cultural factors worked together, Benson has obscured our perception of any of them. Benson's technique of building one explanation upon the next undercuts his own capacity to account for the diverse political affiliations formed by native American voters of similar background throughout the state.

Most ethno-cultural historians do not, like Hays and Benson, combine so many explanations of ethnic and religious voting patterns. Though reference group hostilities, clashes of cultural tradition, and conflicts of religious values are neither contradictory to one another nor mutually exclusive, there are two compelling reasons for distinguishing between them. First, these impulses may not always function jointly as in the Hays and Benson accounts. Other ethno-cultural historians have detailed instances in which voters were cross-pressured between reference group antagonisms and the urge to protect their own cultural practices, or between group hatreds and religious beliefs. Second, ethno-culturalists have opened up the complex question of the sources of voter motivation, and that problem cannot be easily disposed of by the simple assertion that on different, but harmonious, levels, ethno-cultural identifications promoted party differences. There is no obvious reason why cultural differences should become political ones, and to pile one explanation upon the next is to obscure the problem of salience as quickly as it was uncovered in the first place.

Most recent ethno-cultural historians assume that nineteenth-century ethnic and religious voting groups took one another as referents, often as negative referents, and that that orientation was a determinant of voting behavior. Drawn from sociologist Robert K. Merton's observation that "men frequently orient themselves to groups *other than their own* in shaping their behavior and evaluations,"[33] the negative reference group concept has been applied by historians as an independent explanation of voting patterns and in conjunction with interpretations based on religious values and cultural practices.[34]

Michael F. Holt is the most insistent proponent of the view that simple group antagonism explains political alignments in the nineteenth century. Writing of Pittsburgh politics in the 1840s, Holt says "some . . . native-born workers and shopkeepers . . . voted Whig to express their resentment against and disassociation from the immigrants and Catholics whom they considered Democrats." Similarly he contends that the growth of the Republican coalition was shaped as much by "the mutual

[33] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Enlarged Ed. (New York, 1968), p. 288.

[34] For explicit discussions of the reference group concept, see Benson, pp. 27, 284-285, 301-304, and 315-317; Luebke, p. 8; Silbey, *The Transformation*, pp. 8-11; and Swierenga, "Ethnic Voter," p. 32.

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dislike by the members of one party for those of the other" as by national questions.[35] While Holt once slips into a quasi-ideological account of voting patterns (some Whigs "took a different moral view on issues than did those who belonged to the Democratic party"),[36] his basic analysis is exclusively in reference group terms. Responding directly to the view that Protestant moral zeal for temperance, antislavery, and Sabbatarian reform promoted the growth of the Republican party, Holt insists that "a large number of Protestants voted Republican out of a negative reflex response to the Catholics in the Democratic party. Simply because Catholics were Democrats, and not necessarily for any positive reasons, many Protestants voted Republican."[37]

More typically, ethno-cultural analysis connects group political antagonism to conflicts of custom or belief. In general, those ethno-culturalists who have focused on foreign-born voters offer an explanation of political behavior based upon cultural defense. By contrast, those who have explored the politics of both native Americans and foreigners find that differences in religious values were the source of political divisions. Both groups of historians hold that Whigs and, later, Republicans supported temperance, Sunday observance, and English language education to attract the votes of native Americans and some Protestant ethnic groups. Democrats, they contend, fought these efforts to impinge upon ways of living to which their party's constituency was devoted. Though these historians agree on the basic scenario for the conflict, they differ in their accounts of the kinds of human motives at stake.

Emphasizing differences in custom, not belief, several ethno-cultural historians have entered the long-standing debate about the immigrant vote in 1860. Robert P. Swierenga and George H. Daniels contend, respectively, that Dutch and German voters in Iowa supported the Democrats that year in reaction against the Republican party's nativist and prohibitionist image.[38] Specifically denying that Germans were unusually attracted by the Republican ideology of liberty, Daniels says that "Like masses everywhere, the rank and file Germans . . . considered their own liberty to be of paramount importance. Apparently ignoring the advice of their leaders, they cast their ballots for the party which consistently promised them liberty from prohibition and native-American legislation."[39]

[35] Holt, pp. 81 and 8.

[36] Ibid., p. 82.

[37] Ibid., p. 218n.

[38] Swierenga, "Ethnic Voter," p. 41; Daniels in Silbey and McSeveney (eds.), p. 149.

[39] Daniels in ibid., p. 149. Kleppner's study of the immigrant vote in Pittsburgh in 1860 supports the Swierenga-Daniels view of the importance of the prohibition issue

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At the end of the century, too, immigrants voted to defend themselves against the imposition of native-American ways of living. Roger E. Wyman's study of the election of 1890 in Wisconsin concludes that German Lutherans, traditionally in the Republican camp, voted Democratic that year to express their opposition to the Bennett Law, a GOP measure requiring English language instruction in the schools.[40] Only once before had the Republicans lost an election in Wisconsin (in 1873, when the party pushed through the Graham liquor law setting high license fees for liquor establishments), and Wyman accounts for their defeat by reference to German determination to protect *Deutschtum*. "Throughout much of eastern Wisconsin," he says, "German immigrants jealously guarded what they regarded as their right to preserve many of the customs they brought with them from Europe."[41]

Like the Wyman study, Frederick C. Luebke's analysis of Nebraska Germans in the 1880s and 1890s explains voting patterns in terms of cultural defense. "As the 1880s passed," he writes, "the identification of the German voters with the Democratic party was strengthened under the pressure of continued agitation for woman suffrage, prohibition, and Sabbatarianism. By 1890 . . . a remarkable consensus had been achieved among a diverse people as they embraced the Democratic party as the champion of personal liberty."[42] As in Wyman's Wisconsin, Germans in Nebraska switched to the Democrats in response to a perceived threat to *Deutschtum*. "Prohibition," in Luebke's words, "was in reality not a simple political issue. It was the political symbol of a general conflict of cultures that confronted the immigrant." German Democratic votes represented a "defense of their cultural heritage" against the bigotry of both Republicans and Populists.[43]

Several ethno-cultural historians demonstrate that ethnic voters were not always able to reconcile their reference group perceptions and lifestyle interests. Samuel T. McSeveney's account of New York City voting patterns in the middle 1890s is illustrative.[44] German Lutherans,

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that year, but Kleppner finds a religious division more important than an ethnic one ("Lincoln," p. 187).

[40] Wyman, "Wisconsin Ethnic Groups." Other ethno-cultural historians also deal with the political consequences of the Bennett Law: Jensen, *The Winning*, pp. 123-140; and Kleppner, *The Cross*, pp. 158-159 and 165-167.

[41] "Wisconsin Ethnic Groups," p. 273.

[42] Luebke, p. 115.

[43] Ibid., pp. 124 and 151.

[44] McSeveney, *Politics of Depression*, pp. 99-106, 108-113, 142-148, 151-155. McSeveney is something of an exception to the generalization offered concerning the division between ethno-culturalists who focus on ethnic voters and those who explore the political behavior of all groups. His study of northeastern politics in the 1890s

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McSeveney says, "voted Democratic despite their antipathy toward Irish Catholics because of Republican involvement with [i.e., implicit support for] Prohibitionism." In 1894, however, Germans joined Republicans in an anti-Tammany coalition that downplayed cultural issues and elected William Strong mayor of New York. Within a year, the fusion organization was deeply divided over the liquor and Sunday-closing questions; when Republican Police Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt demanded strict enforcement of the Sunday laws, Germans returned to the Democratic party.[45] As McSeveney's analysis makes plain, both Tammany and the GOP represented groups and practices which German Lutherans abhored. Tammany stood for Irish Catholic power and political corruption. The Republicans symbolized native-American domination and a threat to Sundays and beer. German voting behavior in the mid-1890s signifies the impossibility of keeping all reference group and life-style impulses in harmony. Each election day posed a choice in which a range of ethno-cultural voting determinants were by no means easily reconciled.

Wyman's analysis also suggests that politically salient cultural feelings cannot be assumed always to be jointly operative. The elections of 1873 and 1890 in Wisconsin ran counter to the overall drift of German Protestants into the Republican party as a result of the "subtle exploitation of the inherent religious antagonisms between Catholic and Protestant Germans by Republican party leaders."[46] Reference group antagonisms helped solidify Republican domination in Wisconsin, but there was always the possibility that a life-style issue like English language instruction or temperance would override those religious hatreds and swing crucial votes to the Democratic party. Republicans lost the election in the Bennett Law year of 1890 because their efforts to overcome cultural protection with cultural dislike were unsuccessful.

While at least one ethno-cultural historian, Frederick C. Luebke, asserts that a theory of cultural defense or cultural protection can explain native-American voting as well as immigrant political behavior,[47] most ethno-cultural historians suggest that native activity on life-style issues is more logically regarded as aggressive rather than defensive. The line between cultural protection and cultural imperialism is a thin one. The drive of native Americans to impose their styles of Sunday behavior, education, and beverage consumption upon immigrants (cultural imperial-

covers native-born members of the electorate as well as immigrants, but McSeveney's account generally relies on reference group perceptions and cultural defense to account for party identifications. At least twice, however, he uses religious values to explain native-American voting behavior; see pp. 47 and 205-206.

[45] Ibid., pp. 102-103, 142-144, and 153.

[46] "Wisconsin Ethnic Groups," p. 270.

[47] Luebke, p. 130.

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ism) could easily be conceived of and expressed as a desire to protect American moral standards from the corruption of alien ways. Similarly, immigrant defense of ethnic habits could be regarded and denounced as an effort to transmit those ways of living to all Americans. In spite of their rhetorical similarities, the urge to protect one's customs and habits and the effort to impose cultural practices upon others represent quite different kinds of links between ethno-cultural identifications and politics. The simple desire to go on living a certain way can explain the ethnic response without recourse to ideological or psychological factors. The desire to extend one's own cultural mores, by contrast, is not so simple. Religious beliefs, or perhaps an inbred cultural paranoia, might better account for the behavior of native Americans. Consequently, it is understandable why ethno-cultural historians who try to explain the political affiliations of voters other than immigrants find the source of conflict not simply in different ways of living but also in different ways of believing.

Religious Values and Party Identity

Benson and Hays were the first historians to suggest that partisan political differences reflect primarily the division between devotees of two identifiable strains of religious values. More recently, Kleppner, Jensen, and Formisano have treated this subject.[48] Despite differences in terminology and willingness to identify the politically salient values with particular theological creeds,[49] all five ethno-culturalists agree that in the nineteenth century voters whose religious heritage was pietistic or evangelical were prone to support the Whigs and, later, the Republicans, while those whose religion was nonevangelical or ritualistic normally voted Democratic. Expressed as a generalization by Kleppner: "The more ritualistic the religious orientation of the group, the more likely it was to support the Democracy; conversely, the more pietistic the group's outlook the more intensely Republican its partisan affiliation."[50]

[48] Benson, pp. 198-205; Hays, "History," pp. 196-197; Kleppner, *The Cross*, pp. 69-91; Jensen, *The Winning*, pp. 58-88; Formisano, pp. 137-164.

[49] Benson's terms are "puritan" and "nonpuritan"; Hays uses the word "Pietism" but it has no opposite; Kleppner distinguishes between "pietists" and "ritualists"; Jensen calls them "pietists" and "liturgicals"; Formisano's phrases are "evangelical" and "nonevangelical."

Benson and Formisano are reluctant to associate the two clusters of values with theology; see *The Concept*, p. 200, and *The Birth*, pp. 137-138. For Hays, Kleppner, and Jensen the distinction is more closely tied to religious practices and theology: see Hays, "History," p. 196; Kleppner, *The Cross*, p. 73; Jensen, *The Winning*, pp. 62-68.

[50] Kleppner, *The Cross*, p. 71. See also Jensen, *The Winning*, p. 69; Hays, "History," pp. 196-197; Benson, pp. 198-207; Formisano, pp. 138, 324, and 330.

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These historians find the link between religious values and politics in the urge of evangelicals and pietists to "reach out and purge the world of sin." In Jensen's words, "The bridge linking theology and politics was the demand by pietists that the government remove the major obstacle to the purification of society through revivalistic Christianity, institutionalized immorality." Formisano agrees: "The feature of evangelical Calvinism holding most salience for political behavior was concern for the moral and social welfare of the community."[51] Pietists favored Sabbatarian legislation, temperance, and, before the Civil War, abolition. Ritualists opposed all three. Differences in religious values became political when the Whig and Republican parties gave at least tacit approval to the moral reform wanted by pietists, while the Democrats supported the liturgical demand for state neutrality regarding personal behavior.[52]

Kleppner, Jensen, and Formisano are all quite explicit in crediting religious values and world views based on those values with the creation of party differences. According to Kleppner, "Partisan affiliations . . . were political expressions of shared values derived from the voter's membership in, and commitment to, ethnic and religious groups." Elsewhere he says "The conflict was literally one of divergent value systems, and of value systems which had been *sanctified*." Jensen asserts directly that "theology, rather than language, customs, or heritage, was the foundation of cultural and political subgroups in America." Of the political situation in the Midwest in 1889, he writes, "The issue was the tension between the pietistic and liturgical world views." Formisano refers to the "value conflicts imbedded in party cleavages," and he asserts "Whigs and Democrats did possess diverging ideologies which must be seen in the broader context of their antipathetic world views of man and society."[53]

The very same issues which other ethno-cultural historians regard as clashes of custom and habit are treated by Kleppner, Jensen, and Formisano as conflicts of value and belief. Thus, for Kleppner, the debate over education was a "question of *whose* value system was to be transmitted to future generations." According to Jensen, "the prohibition issue tapped a deeper layer of values and beliefs" than a simple old-stock versus immigrant cleavage. To the drys, "opposition to the evils of alcohol was a tenet of religious belief."[54]

[51] Kleppner, *The Cross*, p. 73; Jensen, *The Winning*, p. 67; Formisano, p. 141; see also Benson, pp. 205-207; Hays, "History," p. 196.

[52] Benson, pp. 205-207; Hays, "History," p. 197, and "Community-Society Continuum," pp. 158-159 and 174; Kleppner, *The Cross*, pp. 71-79; Formisano, pp. 102-127.

[53] Kleppner, *The Cross*, pp. 35 and 75; Jensen, *The Winning*, pp. 82 and 89; Formisano, pp. 102 and 55.

[54] Kleppner, *The Cross*, p. 78; Jensen, *The Winning*, pp. 70 and 72.

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The point is not that if Wyman and Luebke are right about these issues, then Kleppner, Jensen, and Formisano must be wrong, or vice versa. It is easily imaginable that the conflict over liquor, for example, represented a clash of beliefs as well as ways of living. As already noted, to explain the aggressive behavior of native Americans, it may be necessary to treat cultural issues as reflections of deep-seated values and beliefs. Nevertheless, crediting world views with the determination of partisan loyalties is quite a different explanation than citing cultural defense or simple group hatreds. These represent strikingly divergent theories about the kinds of human motives which are the source of political activity.

Strong support for the proposition that different kinds of ethno-cultural political impulses must explicitly be differentiated from one another is provided by close examination of the "world view" interpretations of Kleppner and Jensen. Though these historians are reluctant to admit it, the link between religious beliefs and political behavior is quite different for the liturgicals (or ritualists) than for the pietists. Like Benson, Hays, and Formisano, Kleppner and Jensen establish the initial connection between politics and religion by pointing to the pietistic urge to regulate social morality by legal means. There is no analogous linkage between the liturgical world view and political action. "The *ritualistic perspective*," according to Kleppner, "views the world as a sinful one, but one that has to be accepted as such." Jensen agrees that liturgicals believed "the state had no right to assert a role in delineating public morality.[55] It is not that liturgicals lack values, but that these values have no political significance until they are assaulted by pietists. Kleppner fleetingly admits that "the pietistic orientation obviously has greater social relevance than that stressing intellectual assent to doctrine," but he immediately obscures the assertion with the irrelevant observation that "neither perspective is *inherently* radical nor *inherently* conservative."[56] The question is not one of radicalism versus conservatism, but of "social relevance." Pietism (as defined by Kleppner and Jensen) is intrinsically political; liturgicalism is political only when its adherents are on the defensive.

Though religious values are the source of political action in different ways, Kleppner and Jensen are consistent in upholding a "world view" explanation of ethno-cultural voting. Formisano, by contrast, slips back and forth between interpretations based upon reference group antagonisms and interpretations based on religious beliefs. Indeed, it is doubtful that Formisano intends to ground his account simply on value

[55] Kleppner, *The Cross*, p. 73; Jensen, *The Winning*, p. 64.
[56] Kleppner, *The Cross*, p. 74.

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clashes between evangelicals and nonevangelicals. The opening sentence of his chapter on religion and political parties asserts that "Religion as a group experience and source of values profoundly influenced political behavior in nineteenth-century America."[57] The problem is that Formisano never indicates that religion "as a group experience" may not be politically significant in the same manner as religion as a "source of values." Sometimes Formisano explains voting in terms of values only: "to promote their values envangelicals voted anti-Democratic."[58] In other passages, he appears to equate a conflict of values with group hatreds: "Patterns of negative reaction between evangelicals and other groups explain much voting behavior in Michigan from 1835 to 1852."[59] The point is not that group hatreds and clashes of values are incompatible explanations of political behavior, but that by running them together Formisano is imprecise about how ethno-cultural impulses become political. Precision is necessary because group feelings and religious beliefs do not always operate together.

Formisano's account of the social and cultural forces of realignment in the 1850s suffers because he cannot fully explain the movement to the "evangelical" Republican party by groups he has previously identified as "nonevangelical," particularly Methodists and German Lutherans.[60] By the logic of Formisano's own analysis, members of these religious groups should have felt torn between their nonevangelical religious values and their dislike for Catholics. The Republican party represented a version of Protestant beliefs which Methodists and Lutherans rejected, while the Democrats were the party of Popery. But Formisano neglects to differentiate the contradictory effects on voting of religion as a "group experience" and as a "source of values." Religion should have worked in two ways for nonevangelicals who moved in the anti-Democratic direction, and the full development of ethno-cultural analysis ought to make the distinction.

Aside from the need for distinctions between different ethno-cultural impulses, there are special reasons for caution regarding the linkages between religious values and political behavior which Kleppner, Jensen,

[57] Formisano, p. 137.

[58] Ibid., p. 143. See also p. 160.

[59] Ibid., p. 194. See also p. 167. In his discussion of individual religious groups, Formisano often moves back and forth between comments on religious values and on group antagonism. See, for instance, his account of Baptist behavior, pp. 142-143.

[60] For discussion of the Methodists and German Lutherans and ("nonevangelical"), see ibid., pp. 152-155 and 184. For the account of the movement by members of these groups to the Republican party, see ibid., pp. 277, 298-304, and 312-314. Formisano is careful to note that many Methodists and German Protestants remained in the Democratic party.

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and Formisano describe. They explain the relationship between religious world views and politics by referring to the pietistic urge to enforce communal adherence to specific moral standards. But American religious scholars have pointed to ambiguities and divisions in the pietistic tradition, particularly on the question of coercing morality by legal means, such as through prohibition laws. William G. McLoughlin cites an "inherent tension within pietism" between traditions of coercion and voluntarism.[61] Other historians have described an ongoing conflict in nineteenth-century evangelical religion between proponents of moral suasion as a means of social reform and those who urged the legal regulation of personal behavior.[62] The very feature of pietism which enables Kleppner, Jensen, and Formisano to link religious values to politics is more ambiguous than they admit.

The nature of church membership in the nineteenth century suggests further limitations to an explanation of political behavior based upon the religious values of different denominations. A large proportion of the population was unaffiliated with a church and thus beyond the scope of party allegiance based upon religious beliefs.[63] Moreover, these historians do not take account of variations in the degree of devotion to religious values which even church members in the electorate possessed. It is doubtful that all those nominally attached to religious groups felt a commitment sufficient to shape their political behavior. In addition, a high proportion of church members then were women, and hence, nonvoters. Particularly in the Protestant denominations, 60 percent or

[61] William G. McLoughlin, "Pietism and the American Character," *American Quarterly*, Vol. 17 (Summer 1965), 165.

[62] Clifford S. Griffin, *Their Brothers' Keepers: Moral Stewardship in the United States, 1800-1865* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1960), especially pp. 99-151. Joseph R. Gusfield in *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (Urbana, Ill., 1963) argues that the nineteenth-century temperance movement embodied both "assimilative and coercive traditions" and that the commitment to coercion in the late nineteenth century was not inherent in religious beliefs but was rather a "response to cultural confrontations" between native and immigrant groups in the United States; see pp. 69 and 98. Sidney E. Mead in *The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America* (New York, 1963) has noted that the revivalistic tradition itself reinforced the commitment to persuasion and voluntarism in reform movements. "The revivals had demonstrated the possibilities of persuasion. Subsequently, they taught confidence in it" (p. 113).

[63] Jensen estimates that in the Midwest in 1890 fully 27 percent of the population was not church affiliated (*The Winning*, p. 88), and his individual-level data on Illinois and Indiana in the 1870s include huge proportions of voters whose party affiliations cannot be explained by religion (*ibid.*, pp. 59-62; and "Religious and Occupational Roots"). Most of Formisano's tabular presentations of the religious and political preferences of Michigan voting units simply omit those in which the "religiosity" (i.e., ratio of church seats to population) was less than 50 percent (pp. 144, 313, and 315).

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more of those belonging to the church were females, signifying that the proportion of voters who were nonmembers was higher than the percentage of nonchurch members in the entire population.[64]

An interpretation of voting behavior based upon religious values introduces another version of the fallacious assumption that leadership opinions reflect the perceptions of the mass of voters. Ethno-religious historians have properly distinguished between the beliefs and motives of party leaders and those of voters, but they readily assume that religious leaders succeeded, where politicians failed, in transmitting their opinions directly to the electorate. Even if nineteenth-century pietism had been unambiguous in its implications for the legal regulation of morality, and even if all voters had been committed church members, a religious world-view explanation of voting would require evidence that ministers, if not politicians, truly shaped the beliefs of voters.

Starting with similar assumptions about what political history ought to be and about the manner in which national parties utilize culturally salient images to attract grass-roots voters, ethno-cultural historians describe three different ways in which ethnic and religious identifications of those voters are translated into political affiliations. Theories of reference group antagonism, cultural defense, and religious world views represent diverse conceptions of the kinds of human aspirations which are politically significant. Those aspirations are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they may function concurrently, either in harmony with one another, or in contradiction to one another. But it is imperative that political historians distinguish between them, both because ethno-cultural impulses *can* operate in opposition to each other, and in order to understand what kinds of motives and feelings are politically salient at different times and in different places.

The same issue can be politicized for different members of the electorate in diverse ways. Temperance is easily understandable as an attack on aliens and Catholics, as a defense of the native-American way of living, and as an expression of the evangelical urge to make the community more moral. Sabbatarianism and English language education could similarly be politicized at these three different levels. Thus there is nothing surprising about the variety of historical accounts of the meaning of these issues to grass-roots voters. But because the three levels at which the same public question can be treated reflect diverse kinds of political motives and because different groups of voters could exhibit them, historians must make clear just *how* ethno-cultural impulses become politi-

[64] Henry K. Carroll, *The Religious Forces of the United States* (New York, 1912), pp. lvi-lix.

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cal ones. An examination of political rhetoric might indicate, for instance, that in some urban communities temperance was politicized primarily at the level of anti-Catholicism, that elsewhere it was propagandized principally as a way of defending American cultural traditions, and that in some closely knit evangelical communities temperance was pressed as a way of fulfilling one's Christian duty to reform society.

Each of the ethno-cultural historians discussed in this essay gives preeminent attention to one of the three mechanisms whereby cultural impulses become political. A joint examination of these recent studies suggests, however, that historians ought explicitly to take account of the variety of ways in which ethnic and religious aspirations are politically salient. For one thing, the same cultural issue could move different groups of voters in diverse ways. For another, a single voter could be torn between various ethno-religious impulses and face at the ballot box a choice between his hatreds, his habits, and his beliefs.[65]

Voting Behavior and Policy Formation

An ethno-cultural interpretation of past political behavior is fashioned as an explicit alternative to the "progressive" view that socio-economic divisions are the most important determinants of voting behavior and of party coalitions. Yet the most significant theoretical question raised by ethno-cultural history is not whether grass-roots voting is economically determined but whether electoral behavior is rational and goal oriented at all. Given the deep importance of cultural concerns to voters, it is surprising how minimal were the fruits of their prejudices and values. Only a small proportion of public policies in the nineteenth century were culturally oriented, and the question arises as to why the American electorate was so strikingly unsuccessful at getting results on the ethno-religious and ethno-cultural factors that mattered most. From the perspective of the ethno-cultural challenge to progressive history, it is ironic that most of the government's actions related to those economic issues deemed of such small significance in the determination of voting behavior. The most important message conveyed by ethno-cultural analysis is not that voters are ethnically and religiously motivated, but that grass-roots concerns are so irrelevant to public policy making.

[65] Some ethno-religious conflicts have no political salience. Hostility between different nationality groups in the Catholic Church rarely produced political divisions, though analogous antagonisms in Protestant churches frequently found political expression. A theory of ethno-cultural politics ought to specify not only the variety of cultural conflicts which are politically meaningful, but also the circumstances under which those conflicts will fail to achieve political significance.

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Voting can be understood as the expression of deeply felt personal impulses without assuming that its goal is to further the implementation of particular programs, even ethno-cultural ones. The wide range of human feelings and motives upon which appeals for temperance and Sabbath observance were based suggests that desire for specific public policies is not what moves the mass of the electorate. Most voters respond to group likes and dislikes, to fondness for their own way of living, or to a perception of what their God requires. The relation between particular government actions and these deeply personal aspirations is never very direct or obvious. Political rhetoric is designed to establish the connections and to popularize specific public programs by relating them to what men feel. Since most decisions about governmental acts are not overtly cultural, leaders undertake to make those connections for other kinds of issues as well.

If voting behavior is a response to carefully fashioned rhetoric and does not signify the demand for particular government policies, then where and how do public policy programs arise? And if voters care most passionately about cultural rather than material matters, then why is so much of the political rhetoric and so much of the government's activity devoted to economic affairs? Ethno-cultural history raises the question of what, if any, relation the processes of mobilizing voters into political parties and determining economic policies bear to one another. It is important to ask how thoroughly ethno-cultural historians have transcended a rational, goal-oriented view of politics and to see how directly they have faced the question of the relation between mobilizing voters and making economic policies.

Though most ethno-culturalists are not concerned with the sources of economic policies,[66] they take for granted that these programs are formulated by elites rather than by grass-roots voters. Formisano says that in Michigan "The parties' mass supporters tended to follow the positions on economic issues marked out by national and state leaderships." Kleppner points out that leadership decisions are a "visible limitation" on party rhetoric: "When the national and state leaders of the party commit themselves . . . to a high tariff policy, the party's campaign propaganda cannot very well depict the organization as a vehicle for free-trade sentiment."[67] Ironically, while ethno-cultural historians assume policies are the creations of leaders, they analyze them only from the

[66] Hays ("Community-Society Continuum," p. 152), Jensen (*The Winning*, p. xiii), and Formisano (p. 11) explicitly disavow interest in policy making. Other ethno-cultural studies are so evidently preoccupied with voting patterns that a direct disclaimer regarding policy making is unnecessary.

[67] Formisano, p. 55; Kleppner, *The Cross*, p. 150.

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perspective of their influence upon voters. If leaders have any purposes other than the mobilization of the electorate, these are ignored by historians who take as their subject grass-roots behavior. Thus McSeveney says that "Republican leaders had for some time sought to maintain unity among various groups within the party's coalition by stressing the tariff as the bond that united Republicans."[68] The questions of why leaders chose the tariff and a protective stance on the tariff issue are answered only with regard to the effects of the strategy on voters. Policy program decisions are treated simply as the tactics of coalition makers.

Typically, ethno-cultural historians consider economic policies "in terms of their symbolic meaning for the masses."[69] Both Holt and Formisano conclude that in the 1850s tariff and homestead questions were of small importance to the growth of the Republican coalition.[70] When such issues were raised, however, they often were formulated in a culturally symbolic manner. The tariff could easily be argued as a call for the protection of native-American workers against foreigners. Homestead policy proposals for the distribution of land to "citizens" rather than "persons" could similarly take on ethno-religious significance.[71] In the 1890s, too, economic issues were politicized in a cultural context. Kleppner notes that Democrats attacked activist Republican economic policies as threats to the "personal liberty" of voters, and, along with Jensen and McSeveney, he points to the Republican reliance on both tariff and currency questions to mute the party's anti-immigrant image.[72]

Ethno-culturalists are not thoroughly consistent in treating economic policy proposals as cultural symbols. Holt, for instance, regards national economic issues as symbolic but accepts local ones at face value. Pittsburgh Democrats, he says "attempted to build a new coalition based on . . . popular outrage at railroads." In Holt's analysis, there was nothing false or symbolic about the local railroad issue; only when Pittsburgh Republicans themselves adopted an antirailroad stance could they neutralize Democratic gains.[73] Jensen ambivalently treats economic policy questions in 1896 as both symbolic and substantive. Much of his analysis of the presidential campaign that year suggests that the "real battle" was over culturally sensitive moral questions.[74] But Jensen also handles the currency question in a traditional, rational fashion. "Repub-

[68] McSeveney, *Politics of Depression*, p. 87.
[69] Formisano, p. 11.
[70] Holt, p. 5; Formisano, p. 280.
[71] Holt, pp. 243 and 258; Formisano, p. 294.
[72] Kleppner, *The Cross*, pp. 155-156, and 367; Jensen, *The Winning*, pp. 291 and 305; McSeveney, *Politics of Depression*, pp. 185-186.
[73] Holt, pp. 221, 228, and 251-253.
[74] Jensen, *The Winning*, pp. 269, 278-279, 292-296, and 305.

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licans," he writes, "had literature for everybody. Farmers and coal miners, wool growers and steel workers, mechanics and lumberjacks, each could read carefully prepared analyses of the relative effects of gold and silver on his own well-being. . . . Evidently most of the [200 million] pamphlets reached their target audiences and were read and reread."[75] The ethno-cultural approach to political analysis embodies a denial that voters respond wholly rationally to different party policies on economic questions, but some of these historians are reluctant to pursue that insight consistently.[76]

The ambivalence apparent in ethno-cultural history about what political parties are and what they do is another sign of reluctance to move beyond a rational, goal-oriented view of politics to a more symbolic perspective. For the most part, these historians regard parties as coalitional instruments. As Kleppner puts it, hedging slightly, "Whatever else it may be, a political party is a device for mobilizing voters." Formisano agrees, opening his book with a discussion of "parties as coalitional systems," and Silbey takes as his central theme in the 1840 to 1860 period the struggle of the Republican party to reconcile "a combination of social groups."[77] But ethno-cultural historians also treat parties as vehicles for the expression of the policy goals of grass-roots party members. Benson regards "the pursuit of [both cultural and economic] goals by individuals or groups" as one of the three "categories of voting determinants." Kleppner refers to the way in which the coalitional purposes of parties may be threatened by the efforts of different groups to implement their demands through the party. McSeveney upholds both a goal-oriented perspective and a coalitional view of parties. "Each party," he writes, "contained cultural groups that sought to attain their goals through politics." And Silbey, too, combines both interpretations of what political parties do.[78]

There is nothing inherently contradictory about assigning to political parties both coalitional and goal-oriented functions; indeed, traditional political history has always assumed parties perform both kinds of

[75] Ibid., p. 288.

[76] McSeveney (*Politics of Depression*), too, treats economic issues in 1896 as both substantive and symbolic. Republicans argued that a protective tariff and gold currency would reduce unemployment and raise wages (p. 177). But these economic issues were also symbols of the cultural inclusiveness of the GOP (p. 220). Bryan failed because northeastern workers rejected his economic arguments (p. 219) and because his moral rhetoric on the currency question was offensive to some groups (p. 182).

[77] Kleppner, *The Cross*, p. 93; Formisano, p. 3; Silbey, *The Transformation*, especially pp. 28-32.

[78] Benson, pp. 281-283; Kleppner, *The Cross*, p. 93; Samuel T. McSeveney, "Voting in the Northeastern States During the Late Nineteenth Century," in Silbey and McSeveney (eds.), p. 202; Silbey, *The Transformation*, p. 4.

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tasks. Nevertheless, if voters respond most decisively to cultural images and symbols, and if leaders, rather than masses, formulate party programs, then political parties ought not to be regarded as vehicles of grass-roots demands. A coalitional definition of party functions is the most logical one for ethno-cultural historians to adopt.

In its major thrust, ethno-cultural political analysis recognizes that the formation of economic policy programs and the processes of voter mobilization are not intrinsically related to one another. These historians assume that economic policies are formulated by cosmopolitan leaders, refashioned as cultural symbols by local leaders, and perceived by voters in the light of cultural, not material, impulses. Nevertheless, there is an unwillingness among ethno-cultural historians to accept the separation of economic policy making from grass-roots concerns. They sometimes treat voters as goal oriented on economic policies and occasionally regard party voting as the expression of particular material demands.

The problem is dual: on the one hand, ethno-culturalists ignore the question of the origin of economic policies, and on the other hand, they sometimes imply that those policies are formulated to advance the political goals of voters. Ethno-cultural historians neglect the question of how policies are formed by treating party programs only from the perspective of their strategic impact upon mass voting. Private motives of elites, as well as long-range patterns of social and economic development, are ignored as sources of economic policy. The reply that policy formation is another problem and that historians should not be criticized for the topics they select is insufficient here. Ethno-cultural history purports to explore the bridges between local and national orientations in politics, between leaders and masses, and between economic policy programs and the personal aspiration of voters. Bridges cannot be studied from one bank of the river only.

If political history is not to become a branch of social history, then we need ultimately to know what determines the agenda of issues and policies that are up for decision. In effect, the ethno-culturalists have told us where not to look for an answer: the electorate. Voters have other things on their minds. Sometimes, however, ethno-cultural historians imply that the electorate is the place to look. They suggest that voting *is*, in part, the expression of political goals, and that the processes of building majorities and fashioning policies are intimately related. The dangers of an exclusive focus on coalition making are twofold: it ignores the traditional "Who gets what how?" problem, and it risks the implication that in explaining why people vote it has answered the traditional question as well.

Ethno-cultural history—for all the theorizing of its practitioners—

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leaves us without a theory of what electoral politics have to do with policy making. Old ideologically oriented interpretations of American politics and not-so-old class theories at least had the advantage of giving coherence to the electoral and policy-making processes. They implied that voters were goal oriented, that leaders implemented the desires of their constituents, and that the process was a rational one between two (or more) groups of voters and leaders. Ethno-culturalists have quite properly introduced elements of symbolism and myth making into our understanding of electoral behavior. They have distinguished between leadership perceptions and mass behavior, and between economic policies and cultural impulses. Indeed, they have done the job thoroughly enough to suggest that perhaps the pieces cannot be put back together again. Electoral politics and policy making may not have a great deal to do with one another.

The symbolic patterns which politicians create to link decisions about government action to the personal aspirations of voters are available for politicizing noncultural issues as well as explicitly cultural ones. Indeed, any public question can be expressed as a reference group conflict, a life-style problem, or a question of values. The greatest single issue of the nineteenth century, slavery, was propagandized in the North at all these levels. Abolitionists attacked the peculiar institution as sinful and morally wrong, and thereby politicized it at the level of beliefs and values. As Eric Foner has shown, Republican politicians more typically decried the slave system as hostile to free labor and to the northern way of life based upon free labor.[79] And, as several ethno-cultural historians have suggested, slavery was politically salient as a reference group issue too. Formisano, Holt, and Silbey contend that the antislavery issue was often most powerfully argued in the North as anti-Southernism and anti-Negroism.[80] Much of the current debate among historians about the meaning of the slavery issue to the northern electorate comes down to a question of the style by which it was most frequently politicized. Slavery was a moral problem, a life-style issue, and a negative reference group question. Like ethno-cultural issues and economic ones, the slavery question could be made salient through symbolic rhetoric at all these levels, and so move northern voters to strong feelings about government policy toward an institution remote from their daily lives.

While ethno-cultural historians have been neither thoroughly consistent nor fully explicit about the use of political symbolism on other than

[79] Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York, 1970), especially chapters 1 and 2.

[80] Silbey, *The Transformation*, p. 17; Formisano, pp. 244, 265, 267-272, 278-281, 287-288, 326-327, and 329; Holt, pp. 55-56, 193-199, 304-305, and 312.

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cultural issues, their studies strongly suggest that carefully fashioned appeals to deeply felt personal impulses, rather than demands for particular government policies, most decisively activated voters and helped create and maintain their partisan loyalties. But these historians have failed to explain adequately why political history should concentrate so much attention on voting behavior. Election campaigns and party loyalties were important forms of entertainment and of social and cultural expression in the nineteenth century, but what they had to do with other aspects of the political system remains unclear.

The most unfavorable thing there is to say about the ethno-cultural school is that its members have not pursued their own fine insights far enough. Unless political history becomes a subdivision of social history, it is important to specify precisely how cultural identifications become politically salient, and to face squarely the question of what, if anything, mobilizing voters has to do with making policies.

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James T. Shotwell and the Science of International Politics

CHARLES DEBENEDETTI

Like the larger concept of political science, the idea of a science of international politics has many connotations. Traditionalists recognize the idea as a "rigorous and critical" means of acquiring "a coherent, precise, and orderly body of knowledge" regarding international politics.[1] Modernists believe that the notion signifies a discipline "capable of accurate description, comprehensible explanation, and statistically reliable prediction" through the use of quantitative techniques.[2] And, at an earlier time, Scientific Progressives understood the idea to mean the rational management of international society. We may yet be returning to their view.[3]

[1] Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," *World Politics*, XVIII, no. 3 (April 1966), 375.

[2] J. David Singer's introduction, in Singer (ed.), *Human Behavior and International Politics: Contributions from the Social-Psychological Sciences* (Chicago, 1965), p. 4.

[3] David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," *The American Political Science Review*, LXIII, no. 4 (December 1969), 1051–1061. For the notion of Scientific Progressivism, see Ronald Tobey, *The American Ideology of National Science, 1919–1930* (Pittsburgh, 1971), pp. 3, 12–19, 86; Sidney Kaplan, "Social Engineers as Saviors: Effects of World War I on Some American Liberals," *The Journal of the History of Ideas*, XVII, no. 3 (June 1956), 347–369; or in the section "The Assumptions of International Scientific Progressivism" of this article.

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Between 1919 and 1945, Scientific Progressive plans for the rational management of international society sustained the drive toward a science of international politics—and James Shotwell sustained Scientific Progressivism. A Columbia historian and officer of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Shotwell sought to develop among statesmen and social scientists a movement that would place the purposeful direction of international society in the hands of global experts. He attacked the dangerous incalculability of traditional diplomacy, and worked to pacify Great Power relations through the calm reliability of scientific inquiry. Internationalizing his Progressive optimism, the Columbia scholar assumed that rationality guided essential human endeavors; he ignored the power calculations at the base of politics; and he insisted that process and technique would absorb the hard conflicts of interest that separated peoples. With firm Anglo-American sympathies, he proposed from those foundations a series of international actions that failed to meet the power struggles at the heart of interwar diplomacy. Yet it was mostly through his efforts that the working science of international politics advanced as far as it did between 1919 and 1945.

The purpose of this article is to examine the presuppositions of Shotwell's science of international politics; his attempts to implement it in the world between 1919 and 1945; and the meaning of his work in retrospect. In the process, it is hoped that both traditionalists and modernists will see in the work of this man—a genuine pioneer in the systematic study of international politics[4]—the elements of a working reconciliation. For James Shotwell operated simultaneously as a technician and a moralist, an empiricist and theorist, an observer and an activist. More than any other man of his time, he worked at the intersection of theory, method, and action which remains the main crossing of the science of international politics, and the main hope for the rational development of international order.[5]

The Assumptions of International Scientific Progressivism

James Thomson Shotwell was born in Strathroy, Ontario, in 1874, and was educated at the University of Toronto and Columbia University. In 1904 he joined Columbia's prestigious faculty of History and Political

[4] Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York, 1955), p. viii.

[5] Ronald J. Yalem, "Toward the Reconciliation of Traditional and Behavioral Approaches to International Theory," *ORBIS*, XIII, no. 2 (Summer 1969), 599. For the best recent summary of the issues involved in the traditionalist-modernist controversy, along with pleas for conciliation or at least a "complementarity of contention," see Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton, N. J., 1969).

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Science as a specialist in the history of medieval Europe. There he quickly gained a reputation as being both a brilliant medievalist and a leading practitioner of the New History, the Progressive method of historical inquiry which stressed the importance of socioeconomic forces in human affairs and the instrumental use of ideas. His "philosophic grasp" was so remarkable, one associate recalled only half-jokingly, "that his greatest service lay in keeping the department in touch with the cosmic processes. . . ."[6] In 1924, Shotwell accepted an official position with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, while at the same time retaining his professorship at Columbia. It was from these two places that he simultaneously observed and acted in the drama of world affairs of his time. He assisted American negotiators at the Paris peace conference; initiated discussion toward the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928; and contributed directly to the formulation of the United Nations charter. Though age gradually reduced his activities after the San Francisco conference, he continued to speak and write about world politics until shortly before his death in 1965.

The guiding assumptions beneath Shotwell's approach to international politics took form in the experiences and friendships that he enjoyed in turn-of-the-century New York with Scientific Progressives like John Dewey and Herbert Croly. With them, Shotwell assumed that a rational order undergirded human relations and that the main path toward the comprehension (and control) of that order lay in the empirical wisdom of organized experts. He condemned the senseless inefficiencies and ancient animosities that bred violent instability within and among industrializing states. And he insisted that the best hope for a peaceable international order of collective reason and directed change rested with groups of recognized experts, men who combined disinterested authority and professional standards in a commitment to purify diplomatic processes of fear, waste, and ignorance. Working at Columbia in the country's foremost Department of Government and close to leading American Comteans like Croly, Shotwell shared directly in the two traditions that combined to form the matrix of modern "policy scientism."[7] Certainly his value-assumptions mirrored a positivist faith in the virtues of purposeful rationality. Order existed. Change was inevitable. And organized "creative scientific intelligence" must reconcile man, order, and change through fact gathering, inductive reasoning, and the op-

[6] Harry Elmer Barnes, *History and Social Intelligence* (New York, 1936), p. 66. He was also known as an enthusiastic teacher who "entered a class with a whole pile of books on his arm and lectured with the vivacity of a machine gun." Preston Slosson, unpublished autobiography, in the possession of the author.

[7] Stanley Hoffman (ed.), *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1960), p. 10.

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eration of administrative agencies that thrived as they succeeded in ameliorating group conflict. Mankind simply must learn to "apply scientific methods to the management of society as we have been learning to apply them in the natural world," he declared. For, "like the forces of nature, ideas must be harnessed and set to work, or things will remain exactly as they were before."[8]

From these core beliefs, Shotwell strove between 1917 and 1945 to construct a science of international politics that functioned through organized agencies of world order. Working as a peace technician and public agitator, the Columbia historian began from the premise that the most formative factor in modern human affairs resided in the dynamic concurrence of the Scientific and Industrial revolutions. Piling change atop change, the two forces were unleashing human intelligence and natural energy in a way that qualitatively altered the opportunities as well as the dangers of further human existence.

In World War I, their destructive dynamism had ended the justification of war as a workable instrument of national policy, and thereby set off a revolution which "strikes more at the heart of existing political systems than any other single change since politics began."[9] Uncontrollable and unpredictable, war in the scientific age was a catastrophic explosion in the midst of the delicately balanced machinery of industrial society. Its very incalculability rendered war practically useless and morally unjustifiable. Human reason had to provide substitutes to a war problem whose only answer resided "in the nature of science."[10]

Convinced of the rational necessity of peace, Shotwell devoted his life to organizing international experts in the work of rationalizing institutions of world order. He believed that experts were best prepared to organize peace for two reasons. In the first place, they were trained to analyze and resolve problems through the rigorous application of the scientific method, which served (1) to minimize personal prejudices; and (2) as "a directing force which lights up this otherwise so irrational world and gives us our bearings as we move in what we call progress from one obstacle to another on the path of our adjustment to environment."[11] In the second place, experts were responsible for devising a

[8] James T. Shotwell, *Intelligence and Politics* (New York, 1921), p. 26; "Mechanism and Culture," *Historical Outlook*, 16 (January 1925), p. 7; address, in *Report* of the National Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, January 1925, p. 200, Box 1, Records of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, Swarthmore College Peace Collection.

[9] James T. Shotwell, "Locarno and After," *Association Men*, LI, no. 6 (February 1926), 269.

[10] James T. Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy and Its Renunciation in the Pact of Paris* (New York, 1929), pp. 21–22.

[11] James T. Shotwell, "Intelligence in Foreign Affairs," *Columbia Alumni News*,

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functioning science of international politics because of the peculiar success of their nineteenth-century forebears in rationalizing the institutions of the modern nation-state. Shotwell conceded that social scientists might become "evangelists of the religion of patriotism rather than the exponents of scientific objectivity." But he felt that this danger was minor in comparison with the massive ignorance of international politics that social scientists were best prepared to eliminate.[12]

A dedicated gradualist, Shotwell assumed that the sinews of world order would grow from the combined experiences of existing nation-states. Yet he was willing to explore almost any avenue toward world order, and he operated in practice as both an internationalist and a transnationalist, seeking general harmony through cooperation among national governments as well as among common interest groups. The Columbia historian made no pretenses toward utopian schemes of world government or universal control. But he was determined to construct an international order of change and stability that melded the interests of various nation-states in institutions approved by statesmen and supervised by a multinational corps of scientists and engineers "in whose hands lie the forces of eternal change."[13]

In accepting the nation-state as the core unit in a system of world peace and a science of international politics, Shotwell flashed that sense of ambiguous realism which he exhibited throughout his career. He readily acknowledged that there was no single panacea for war or international chaos. There was no way to extinguish power as a factor in human relations. There was no use in appealing to men's higher ideals.[14] Peace scientists must recognize that it was "not logic but self-interest which in the long run determines the structure of international rela-

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XVI, no. 22 (March 13, 1925), 291. While Shotwell's faith in progress through the scientific method today seems quaint and outmoded, his understanding of social scientific objectivity corresponds to its modern status as "a social virtue, an unwillingness to commit oneself too far to any particular conceptual scheme or any particular view of reality." Paul Taylor, "International Relations Theory, the Idea of Progress, and the Role of the International Civil Servant," *Political Studies*, XX, no. 3 (September 1972), 272; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master?* (New York, 1972), pp. 11–13, 15–16.

[12] *New York Times*, June 28, 1935, p. 23; *Yearbook of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1937* (Washington, 1937), p. 138; ibid., *1934* (Washington, 1934), p. 138.

[13] James T. Shotwell, "The Place of Woodrow Wilson in History: Address to Commemorate the 82nd Anniversary of Woodrow Wilson's Birth" (New York, 1939), p. 9.

[14] "I have no hopes of reforming the world by either formulae or idealism alone," he told a close friend. "We have to adjust governments to realities. Fortunately, I see the *realities* of the future as headed for cooperative experiments in justice (broadly speaking) instead of tolerating the anarchy which openly endorsed aggression, as was

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tionships."[15] Yet it was precisely in his understanding of that self-interest that Shotwell misled both himself and the movement for a scientific peace. Detached from domestic power struggles within his own country, he failed to treat expressions of national interest as the political upshot of shifting contests for internal power. Instead, he insisted upon defining the self-interest of states in rationalistic but artificial terms which had their base in the increasing interdependence of science and industry. Neglecting the political substance of international politics, Shotwell consistently interpreted the actions of states in light of his belief in their common need to avoid total war and prepare for fuller economic integration. In the process, he ignored the diabolical tenacity of modern integral nationalism and overlooked the possibility that the conflicting interests of rival nations might be so fundamental to the survival of their respective ruling elites that even the most scientific advice of expert specialists would be irrelevant to their calculations. In that wilderness where scientific inquiry passes into crude political action, Shotwell had neither charts nor the resources for exploration. He could only hope for "the realism of intelligence and discovery."[16] But hoping was not enough.

James Shotwell aimed to uncover the mechanics of peace, and not its political prerequisites. In this spirit, he urged men of goodwill to experiment in periodic conferences and continuing commissions in building harmonious policies on the basis of facts assembled by expert authorities. War was no longer the way of peace, he declared, just as "*Machtpolitik* is no longer *Realpolitik*."[17] It was rather facts and figures, organized experts, and machinery for conferences and commissions that constituted the essential means through which social scientific realists could align national politics with the peacemaking interdependence that science and industry were weaving in everyday life. It was a course that promised great advances, and which produced great disappointments.

Implementing a Science of International Politics

In practice, Shotwell sought to realize his social scientific ideals through the building of international data-gathering commissions and the for-

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the case in the 18th and 19th centuries. The growth of international morality was feeble so long as there was no mechanism for it to work, no surety for its functioning. That is why the League and Court seem to me so fundamental. *If they are*, we have merely to direct the attention of the coming generation to them, and leave the decision of policy safely in their hands." Shotwell to Tasker H. Bliss, February 28, 1926, Box 270, Tasker H. Bliss Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. (Shotwell's italics.)

[16] *New York Times*, IX, May 16, 1925, p. 23.

[10] Shotwell in *Report* of the National Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, pp. 299–300.

[17] *Yearbook of the Carnegie Endowment*, 1937, p. 134.

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mation of cadres of organized experts. In 1917, he helped Walter Lippmann and Colonel Edward M. House in forming the Inquiry, a high-powered group of academicians and social scientists who were expected by Washington to define the rational bases of lasting peace. Operating as an expert fact-finding commission, Inquiry members surveyed world affairs in a massive analytical effort that was transmitted to the official American Commission to Negotiate Peace in the form of monographs, maps, memos, and draft treaty formulas.[18] "Tell me what's right," President Wilson begged Inquiry in an unforgettable display of the Progressive faith in social science, "and I'll fight for it; give me a guaranteed position."[19] The Inquiry did amass the empirical data; and the president did fight. But no one in the chaos of 1919 could translate collected facts into a "guaranteed position" of the right, or into a consensual world order that could effectively claim widespread legitimacy.

At the Paris peace conference, Shotwell assumed special responsibility for assisting American negotiators in the formation of the International Labor Organization. Fearful of the strength of class tensions in industrial society, the Columbia historian prized the new organization as the model for the kind of voluntary, cooperative agencies of research and investigation which ought to underpin the new world order of flexibility and strength. As an organization of experts responsible for mediating specific class and international differences, the ILO stood as the prototype of that kind of rational institution which overcame conflict through empirical analysis and administrative action. At the same time, Shotwell valued the ILO experience for the opportunity that it afforded him to establish contact with sympathetic European social scientists. Working with the likes of Jean Monnet and John Maynard Keynes, the American historian built up an informal network of personal contacts with leading members of Europe's liberal community. Ideally, Shotwell wanted to develop "a sort of international academy" of peace technicians who attached their highest loyalties to the dispassionate study of war and its substitutes.[20]

[18] "The task of the Inquiry," Shotwell declared proudly, "was to apply to those problems of international politics, in which the United States has become involved, the tests of scientific research, to measure as far as possible the reality of conflicting claims and to offer suggestions for the new orientation of America. It was a novel experiment; never in the history of the political sciences had there been a greater opportunity for the students of those sciences to help mould instead of merely register events. But the responsibility matched the opportunity." James T. Shotwell, "The Paris Peace Conference," in *George Louis Beer: A Tribute to His Life and Work in the Making of History and the Moulding of Public Opinion* (New York, 1924), p. 83.

[19] Quoted from various diary entries in Lawrence E. Gelfand, *The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917–1919* (New Haven, Conn., 1963), p. 174.

[20] *Yearbook of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1922* (Washington, 1922), p. 82.

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Shotwell worked more directly to formalize that network in 1920, when he became editor of the Carnegie Endowment's *Economic and Social History of the World War*. A seventeen-year, 152-volume project, the *Economic and Social History* represented the most exhaustive attempt on the part of social scientists and wartime administrators to utilize "the great laboratory of the World War" in order to determine the impact of modern total war upon industrial societies.[21] The enterprise provided sobering reinforcement to Shotwell's belief in the criminal stupidity of war in an age of science and industry.[22] Even more, it enabled him to strengthen ties of common interest within the European liberal community and among the Euro-American experts who were best prepared to rationalize the structure of an enduring peace.

Shotwell acted further upon his ambition of joining expert authorities in the organization of peace in 1924, when he founded the American Committee on Disarmament and Security with four sister committees in Europe. Made up of former government advisors and policy makers, the American committee and its sister groups aimed at analyzing the complexities of the global need for disarmament and security through the League of Nations. The league apparatus hardly was prepared to effect early disarmament, Shotwell agreed; but "the method of Geneva" most surely represented the "method of science which carries us out of politics and partisanship into the realities of the situation."[23] Cautiously and quietly, the American group prepared a Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security, a proposal whose principles league leaders fixed into the abortive Geneva Protocol of 1924. The group also continued to serve, like its sister committees in Europe, as an informal advisory body to national policy makers whose approach to international relations was hampered by foolish prejudices and ingrained domestic fears.

In a parallel vein, Shotwell accepted in 1927 the chairmanship of the International Research Committee of the nascent Institute of Pacific Relations. Organizing authorities and conducting planning sessions, the Columbia historian happily presided over successful meetings of the IPR in Honolulu in 1927 and Kyoto in 1929. The influence of experts was becoming everyday more pronounced in international life, he declared in Honolulu, as they uncovered the common interests of states and devel-

[21] James T. Shotwell, "A Mechanism for Peace in Europe," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, XVII (May 1937), 288.

[22] Indeed, he declared confidently when the project ended that "the social sciences are perfectly clear that war is no longer a pertinent instrument for the achievement of national aims in a world which has become economically interdependent," *Yearbook of the Carnegie Endowment, 1937*, pp. 143–144.

[23] James T. Shotwell, "The Responsibility of the United States in the Disarmament Problem," *League of Nations News*, 3, no. 50 (February 1926), 5–6.

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oped the true "strategy of peace."[24] In 1930, he assumed the directorship of Planning and Research in International Relations for the Social Science Research Council. Two years later, he became the American representative to the league's International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation for the purpose of introducing more social scientists to the study of international politics.[25] Overseeing the activities of all three groups, Shotwell grew confident that world politics were entering a higher phase of practicality and service as the technique of inquiry came to replace the technique of force. Geared to the "machinery of discussion" functioning at Geneva, the technique of inquiry was becoming institutionalized through the work of organized experts and rational statesmen who realistically placed conciliation above conflict.

Shotwell's dream of an expanding science of international politics reached its height in the 1920s, as the recuperative diplomacy of postwar Europe stimulated his hope that scientific expertise and intelligent statesmanship would intersect at the league in pursuit of real disarmament and the control of scientific advances. The "development of the physical sciences," the academic activist warned,

> especially in Chemistry and Engineering, is causing a complete displacement in the defense organization of civilized nations. Any serious attempt to find substitutes for war must measure up to Science, as devoted to the mechanics of destruction. The phrase, "the race in armaments," no longer applies. It is a race with invention and discovery in the field of science.[26]

Certain that disarmament represented the litmus test of the league order, Shotwell poured his energies into attempts to assert collective expert direction over the exponential rate of discovery in physics and chemistry, the two scientific areas most closely related to national armament. "We need the scientific analysis, careful, long-continued," he insisted. "No one generation will solve this entirely, but let our generation make a start."[27]

Sensitive to the historic immediacy of the disarmament question, Shotwell collaborated in the 1920s with European and American sympathizers; presented data to national policy makers; and even proposed the cre-

[24] James T. Shotwell, "The Strategy of Peace: What an Unofficial Conference Did in the Pacific," *The Century*, 115, no. 3 (January 1928), 340.

[25] Harold Josephson, "James Thomson Shotwell: Historian as Activist," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison, Department of History, 1968, pp. 264–272.

[26] Shotwell to Raymond B. Fosdick, May 27, 1925. Institute of International Education, Raymond B. Fosdick Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University.

[27] James T. Shotwell, "Political and Technical Aspects of Disarmament," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, XII (January 1926), 82.

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ation of "a Third House" for the league, where "men of special training, both in political and technical matters, but neither politicians nor technical experts in the ordinary sense, might appropriately be assigned the task of working out the armament question."[28] A "Third House" would prepare men of reason and intelligence to study "the fundamentals of international dealings" free of the snares of politics and diplomacy. It meant "a study of the fundamentals behind diplomacy, just as economics furnishes sound principles upon which to base the practical legislation in tariffs or questions of taxation."[29] In a most immediate way, Shotwell was seeking to bridge the two cultures, to join scientists and humanists behind the needs of a world beyond war. It was fruitless, he argued, for humanists to protest against the mounting power of science and technology. "The race in armaments is an international competition in industrial and chemical efficiency," he argued, "and this will never stop. It is ridiculous to think of measures interfering with the progress of modern science merely because that science has a dangerous possibility."[30] What was needed instead "in both humanists and scientists is the Hellenic sense of just proportion, so that neither thought nor machines shall become master of life."[31]

In his drive to organize experts and collect data for responsible policy makers, Shotwell believed that he was proceeding across a watershed in human history, a time when man's vast ignorance of the world of nations was succumbing to the process of planning and control. Faced with species suicide through instability and war, men of intelligence were creating a science of international politics in the postwar years as surely as the science of economics arose in the 1770s, when Scotland's Adam Smith and his colleagues transformed the vague philosophy of political economy into an inductive science. Just as Smith and his associates had informed economics with verifiable hypotheses based on "the study of the fact," so international experts after Versailles were successfully working to give life to a science of politics that reliably provided an orderly framework for legitimate change.[32] In addition, Shotwell maintained, the maturing science of international politics paralleled Smith's work insofar as it rested "similarly upon a recognition of common and reciprocal material interests, which extend beyond national frontiers."[33]

[28] Memorandum of conversation with Professor James T. Shotwell, May 10, 1929, 711.9412 Anti-War/127, *Records of the Department of State*, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

[29] Shotwell to Fosdick, May 27, 1925, Fosdick Papers.

[30] *New York Times*, IX, May 16, 1926, p. 12.

[31] Shotwell, "Mechanism and Culture," p. 8.

[32] James T. Shotwell, "Disarmament Alone No Guarantee of World Peace," *Current History*, 30, no. 6 (September 1929), 1028.

[33] New York Times, X, April 22, 1928, p. 4.

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There was no escape, no evasion, from the fact that industry and modernizing peoples were fixed in an increasingly complex web that was being woven by the crisscrossing lines of science, industry, and trade. The only question worth facing was whether, in its growth, the web of interdependence would increasingly transmit more frequent and more devastating violence; or whether man's collective intelligence could rationalize its development through agencies of peaceable change and mutual prosperity.

Shotwell, of course, was committed intellectually and temperamentally to the second alternative; and, like Smith, he believed that the safest path toward peaceful interdependence existed in the free market exchange of goods among peoples. A true believer in the beneficence of open-door opportunity, Shotwell emphatically identified peaceful world politics in the 1920s with expanding channels of trade among nations. Captivated by the postwar dynamism of American industrial capitalism, he deftly came to characterize industrialization, capitalism, science, and peace as integral—if not interchangeable—parts in an advancing world of liberalism and progress. He not only accepted "the fact that capitalism within the state means peace." He also viewed "the financial balance-sheet" of international capitalism as a "sort of international Magna Charta proclaiming the fundamental principle of emancipation from the tyranny of war. . . ."[34] The Columbia activist virtually identified competitive capitalism as the peaceable and profitable equivalent of war. Certainly he reiterated often the nineteenth-century liberal dogma that fuller trading opportunities provided the best inhibition against balance-of-power politicking, imperialism, and strife.

In line with this belief, Shotwell assumed that the evolving science of international politics and the organization of peace were anchored politically in the global preeminence of the two greatest centers of capitalist power, the United States and the British Commonwealth. The transplanted Canadian felt a strong sentimental attachment to the union of English-speaking peoples. Yet he was even more convinced that Britain and America had an overwhelming material interest in the preservation of peace, that they "have given sureties for peace both to the world generally and to each other, in that they are the two great commercial nations of today with investments throughout the world that depend upon continuing peaceful conditions for their economic life."[35] In international affairs, the convergence of British and American interests and power pointed toward the creation of a world organization that was based

[34] James T. Shotwell, "Does Business Mean Peace?" *The Outlook and Independent*, 151, no. 11 (March 13, 1929), 406, 436.

[35] Shotwell, letter to editor, *The Saturday Review of Literature*, V, no. 33 (March 9, 1929), 758.

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upon "economic interdependence in place of a reliance upon political measures for purely political ends." The enmeshing power of Anglo-American capitalism was carrying nations beyond the anachronism of war and into union with the "natural forces that make for a co-operative civilization."[36]

In a visible way, the capstone of Shotwell's commitment in the 1920s to an evolving science of international politics was the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which bound sixty-three nations to renounce war as an instrument of policy and to seek only pacific means in settling their disputes.[37] Scarcely a repository for meaningless good intentions, the Kellogg Pact ratified in Shotwell's mind the growing recognition among modern peoples that war had outlived its functional usefulness and that nations required rational alternatives. War in its traditional form had been proscribed by common agreement; and industrial states pledged implicitly to employ peaceful means to settle their quarrels. Statesmen had formally acknowledged their responsibility for collective order. Nations had finally set their faces against aggressive war. The organization of peace stood poised at the threshold of its fullest success. Then it disintegrated in the shock of the Great Crash and expired in the ensuing depression.

Inevitably, the disruption caused by the Wall Street crash and depression distracted Shotwell from his hopes for an operating science of international politics. The expansive world of Adam Smith and open-door trading exchange shrunk precipitously as a "contagion of autarchy" infected advanced industrial states; and with their shrinkage went Shotwell's first hopes for an operating science of international politics. Jealously protective of national trade, each major power turned inward to cope with massive domestic discontent at the same time as it exhibited externally a sense of besiegement and fear. The sense of besiegement was justified, of course, in view of the militantly expansionist aims of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the entire authoritarian trend of European politics. Mired in mutual fear and anxiety, the great industrial states turned first to defend their immediate interests against the ravages of the depression and the plans of ambitious neighbors. Shocked by domestic distress and fearful of bolshevism, liberalism reverted to its first commitment to the nation-state and ended its brief affair with the internationalist dream of a predictable world order of consensual change. By

[36] James T. Shotwell, "Peas in the International Pod," *The Outlook and Independent*, 154, no. 11 (March 12, 1930), 414.

[37] For Shotwell's involvement in the origins of the Kellogg Pact, see *The Autobiography of James T. Shotwell* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1961), pp. 205–214; or Robert Ferrell, *Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact* (New Haven, Conn., 1952), pp. 67–70.

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1935, the league system was in shambles; and the thought of a working science of international politics lay broken and discredited.

Though frustrated by the collapse of the league system and the violent spread of integral nationalism, Shotwell struggled in the 1930s to uphold liberal internationalist ideals and to promote the place of organized intelligence in a just world of collective security. He attributed the world depression to the unforeseen costliness of the world war. And he consistently maintained that the best antidote to general economic stagnation was in a full-fledged commitment to free world trade. Disgusted by the authoritarian upsurge in Europe, Shotwell started to agitate for the first time for a fuller liberal commitment to the realization of true social justice. Arguing that international peace hinged upon domestic tranquillity, the historian demanded the "democratization of wealth which enables the common man to buy the goods which he produces" in order both to satisfy himself and to keep the machinery of modern industrial capitalism operating smoothly.[38] Peace was "a function of political, social and economic justice," he declared, and justice was "the criterion of international dealing as it is the ultimate test of the capacity of societies at home."[39] Operationally, the responsibility for effecting these truths devolved once again upon informed cadres of scientific experts. For it was they who best recognized that, while justice still entailed the need to give every man his due, its application "lies now in the extension to human relationships of that same scientific spirit which has so transformed the material world."[40] There was no standard, no ethic, which could not be made more rational and more human by the conscientious application of the scientific method.

Generally, however, Shotwell's hopes for the application of the scientific method in world affairs stagnated in the late 1930s as mounting international tensions drove him into political activities intended to bring about fuller American concern for world order. He served as president of the League of Nations Association, was an active champion of the idea of a world economic conference, and was the driving force behind a series of attempts to modify congressional neutrality legislation. Ironically, it

[38] James T. Shotwell, "The Conditions of Enduring Prosperity," *International Conciliation*, no. 267 (February 1931), 62.

[39] James T. Shotwell (ed.), *The Origins of the International Labor Organization*, Vol. I (New York, 1934), p. xx. "The alignments of the future both between nations and within them are conditioned by economics," Shotwell asserted in 1934. And eleven years later he still assumed that "the advancement of science will ultimately outlaw war, if it has not already done so, but it creates vast new problems in the field of economic relationships." Ibid; and *Yearbook of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (Washington, 1945), pp. 104–105.

[40] James T. Shotwell, "Justice, East and West," *Pacific Affairs*, 5 (May 1932), 403.

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was not until the outbreak of World War II in September 1939—the war that he had struggled so energetically to prevent—that Shotwell returned actively to the work of making international politics more comprehensible and more predictable. In November 1939 the sixty-five-year-old scholar and his good friend, the internationalist leader Clark Eichelberger, organized the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. Composed initially of more than sixty prominent international authorities, the commission provided a precious reservoir of information and analysis for Shotwell during World War II, when he assisted State Department planners in designing the structure of the United Nations.[41] The organization also conducted studies for a variety of infant U.N. agencies, most notably the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, out of its guiding conviction that the most stable bases of peace expanded as international social agencies met the socioeconomic inequities which were at the root of war.

More through action than writing, Shotwell also assisted in the 1930s and 1940s in the development of the modern Functional theory of international relations. The Columbia historian supported the evolving Functional beliefs in the primacy of international social welfare activities and in the importance of independent expert authorities for the building of world order.[42] Though he emphasized the role of the international security machinery more than did leading Functional theorists, Shotwell concurred in their insistence that the twentieth century was the "social century" whose needs were well met by limited transnational agencies, like the ILO and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., that flourished as they met basic human needs. Functional institutions that were built upon shared social and economic interests, designed by experts and administered by agencies of multinational managerial authorities, promised to transform local sources of tension into links of global cooperation while circumventing the persisting claims of nationalism. Empirical, efficient, and effective, the Functional theory of international relations appeared in America in the 1930s as the foremost glo-

[41] Among other members of the commission were John Foster Dulles, Quincy Wright, Denna F. Fleming, Thomas Lamont, Henry Steele Commager, Philip Jessup, Alvin Johnson, and Max Lerner. Shotwell, *Autobiography*, pp. 311–314; Josephson, "James Thomson Shotwell," pp. 372–373; Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II* (New York, 1967), pp. 52–54, 291–292.

[42] David Mitrany to author, May 20, 1970, and January 30, 1973, along with excerpts from Mitrany's paper, "The Making of the Functional Theory." For the common assumptions shared by Shotwell and Mitrany, see the section "The Assumptions of International Scientific Progressivism" above, and Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective," *International Affairs*, 47, no. 3 (July 1971), 532–533, 542–543.

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bal legatee of Scientific Progressivism.[43] And Shotwell did much to smooth the passing inheritance.

An Injured but Inspiring Legacy

James Shotwell was America's most advanced proponent of a science of international politics. Yet his name is shrouded in obscurity and his cause in immobility. Despite a lifelong effort to build a science of international politics within an organization of world order, Shotwell remains a peripheral figure in the history of modern international relations, an undoubted activist but a doubtful achiever. In part, Shotwell's obscurity derives from the fact that he never held a position of policy-making power within the United States government or an international organization. While he held prominent posts with government advisory groups and major peace organizations, the erstwhile medievalist generally exercised policy-shaping rather than policy-making influence within decision-making circles. At the same time, Shotwell's obscurity resulted in part from his temperamental aversion to high visibility. Unassuming in demeanor, he enjoyed his reputation as an influential policy shaper who slipped through the side doors of foreign office buildings while better known but less effective figures marched solemnly through the front entrance. He agitated often for public support. But he much preferred the private work of organizing and managing selected groups toward purposeful ends.

Even more, Shotwell's work toward an operating science of international politics has slipped toward obscurity because of the nationalistic and functionalistic limitations that were inherent in it. The Anglo-American underpinnings of Shotwell's proposed science of international politics sharply curtailed its global appeal. And the professor's liberal-capitalist biases weakened the attractiveness of his cause among peoples who failed to share his enthusiasm for the private ownership of essential goods and services and the bitter competitiveness of the open market. The pretension toward universality which is basic to any science was compromised gravely by Shotwell's transparent prejudices. He managed to expand upon his hopes in a convincing manner until the 1930s, when the refusal of other industrial powers to adjust their desires to the needs of Anglo-American capitalism abruptly destroyed the largest political

[43] For the Functional theory (and hints as to its relationship to Scientific Progressivism), see Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions* (London, 1959), pp. 81–82; Ernest Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Palo Alto, Calif., 1964), pp. 8–14, 19–24; David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago, Quadrangle ed., 1966), pp. 39, 41–42, 68–72, 96–99, 172–173.

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prop beneath his dreams. There proved to be no "natural" interdependence among peoples in the age of science and industry.[44]

Similarly, the effectiveness of Shotwell's envisioned science of international politics was limited severely by its own functionalist presupposition. More than anything, Shotwell and his cause have gravitated toward obscurity because his proposals failed to work; they failed to function. In itself, this is a telling commentary not only on Shotwell's definition of science but also on the larger American liberal conception of science and its place in the field of political behavior. Shotwell rarely was concerned with abstruse questions of scientific methodology or the problems of pure science. Rather, like other Scientific Progressives, he understood science as a functional utilitarian approach to social problems which was valid insofar as it succeeded in rationalizing institutions that worked to make human relationships more efficient and predictable. "The realistic test of an institution," Shotwell said simply, "is whether it works or not."[45] With its very definition predicated upon performance and workability, science by Shotwell's standards was measured by practical results—by visible achievements or failures. It was the science of the tinkerer, of the workshop inventor. It was the science that served as it produced results. And when it failed to produce results it not only failed to be of service, but it called into question the very validity of the ideal—in Shotwell's case, the validity of a science of international politics.

The continuing failure of world leaders after 1919 to cooperate in building an international system to peaceably bring about controlled change through expanding order also helped to hasten the declining appeal of Shotwell's cause. The diplomats' failure compounded the nationalist and functionalist flaws within the professor's plans for a science of international politics that progressed as organized experts transmitted empirical data to rational statesmen. Yet Shotwell's work and his ideas endure. The ILO, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, and the educational, social, and economic agencies of the United Nations all survive as monuments to his success in agitation and organization. His working experiments in international and transnational cooperation mark him as one of the leading seekers in the attempt to implement the Functional theory of international relations. And his basic belief that the Scientific and Industrial revolutions

[44] For a recent warning against the nationalistic coloration of the advice offered by social scientists to international civil servants, see Taylor, "International Relations Theory," pp. 273–275.

[45] *Yearbook of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938* (Washington, 1938), p. 147.

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were producing fundamental changes in the politics of war and peace remains the central justification for the modern disarmament movement, for the ongoing determination to protect humankind against unchecked scientific advances in the making of war.[46] A pioneer in the systematic study of international politics, Shotwell advanced his work in the faith that:

> There is a place in the world for intelligence. The day is coming when science will pass from engineering to statecraft. It has just begun to tear down the old local frontiers of our loyalties to ancient things and is now creating truer loyalties to ourselves and our State by making them part and parcel of a great world problem, . . .[47]

a great world problem whose solution rested with expert policy scientists.

James Shotwell undoubtedly failed to institutionalize a science of international politics in a system of world order during his own lifetime; and for that failure he and his work have been ignored and neglected. Yet Shotwell undoubtedly strengthened the claim of world order by establishing a tradition of employing corps of independent experts and individual agencies to devise, rationalize, and administer multinational institutions that worked to absorb the strains and pressures of global change. And for that success he deserves to be remembered and praised, and his work deserves to be pursued. James Thomson Shotwell talked more about social scientific technique than he practiced it. Yet he can lay greater claim to service in the tradition of the social sciences than most. For he was not content with explaining our violent world; he was determined to change it.

[46] Often his perception enabled him to view matters with a striking prescience, as in the foreboding spring of 1941, when he asserted that "the greatest fact in the world today is not to be found in the European war, vast and portentous as that war is, but in those laboratories where the atom may yield potentialities utterly beyond the control of any master of military powers." *Yearbook of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1941* (Washington, 1941), p. 112.

[47] James T. Shotwell, "International Peace," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 78, no. 4 (March 31, 1938), 550.

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Book Reviews

The Americans: The Democratic Experience *by Daniel J. Boorstin. New York, Random House, 1973.—xiv, 717 pp. $10.00.*

In *The Americans: The Democratic Experience,* Daniel Boorstin completes the interpretation of American history which he began in his two earlier books on *The Colonial Experience* and *The National Experience.* Credit for this *tour de force* should be shared with his wife, Ruth, who has been a collaborator in his work, and with the editor, Robert Loomis, who has helped Boorstin write an immensely well-organized and superbly written book.

More than a century earlier Tocqueville, fascinated by the concept of equality, explored the impact of democratic ideals. For Boorstin, the key concept in *The Democratic Experience* is choice. He is captivated by the energy, vitality, and mobility of Americans in creating an ever expanding world of choices. His book is more than anything else a history of the impact of technology on the capacity of Americans to make choices, a history of the democratization of consumption.

Understandably, Boorstin is less concerned with political structures than was Tocqueville. Political institutions have remained remarkably stable. Even by Tocqueville's time, the basic framework was set. What matters most in this book is what has happened in the kitchen, at the workbench, or on the public highways, not in the legislative halls or the courts. Boorstin chronicles the enormous breakthroughs made between the end of the Civil War and World War I to multiply choices for women and men in their everyday lives: the Singer sewing machine, ready-to-wear clothes, condensed milk, bottled fresh whole milk, the Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, the supermarket, Woolworth's Five and Dime, Montgomery Ward and Sears, rural free delivery, parcel post, the telegraph, radio, trolley cars, automobiles.

Boorstin is at his most interesting when he is writing about the "go-getters" —inventors, organizers, and synthesizers of new technologies—who bring

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doughnuts, hamburgers, and automobile replacement parts to a nation on wheels. In his hands, the democratic experience turns out to be the history of technology for the purpose of consumption. The heroes of the book include Alexander Graham Bell, Thomas Edison, and the less famous, such as Clarence Birdseye, who invented a machine to quick-freeze food, and John Wesley Hyatt, who invented celluloid.

Boorstin is mindful of the hidden costs of technology, and that, paradoxically, it has now given America a sense of narrowing choice. He wonders too whether technology will actually control the daily lives of Americans, while he relies on technology—new knowledge—to determine the answer to that very question.

The book is vulnerable to criticism because of its title. Someone else might see the democratic experience in America from another vantage point: the democratization of social welfare, health care, education, the family, or ethnic group power. This last theme is the problem raised by Tocqueville at the conclusion of his *Democracy in America*, including his prediction that whites, blacks, and native Americans would never be able to relate to each other on a basis of equality. It is not that Boorstin neglects education, ethnicity, or the family completely, but it is technology which captivates him. Infrared radiant heating, the Ingersoll watch, and instant replay techniques get as much space and attention as the infant mortality rate. And it is consumption which absolutely fixates him. For example, installment buying is discussed much more than inoculations. It is fair to question why insurance should be given as much attention as immigrants and immigration, or photography as much as secondary education, or why oil gets more space than women. Even with his framework, Boorstin could have done more to explore the impact of technology on equality and choice within families—e.g., how advanced medical technologies have radically changed the view which middle-class American women now hold of themselves as mothers and potential mothers.

One might wish for more anthropological sensibility and sensitivity in Boorstin. He loves American vitality and energy. For him, the melting pot appears to be a reality. In writing about Italian Americans, the largest single immigrant group to come to the United States during the period covered, one would never suspect their extraordinary tenacity and persistence in holding on to patterns of southern Italian village life. American Jews, who have played a disproportionate role in the evolution of communications and merchandising technologies, usually are noticed only as individuals. Boorstin also betrays slight ethnocentrism in his discussion of American foreign missions. It is one thing to admire the drive, excitement, and benefactions generated by such people as Samuel John Mills, the founding father of American missions; it is another to speak of the young Hawaiian, Henry Obookih, as training "for the priesthood in a pagan Hawaiian cult" (p. 561). That is the way it may seem to Boorstin but it does not seem that way to hundreds of native and thousands of part-

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Hawaiians who look back to their ancient Hawaiian culture with a great sense of respect.

However valid the criticisms, the book is a triumph of Boorstin's own energy, organizing ability, immaculate style, and extraordinary knowledge.

LAWRENCE FUCHS
Brandeis University

The Nature of Human Values *by Milton Rokeach. New York, The Free Press, 1973.—x, 438 pp. $13.95.*

This major work represents the culmination of studies, extending over some twenty-five years; beginning with the study of "authoritarianism" and dogmatism, the investigations have led into generic problems of the organization and change of attitudes, beliefs, and values.

For a social psychologist at this time to entitle a book, *The Nature of Human Values* is no timid act, for it stakes high claims in an area of intense scientific controversy. But this challenging and clarifying work justifies the title as it develops its important thesis through a continuous interplay of data and interpretation.

The volume begins with some crucial definitions and classifications of values and value systems and of related concepts, followed by a detailed account of how indicators were developed for eighteen *terminal* and eighteen *instrumental* values. Next is an analysis of "Values in American Society" based upon data from a 1968 national survey, showing striking differences by sex, income and education, race, and age. Limited comparative data also are presented for students in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Israel. The findings generally accord with other systematic analyses for American society, but add useful specificity. Some findings possibly may be surprising to some readers, e.g., that blacks and whites do not differ significantly across most of the thirty-six values and that many of the first-order differences disappear when socioeconomic differences are controlled. (Perhaps not so surprising is the finding on page 69: "The only value that continues to show a rather large undiminished difference between black and white Americans is *equality*.")

Part Three on "Values and Politics" is essential reading for students of the relationships between ideologies and political behavior. Rokeach presents a "two-value model" of political ideology that treats diverse historical cases as derivatives of two, and only two, major value orientations: *freedom* and *equality*. This generalization is shown to be consistent with an array of diverse sets of evidence. Furthermore, the model leads directly to the formulation of a "tentative law" of political activism: "A more extreme regard of either one or both of the two political values, *equality* and *freedom*, is a minimum condition for sus-

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tained political action and is also a minimum consequence of political action" (p. 211).

The basic research technique used throughout the various studies is to have people rank-order words that are taken to stand for values. To the question of possible invalidity due to variations in respondents' interpretations, Rokeach brings both theoretical considerations and data to support his view that the Value Survey is *not* "semantically tyrannical, meaning different things to different people" (pp. 49–51).

If one wishes to show that values "make a difference" in attitudes and behavior, it is legitimate and reasonable to look for contexts in which the influence of particular values as such is not severely constrained, e.g., by coercion or by simultaneous activation of two or more strongly contradictory values. Thus, Rokeach elicits value-orderings from adults in the permissive setting of anonymous interviews, and relates the values of college students to their overt behavior in settings where the behavior (e.g., joining NAACP) is not likely to be strongly sanctioned.

The consistency of values with one another and with that behavior which seems intuitively relevant probably is accentuated under most of the conditions studied. Replications should be sought in contexts of greater ambiguity, lower levels of information, lesser definiteness of social support, greater uncertainty concerning severe risks, and the like. Also, testing of assumptions through study of a wider range of special populations is needed. Is it always the case that individuals seek a total conception of themselves that is internally consistent and that represents the self as "competent" and "moral" (pp. 215–230)? Perhaps so, but we should be very sure that we avoid both tautology and culture-bound data in this most complex, ambiguous, and multivalent of matters—the nature of self-conceptions and self-evaluations.

Rokeach concludes that contradictions between values and self-conceptions will be resolved so that self-conceptions will be maintained or enhanced. This principle may well be correct for all those situations in which there is a relatively high degree of objective freedom. But many human relationships are nonvoluntary—and that in pervasive and endlessly subtle, as well as obvious, ways. What happens when the whole environing social structure in effect says, you cannot change your values and since you hold the wrong values your self is evil and inferior?

These, no doubt, are questions for another day and another book. Rokeach has woven so comprehensive a network of data and hypotheses that the burden has been shifted largely to those who would refute the generalizations. Of course, further testing is needed, and no doubt will appear in due course.

The book's theory of cognitive and behavioral change is a major forward step. It reorders and subsumes the main current theories that attribute attitude change to some kind of inconsistency or incongruence. The reformulation gen-

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erates predictions contrary to those of prior schemes (e.g., p. 266); the supporting evidence, although not conclusive, is highly persuasive.

In many cases, no doubt, political scientists and sociologists will miss in this work an adequately detailed specification of social processes and structures to match the explication of systems of beliefs and values. But one book cannot be expected to do everything that is needed to integrate value-theory with analysis of the dynamics of social systems, and this pioneering volume will abundantly reward our most careful attention.

ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR.
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Beleaguered Minorities: Cultural Politics in America *by S. J. Makielski, Jr. San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1973.—x, 227 pp. Cloth, $8.95; paper, $3.95.*

Beleaguered Minorities is an exercise in "radical," "committed" political science—published and reviewed, alas, when radical and committed research seems less attractive than it did when the book was begun.

Makielski is concerned about blacks, American Indians, Mexican Americans, students, and women, and he delivers a critique of the pluralist model in American politics as a response to the problems of these oppressed minorities. He concludes with advice to the minorities (read "their militant, self-appointed leaders") on strategy and tactics.

The book's defects are numerous. Linking upper-middle-class blacks to upper-middle-class women, and college students with blacks, Indian Americans, and Mexican Americans may make ideological sense but it does not make any political or economic sense. Blacks, Mexicans, and Indians are poor. Many are excluded from the affluent American society. Women and students are from the upper middle classes and never had it so good. Black leadership speaks to real economic problems that afflict large numbers of its constituency. Self-appointed leaders of women's movements and students' movements speak only for themselves and a tiny group of supporters. There is no evidence than most women or most students feel particularly disadvantaged in American society.

Curiously enough, Makielski, who has a Slavic name and is a professor at a Catholic university, seems singularly unaware that Catholics are a minority in American society and that Slavic Catholics, in particular, are still discriminated against in a wide variety of institutions (a recent study by the Institute of Urban Life in Chicago could find very little trace of Italian or Polish leadership in large corporations). Similarly, one finds few Catholics in the senior faculty of the great American universities, and when one raises the point one is told that women and blacks are not there because of discrimination, whereas

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Catholics are not there because their religion does not permit them to do serious intellectual work. Makielski, however, does not seem to be interested in this kind of minority.

Finally, his critique of the pluralist model contains very little that is original. The pluralist model is not perfect, but it certainly subsumes a great deal of the data. Why one cannot be content with saying that, and then point out where the data does not fit the model escapes me, but a certain kind of political scientist seems compelled to denounce the whole pluralist model before he goes on to describe his own political strategies and tactics.

The tactics advocated by Makielski are not those that led black men to become mayors of a number of major American cities. They are rather the tactics of "militancy," which he seems to identify with the beleaguered minorities but which in fact are pursued by only one element in the leadership of these minorities—an element which finds it singularly difficult to collect large-scale support from its alleged constituency. Most militants get whatever clout they have from their capacity to be media personalities. Media politics as a substitute for pluralistic electoral politics may achieve some minor gains, but in a society like the United States its chances for bringing about significant change seem dubious at best.

Finally, the book is singularly without any comparative perspective. What happens, one wonders, to minorities in other multiethnic societies? In how many such societies have members of different minority groups been elected mayors of major cities? My own impression is that for all its faults and frailties American pluralism has provided more opportunity for political and economic advancement for America's beleaguered minorities than has any other major multiethnic society in the world. This is not grounds for complacency or relaxation of effort, but it does seem to be a fact to be taken into consideration in any intellectually honest analysis of our own multiethnic society.

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National Opinion Research Center

Economics and the Public Purpose *by John Kenneth Galbraith. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973.—xvi, 334 pp. $10.00.*

Although this book contains some important insights, it also contains an insufferable amount of arm-chair theorizing. Unfortunately this eventually leads to a host of highly controversial policy recommendations which, if Galbraith's theories are wrong, would be downright dangerous.

Galbraith's important insight is to see the possibility of a significant influence of corporate wealth and organizational structure on governmental operations and decision making in advanced technological societies. No economist who

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has spent some time in Washington can ignore the "symbiotic relationships" (Galbraith's term) that develop between corporate managers and the high-level bureaucrats who administer government programs and contracts. Hopefully this aspect of the book will stimulate more young economists and political scientists to join the muckrakers, journalists, and lawyers in this area. More systematic studies of the facts surrounding these interrelationships are needed.

Galbraith, however, does not bother to pursue any serious empirical work on this specific issue. He is after much bigger game. Instead he devotes the first two-thirds of the book to the frenzied development of an all-encompassing theory of social and economic development. From this theory Galbraith then proceeds to derive a wide range of suggestions for reform. Some of them represent no more than benign (although hopelessly pompous) exhortations to private individuals to change their life styles. However, most of them are very controversial programs for the government to enforce—high levels for the legislated minimum wage, minority- and sex-hiring quotas, permanent wage and price controls, socialized medicine, etc.

The style and key concepts of Galbraith's theory will be familiar to those who have read his other books. The advanced economy tends to be divided into two fairly distinct systems: (1) the "planning system" characterized by the huge multibillion dollar corporations and administered by a kamikazelike group of corporate managers known as the "technostructure"; (2) the "market system" peopled by wretched self-exploiting owners of small firms, artists who have been hypnotized by the technostructure into believing that it is wrong for the government to subsidize the arts, and poor black workers from ghettos. The main objective of the all-powerful technostructure is growth of the corporation. The final key building block is the all-pervasive effect of the neoclassical economic model on public attitudes and public policy. The public (and politicians) mistakenly believe that the consumer is sovereign, so they are never able to perceive the pivotal control of the technostructure.

From this model Galbraith is able to derive all the key features of what he considers to be our major economic and social problems. The planning system grows too much relative to the market system and we end up with too many cars and deodorants and not enough health care and art. Also because the neoclassical model never recognized the male-dominated household, wives are easily turned into a "crypto-servant" class in order to help with the administration of all this conspicuous consumption—thus Women's Lib is explained (this argument is actually put forth; see Chapter 4). The "well-known" maldistribution of public goods between defense and social programs and the lack of decline in the relative inequality of income also reflects the power and motivation of the technostructure.

How should someone, especially someone who is not strongly committed to Galbraith's particular set of social values, feel about the general validity of this model? More important, should one seriously consider the policy recommenda-

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tions he derives from it? One way for the non-true believer to assess the model is to see how consistent it is with broad empirical facts and how well it explains them relative to alternative theories.

Expenditures on health care and education for example, two major industries in the "market system," have grown enormously in recent years. Indeed the entire service sector has grown more rapidly than the goods-producing industries. At the least these facts put the burden of proof on Galbraith to show some direct evidence on the mechanisms by which the technostructure dominates consumer wants.

Or consider the notion that the planning system somehow "holds back" the growth of earnings and incomes in the market system by determining the prices at which it sells its products and purchases its intermediate goods. What are the relevant facts on this issue? How much of the market system's final output and purchases are transacted with monopolistic firms in the planning system? The education and health care industries appear to deal largely with consumers and other firms in the market system. Galbraith does not bother to present one scrap of data on this question.

Also we are told that the salary of a Lee Iacoca is sixty or seventy times that of a blue-collar worker not because of his relative productivity, but because of the power of the technostructure. But what of a Joe Namath? How is this denizen of the market system able to behave like the president of General Motors? Unfortunately for Galbraith, the hated neoclassical model easily explains both cases. They both represent situations in which wages are being determined almost exclusively by competition among demanders since the talent is in such scarce supply.

But one could go on ad infinitum. For example, Galbraith's analysis and recommendations about the minimum wage just ignore the voluminous empirical evidence that has been accumulating on how it has serious adverse effects on teen-agers. In sum it is this reader's opinion that, at present, there exists no convincing empirical basis to support Galbraith's theory and that therefore his policy recommendations can hardly be taken seriously.

Galbraith might be more influential if he would spend less time attacking the neoclassical model and more time developing some solid empirical support for his own theory. One of the reasons that the neoclassical model has so many fans is that it has been found to be consistent with a wide range of empirical experience.

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The New Inflation: Causes, Effects, Cures *by George L. Bach. Providence, R. I., Brown University Press, 1973.—x, 103 pp. $6.00.*

Inflation, A Worldwide Disaster *by Irving S. Friedman. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973.—xiv, 291 pp. $7.95.*

One can make a good case for the proposition that what is genuinely new about the present inflation is that economists are taking it seriously. Certainly the causal factors in it are not new. There is wage push, as Professor Bach points out, but we have had this in earlier inflations in ample force. Similarly, budget deficits and excessive monetary expansion are all too familiar.

The new sense of urgency, if not panic, that is creeping into the literature is due, of course, to the exceptionally rapid rates at which prices are rising. Inflation in Western Europe is close to 10 percent a year. In the United States, it is well over 5 percent, even excluding the effects of the Arab oil embargo. Prices of raw materials, also excluding oil, have been rising in world markets at about 40 percent a year. And there is a growing feeling that these conditions will be chronic, not transitory.

There is an element of newness also in the growing sense that no one knows quite what to do about inflation. Experience has bred so much uncertainty as to how money supply should be defined for purposes of controlling its amount, and thus controlling inflation, that monetarists no longer speak with the confidence that earlier made their views so engaging. And fiscalists are no better off. Until recently they have rested their argument largely on the full employment budget concept, which has been presented as an automatic and virtually infallible guide to the uniquely correct program for achieving full employment and stable prices. The concept still is found in official budget papers, as well as in professional literature, but in a distinctly deflated version. And the disarray of direct controls—the so-called incomes and prices policies—needs no elaboration. These have ceased to play a meaningful role in British economic policy and have been all but given up on the continent. In the United States, Phase IV seems about to be abandoned as the last (for the time, perhaps) of a series of aborted—this writer would say ill-starred—attempts to control inflation by putting a lid on it.

The two books reviewed here will not by themselves set matters right, but they should help. Professor Bach's study will be an enormously useful guide to the findings of research in the past ten to fifteen years on the effects of inflation. No serious student should overlook it. That Bach finds inflation's effects rather less horrendous than often portrayed is obviously because recent research has dealt mainly with inflation proceeding at only moderate rates. But suddenly things are different, and as Bach sees inflation developing at scary rates his attitude stiffens and he recommends taking "a major stand against inflation, hard though this may be" (p. 80).

In his confrontation with inflation, Bach would depend primarily on tradi-

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tional monetary and fiscal restraints. But he is sympathetic also to what structuralist measures (job training, income-support programs, etc.) can do. What is particularly encouraging is the stress he places on what government can do in the management of its own affairs to help stem inflationary trends. It is this writer's view that the latter remains the one great unexplored and unexploited potential for inflation control. Bach relies heavily on what he calls the "stable-money mores" of Americans—their preference for price stability and their fear of inflation—as a kind of grass-roots check against policies that would worsen inflation.

Friedman's book is of interest especially for its analysis of the interplay in the development of inflation between overly ambitious political programs and the limitations that available resources place on what can actually be accomplished. It is of interest also—and the literature on inflation has not been notable for this—in the alertness it shows to the destructive impact of inflation on political and social institutions.

Although Friedman's book deals with inflation as a worldwide phenomenon, what it implies for inflation control seems relevant particularly to less-developed economies, on which he has exceptional expertise as a long-time member of the IMF staff. It is perhaps for this reason that the approach to inflation control he finds most promising is a species of national planning in which, as he puts it, the public participates.

With the struggle against inflation being lost at an alarming rate, there is obviously an enormous amount yet to be done, not only at the analytical level but in designing programs of public administration adequate to cope with it. Basically, both books make constructive contributions to that end.

RAYMOND J. SAULNIER
Barnard College, Columbia University

The Retreat from Riches: Affluence and Its Enemies *by Peter Passell and Leonard Ross. New York, The Viking Press, 1973.—xiii, 185 pp. $6.95.*

> "But wait a bit," the Oyster cried,
> "Before we have our chat;
> For some of us are out of breath,
> And all of us are fat!"
>
> Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*

Increasing concern is being shown in this and other countries, and not necessarily all developed ones, over the goal of unbridled economic growth, because of the social ills most people feel are attendant upon it. Fuel has been added to the fire by the simulations of Forrester and the Club of Rome which predict our demise sooner than anyone would care to think. The work of Drs. Passell and Ross breaks with this recent tradition and attempts to: (1) demonstrate the faultiness in the models of doom, (2) discuss why economic growth is not in-

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consistent with the social good, and (3) make explicit the political constraints which have prevented the policies necessary to alleviate the social ills from being implemented.

Drs. Passell and Ross split their work into two parts. The first deals with the doomsday models, affluence and effluents, and redistribution of income as an alternative to growth. Each of these subjects is quite well handled. The second part is a discussion of the economic side effects of growth—namely inflation, balance of payments deficits, and government budget deficits. The authors do not fare as well on these points. Professor Samuelson points out in his foreword to the book that the hearts of the authors "are on the side of the angels." This fact, however, is not sufficient to guarantee that their economic analyses remain pure.

No one can help but share the authors' healthy skepticism for the dire results of computer simulations which feed in parameters derived from historical trends and attempt to project the model to infinity. If people's attitudes toward childbearing had not changed, if technology had not advanced, and if our stock of knowledge had not increased, the Malthusian dilemma would have resulted in doomsday long ago.

From the social standpoint, growth seems to be one of the few effective methods of raising the incomes of the poor. The authors point out that economic growth and full-employment bestow relatively larger benefits on those at the bottom of the totem pole. In view of this, it is hard to understand why they attribute the greater part of the relative increase in nonwhite incomes over the period 1958–1968 to nonwhite northward migration. At least part, and perhaps the largest part, of the improvement must be attached to the unprecedented boom of the 1960s. Passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not hurt either.

The political constraints that helped dig the grave for certain policies, which seemed correct from an economic standpoint, are brought out quite clearly in the book. Economists normally relegate the political realities of their policy prescriptions to secondary positions. The old cliché that "every economic answer is a political question" aptly sums up the political input of most economic policy proposals. It is also interesting to learn how little some of our elected officials knew (or should I say know) about the workings of the economic system.

The book's treatment of budget deficits is also handled well. Economists have, for a long time, recognized that deficit spending is not a social ill. Often it is likened to a person moving money from one pocket to another. The only advantage of a balanced budget is a political one. To the voter there is something neat and clean about a balanced budget, the economics of Keynes notwithstanding.

Where the authors err is in their treatment of the growth-related problems of inflation and balance of payments deficits. Their errors result from their treating these economic illnesses as long-run problems when, in fact, their main impact is in the short run. As Keynes so eloquently put it, "In the long-run we're all

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dead." The finding of Bach and Ando that the share of labor in total income increased by 6 percent from 1939 to 1952 in spite of constant inflation says nothing about the short-run redistribution of purchasing power inflicted by price rises. In the short run, inflation is a tax on those with fixed incomes (which includes many more people than simply the pensioners that the authors mention), on those who save at fixed interest rates, and on lenders (this is also a long-run problem). Purchasing power is redistributed to producers, to those not on salaries or pensions, and to the government (whose tax revenues increase). Of those hurt, attention should be concentrated on fixed-income recipients and, as the authors point out, small savers. It is not clear that either group, especially fixed-income recipients, can ever muster enough strength or have sufficient foresight to plan for inflation in their negotiations as the authors suggest.

A glaring omission occurs in the discussion of the use of price and wage controls to stem inflation. One of the primary concerns of economists through our many "Phases" was the extent to which the price controls would induce distortions in the markets affected with the resultant misallocation of resources. After all, one of the most publicized benefits of the "free" market system is that it allocates resources in the most efficient way. If we tamper with it, we tamper with that allocation. Yet no mention of this problem is made in the text.

For anyone living through the current oil shortage, it is abundantly clear that the 5 percent of our GNP that emanates from trade can have far-reaching consequences. It is not the amount of trade that matters but the indispensability of the items traded. Under given relations of production, a shortage or bottleneck in one area can wreak havoc throughout our entire input-output table. And altering those production relationships can take considerable time and expense. The authors are correct in pointing out that political integration has not proceeded at as fast a pace as has economic integration. There are no visible signs of it catching up. As a consequence, trading relationships must be considered as very important to domestic prosperity.

One could argue and disagree with many of the statements of Drs. Passell and Ross. For example, the authors suggest taxes be placed on effluents to hasten pollution control. But there are subsidiary effects of such taxes. They may be regressive if the goods taxed are consumed as much by the poor as by the rich. Furthermore, an earlier article by Coase pointed out that the decision as to who should pay for pollution is a decision as to who should bear the injury from externalities, polluter or pollutee. The answer is not always straightforward.

The primary benefit of this book lies in the controversial nature of many of its policy discussions. Whether or not it is successful in bucking the tide of sentiment for "no growth" as a solution to our social evils is not as clear.

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Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind *by Stephen R. Graubard. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1973.—xix, 288 pp. $7.95.*

Professor Graubard has produced a sympathetic, comparatively complete, and altogether readable summary of the intellectual achievements of Henry Kissinger. He terminates his analysis with Mr. Kissinger's noted article on Vietnam, published in the January 1969 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. The author's intent, as he makes clear, was not merely to reveal the qualities of Kissinger's mind and thought but also to remind Americans generally that they cannot understand or appreciate the present secretary of state without some knowledge of his writings. As a public official Mr. Kissinger is unique in American history. That he possesses extraordinary intelligence and that Harvard University permitted him the opportunity to develop his various conceptualizations of world affairs amid maximum encouragement and freedom are equally clear. Beyond that, Mr. Kissinger's life at Harvard, especially his international seminar, added to his long and special relationship to the New York Council on Foreign Relations, gave him personal, intellectual, and political contacts which few if any other professional scholars have enjoyed in the nation's history. Unfortunately those special connections seemed to impose their obligations and limitations as well, for Mr. Kissinger's perennial criticism of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson policies never confronted their basic drift. What this volume demonstrates, therefore, is the fundamental sterility in much of Mr. Kissinger's actions as a member of the Nixon administration. This is no criticism of the book—which has great merit, but it questions the validity of the author's intent.

Fortunately Professor Graubard includes a long chapter on Kissinger's study of Castlereagh and Metternich, for *A World Restored* (1957) is insightful and exceedingly useful for diplomatic historians of either Europe or the United States. It demonstrates clearly the dilemma of Austria as the weak link in the European system. Austria remained that weak link in 1914. Even his brief writings on Bismarck reveal Kissinger's fine grasp of European diplomacy and the fundamental elements in international stability. After 1955 Kissinger sought to apply his well-learned lessons to the world in which he lived. For him the United States was Lord Castlereagh's island power, Europe's major source of stability against the revolutionary pressures of Napoleon's France. Russia had replaced France as Europe's all-powerful, overdemanding revolutionary danger, about to unleash its full power to solidify its dominance of the continent. This analogy explains why much of Kissinger's writings, despite their outward brilliance, proved to be irrelevant. But it also explains why he accepted the official assumptions of the cold war, was far more fearful of Russia than either Acheson or Dulles, and dwelt on the means, not the ends, of American policy. True, he condemned Washington for neglecting the apparent opportunities for negotiation in 1949 and again after 1953, but negotiation for what? Mr. Kissinger condemned every suggestion of negotiation on the basis of unchangeable realities as readily as did the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

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Second, as a student of military strategy, Mr. Kissinger denounced three successive administrations for not building a varied strategy on nuclear and conventional weapons designed to meet any and every Soviet thrust with the precise counterforce required to negate the aggression and avoid a major war. In the process Kissinger revealed an impressive knowledge of detail and strategic theory; he could discover something lacking in every American defense policy. Still, how is a government to maintain a perfect military strategy against an enemy that no one, not even Mr. Kissinger, could ever define in precise military terms and one which very few Americans or Europeans ever really expected to attack anyway? It mattered little. Whatever the weaknesses of American and NATO policy, it managed to keep the European peace and permitted the evolution of that world in which Mr. Kissinger now operates with the considerable appreciation of the American people and this reviewer. During the Johnson years, when the country was rent by the most divisive foreign policy in the nation's history, Mr. Kissinger was strangely silent. Perhaps he preferred to deal with policy questions more abstract and divorced from action.

After 1969 the Nixon administration assumed that the USSR and China were stable, not revolutionary, forces in world politics. When had this change occurred? To his credit Kissinger recognized it in 1968. In brief, this book upholds well the scholarly reputation of its author; it relates much about Mr. Kissinger both new and enlightening. Unfortunately, at least to this reviewer, it renders a greater service to its reader than to its subject.

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The Devil and John Foster Dulles *by Townsend Hoopes. Boston, Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1973.—xiv, 562 pp. $15.00.*

Long before reading *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* I had concluded that if Dulles had not been born, it would not have been necessary to invent him. The occasion for this conclusion was my meeting during the Truman years one of Dulles' nephews who argued with great vehemence that American foreign policy was determined by communists in the State Department. When I accused him of being a reactionary, he said: "If you think I'm reactionary, you should meet my uncle." I began to see what he meant when his uncle became secretary of state in January 1953, but what I did not comprehend at that time was the extent to which Dulles was also a fanatic and a megalomaniac.

It was not only that Dulles erred in sabotaging the agreements reached at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, thereby setting our fateful course in Vietnam, or that he erred again in throwing the Egyptians into the arms of the Russians by reneging on our promise to finance the Aswan Dam. These were serious mistakes, but they were mistakes that also could have been made, in-

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deed probably would have been made, by an Acheson or a Rusk. Dulles, however, always assumed that he was in the right, even when it was beyond dispute that the decisions he had made were the wrong decisions, and, with the exception of Adenauer, he cared little for the opinions and advice of anyone else, whether Eisenhower, Churchill, Eden, Nasser, Bohlen, or Kennan (because Kennan favored admitting Communist China to the United Nations, Dulles regarded him as "a dangerous man"). Like Louis XVI, who could neither learn anything nor forget anything, Dulles' rigidity and obtuseness increased rather than decreased with time, and in 1950, after years of study and thought about the nature of bolshevism, Dulles' summary view was expressed in the naive and simplistic formulation that "Soviet Communism starts with an atheistic, Godless premise. Everything else flows from that premise" (p. 83).

One would think from this and many other statements that Dulles, the son of a minister, was a profoundly religious man whose actions were governed always by the highest moral principles. In fact, as Hoopes makes clear, at least one of Dulles' friends thought he had "spent some years as an atheist," and apparently Dulles' "rediscovery" of religion did not occur until 1937 when he was almost fifty. Hoopes does not explain this "rediscovery," and it remains, like many other facets of Dulles' life, something of a mystery. But it may be significant that when Dulles was five years old his mother noted in her diary that "He is reverential to a striking degree. . . . Whenever he sees . . . his father or mother in the attitude of prayer, he will instantly assume the same attitude and so remain until they rise." This behavior is less "reverential" than imitative or perhaps based on identification, and it is reasonable to wonder who or what was influencing Dulles in 1937.

Since Hoopes is not much interested in psychobiography, we learn nothing about Dulles' feelings at the time of his father's death in 1931 (the death of a father, Freud suggested, was one of the most traumatic events in a man's life), or how he felt when his Jewish brother-in-law David Blondheim, who was married to his sister Eleanor, committed suicide in 1934; of the latter episode we are told only, and somewhat cryptically, that "to muffle the scandal," Dulles "who could be very overbearing in family as well as in business affairs, put a great deal of pressure on Eleanor to take back the Dulles name. This she soon did, giving it also to the boy she had been carrying at the time, and later to an adopted daughter" (p. 42).

Perhaps a more significant clue to Dulles' personality lies in his treatment of his children. Hoopes quotes a family friend as saying that in the Dulles household there was "no basic acceptance of the children as children." In addition to being totally absorbed in his own career, writes Hoopes, Dulles displayed toward his children "a heavy ineptitude that combined unbending reserve and sternness with more than a little derision. His idea of how to inspire them to achievement—in reading, tennis, sailing, chess—was to place great demands on them (often beyond the capacity of their years) and then, having done so, to

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bait them with pointed indications that, in his opinion, they really couldn't meet the demands and would accordingly never amount to much" (pp. 43–44). Small wonder, then, that Dulles as father was no more successful than Dulles as secretary of state, with one son self-exiled to Mexico, the other a convert in 1939 to Catholicism who later became, to the family's even greater consternation, a Jesuit priest, and the only daughter married to "the first man who came along" with whom, as Hoopes puts it in a few well-chosen words, she "developed a quietly spectacular capacity for running up bills . . ." (p. 44). It may be overstatement to suggest that Dulles was a cruel father, but certainly it is understatement to say merely that he was an indifferent father.

Above all, since Dulles was a complex man, and in most areas of his life a secretive one, we can only speculate about some of his deeper motivations. It is tempting, however, to account for his "rediscovery" of religion in 1937 in terms of his guilt about the two deaths in the family, and his treatment of his children. The need to appease or provide a support for the superego has led many another man toward religion, and perhaps Dulles' anticommunism can be viewed as, in some sense, a religious crusade analogous to those crusades of the Middle Ages upon which the penitential sinful could embark by way of expiating their evil deeds. In effect, Dulles, who was never militantly anti-Nazi and who resisted efforts of his law firm partners in 1935 to sever the firm's connections with German industrialists, could displace onto the Godless Bolsheviks his own doubts and reservations about religion, and his own impulses toward violence and aggression that earlier had been directed toward his children. Thus purged of almost everything in himself that he did not like or could not confront, Dulles could conduct himself as if, in the words of one observer, "he had a pipeline to God," and Jesus Christ was on the side of the United States.

All this, of course, is speculation rather than informed inference or knowledge. But what is not speculation, in my view, is the judgment that Dulles will be regarded by future historians as one of our most incompetent secretaries of state, and also as one of the least appealing men, in personal terms, to hold that office. Indeed, had Hoopes titled his book *The Devil in John Foster Dulles*, one could have compared his work with *The Devil in Miss Jones*, a popular porno movie currently making the rounds, in which hell is depicted as a place where lust is doomed never to be consumated. Hell, for Dulles, was anyplace where he could not exercise power in a Holy War against communism.

Where, one wonders, is John Foster Dulles *now*?

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The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, 1880–1970 *by Stephan Thernstrom. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973.—viii, 345 pp. $12.00.*

Scholarly speculation in political science and sociology often converge around issues of social mobility. Both disciplines reason about the levels of well-being and satisfaction of populations from surveys and guesses about the gains of sons over fathers, and the ability of breadwinners to accumulate security, status, and property in the course of a lifetime of work.

In America our tradition gives special meaning to these concerns by interpreting social justice as some "fair" chance to compete for wealth, status, and power. Only radicals and conservatives seem comfortable here in judging social justice in terms of the class distributions of these benefits. Yet whether one approaches mobility from the most general point of view, or from the American corollary, the salient characteristic of such arguments is the absence of much reliable information which tells whether modern societies have afforded more or less morality, to whom, and under what circumstances.

Professor Thernstrom is the dean of our historians of social mobility, and his latest book is a report on his most ambitious study, and a review of the available American literature. The heart of the book is a series of samples of the population of the city of Boston from 1880 to 1958 with an added sample of nearby Belmont and Cambridge from 1963. The clearly written and carefully researched findings are the result of years of arduous work by Thernstrom and his assistants, and he provides us with a full methodological appendix to guide others through the thickets he discovered.

Boston was chosen because Thernstrom lived there, and because it was one of the nation's largest cities and therefore experienced heavy immigration, rapid industrialization, and ever-changing urban growth. A study of the city as a metropolitan region far exceeded the resources of the team. The findings are presented in three major categories: (1) movement of the population, (2) occupational careers, (3) race, ethnicity, and religion.

Very high levels of population movement, from six to twelve times the decennial net change, characterized the Boston population in all the nineteenth- and twentieth-century decades studied. There is a strong implication from this finding that the persistent community is the political community, and that the political community in American cities is at best a bare majority of the adult population.

In the nineteenth century the rates of movement out of the city were highest for low-status males. Those that stayed in town prospered; whether the movers prospered elsewhere is an unanswered question. In the twentieth century this pattern of movement reversed itself. The upper levels of the population moved more often than the lower. This reversal perhaps confirms the Veblen-Mills hypothesis of the structural changes in the American economy. According to this

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view the middle class changes from a bourgeois rooted in business and property to one based on skills, education, and professional and bureaucratic advancement. The two-century movement patterns do not vary between natives and foreign born, thereby defeating any notions of ghetto entrapment, or culture of poverty for white Americans.

The occupational careers are analyzed in five categories, two white collar and three blue collar. In general a quarter of those starting as blue-collar workers became white-collar workers during their lifetimes; only one-sixth of those starting as white collar finished as blue. With the exception of the Great Depression, rates of mobility remained constant over the long period from 1880 to 1970. Movement proceeded in a stepwise fashion; few leapt from laborer to banker.

Blacks occupied a separate niche in society and could not participate in this white circulation. Native-born whites and their children possessed very marked advantage, moving up most rapidly, but English and Jewish immigrants also had high rates of mobility into white-collar occupations. Italians and Irish in Boston moved only sluggishly to white collar. The upper levels of the occupational ladder were able to protect their advantage and to pass it along to their sons.

There is a chapter on the correlates of religion which will bring forth much scholarly controversy since its samples are small and essential structural and cultural material is lacking. However, Thernstrom's speculation on alternative hypotheses to explain differences, to the extent that they exist, is excellent.

The concluding chapter, which compares his Boston findings to other fragmentary studies and which attempts national generalizations, is pure guesswork. The author is forced to swing from structural and environmental explanations to cultural ones by the confusion of the data upon which he depends.

Altogether *The Other Bostonians* is a fine scholarly work, a most welcome summary of the state of the art, which should sweep away a lot of uninformed historical reasoning currently employed by social scientists. My further hope is that Professor Thernstrom and his fellow historians will regard their explorations into the empirical study of social mobility as intellectual capital to be spent on designing a systematic, organized national history which would employ an adequate research design and adequate samples to deal with the structural and cultural variables from which they, and all of us, wish to reason.

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The Politics of Progress *by Raymond E. Wolfinger. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1974.—x, 416 pp. $10.95.*

This volume grows out of the Yale study of New Haven politics, which was carried out in the late 1950s under the direction of Robert A. Dahl. Earlier works produced from this research effort include Dahl's *Who Governs?* and Nelson W. Polsby's *Community Power and Political Theory.* Because the New Haven study has been at the center of much of the debate over community power, some of its contributions in other areas—like city politics and the nature of leadership—have been relatively ignored. Wolfinger's book should change this situation. Although he offers some comments and rejoinders to his opponents in the community power debate, Wolfinger's major focus is on the formulation and implementation of innovative policies in cities. Along the way, he provides a number of insights on the workings of local politics.

In its first section, the book explores the political system of New Haven and relates findings from that city to broader theories of urban politics. Particularly memorable is the chapter on machine politics, which challenges a number of widely held views on the subject: that machines are somehow "withering away," that machines are a force for coordination in city politics, and that machines work to help poor people. (This chapter is also valuable for its priceless anecdotes about patronage politics in New Haven.)

Turning to the question of policy innovation, Wolfinger first examines the characteristics of the substantive area—urban renewal—in which New Haven's Mayor Lee distinguished himself and his city. Some critics of *Who Governs?* have remarked that Lee's successes might not be attributable (as Dahl had suggested) to political skill, but rather to the substantial influx of federal funds. In a convincing reply to these criticisms, Wolfinger argues that urban renewal funding is no automatic bonanza for mayors. The renewal process is fraught with dangers for local officials—slow administrative procedures, continuous litigation, and strong political opposition from those whose land is to be "renewed." The author shows in analytical detail how Mayor Lee was able to use his considerable talents for political entrepreneurship to achieve a measure of coordination within city government and to build a coalition in the community which would support his renewal program.

The final part of the book examines two renewal projects in depth, providing the reader with a description of the tortuous redevelopment process and an analysis of the crucial factors facilitating project success—the Lee administration's technical skill and public relations talent, the mayor's control of government and party machinery, and the close alliance between City Hall, local businessmen, and Yale University. However, the author does not mean to suggest that Lee was invincible. A final case study—that of an unsuccessful attempt by the mayor to revise the city charter—is used to suggest the limits of mayoral leadership and the particular difficulties involved in effecting structural (as opposed to substantive) changes.

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Because of the many hardships (including uncertain tenure) of a modern mayoral career, and because of the limited value of the position as a stepping-stone to higher office, Wolfinger concludes that few of the ablest politicians will be likely to try to follow Lee's path. And those who do become mayors will find that comprehensive innovation is risky, engenders hostility, and takes more time in office than many of them will have. Therefore, says the author, it is important to consider possible substitutes for mayoral leadership. He suggests city managers as an alternative source of innovative leadership, arguing that their membership in a national professional organization expands their horizons and that they are rewarded for developing imaginative programs. (On the basis of reading this book, one might find himself treating the author's suggestion with some caution. Mayor Lee was helped enormously by his deep roots in the community, his control of a political party, and his impressive electoral success —resources which would be less available to a city manager.)

This book is subject to some criticisms. Because it covers so many topics, the reader must wait for some time before encountering the major analytical themes of policy conception and execution. And more might have been done to integrate the introductory chapters on New Haven with the later policy chapters. Furthermore, the author might have said more about the impact of later urban problems and policies on the opportunities for executive leadership. For example, what are the implications of increasing racial division and hostility for the exercise of entrepreneurial leadership? (Where the book does address current policy problems, like revenue sharing, the analysis is well done.)

On the whole, *The Politics of Progress* is a substantial contribution to our understanding of both city politics and the making of policy. Going beyond the analysis of a political system, it focuses in detail on the problems and strategies of purposeful governmental action. In a time in which we read a lot about government programs that have failed, it is particularly useful for comparative purposes to have an analysis of some that succeeded. Finally, the author obviously understands and enjoys the flavor of politics—which is not a universal trait among political scientists.

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Rizzo, From Cop to Mayor of Philadelphia *by Fred Hamilton. New York, The Viking Press, 1973.—209 pp. $6.95.*

Philadelphia, at least in the last quarter of a century, has had a tradition of great local leadership. Joseph Clark was mayor of Philadelphia in the early 1950s and then left to become a distinguished member of the U. S. Senate. The late Richardson Dilworth, crusading district attorney who with Mayor Clark created a formidable reform movement in a fight against corruption, succeeded

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Joe Clark and the record those two compiled in their terms in City Hall places them among the great American mayors in the so-called Golden Age of the Cities—1950–1970.

Fred Hamilton's biography of the incumbent mayor of Philadelphia, former police chief Frank Rizzo, makes for interesting reading. But just on the basis of this volume alone, Frank Rizzo's competency does not qualify him for the august company of Clark and Dilworth, although at the time of his election in 1971 Rizzo was a popular figure. That fall 390,000 people voted for him. His basic appeal was in large measure brought together with his easy answers and instant action, particularly in the areas of civil rights and social problems of the kind which plague every city today.

But a city is not a quasi-military body run just with words, whether eloquent or caustic, nor with simplistic positions on formidable and complex questions. Rizzo's candidacy came out of the turmoil of the 1960s when minorities were on the march all over America. Their militancy led to confrontation, and confrontation led to violence all over the land, including my own city of New Haven. Mayor Rizzo's rigid postures on social questions helped propel him into City Hall where at this writing he is finishing the last two years of his first term. It was the civil rights issue which projected him into prominence and it was also the Philadelphia newspapers in large measure which developed the cult of the "Cisco Kid" or "Supercop," nicknames in which apparently Rizzo gloried and which molded his image in the public mind and gave him both notoriety and wide recognition.

Frank Rizzo makes no bones about this. In Hamilton's book there is a simple Rizzo statement: "The working newspaperman made me what I am" (p. 117). True, adds Hamilton, but Rizzo also provided beer and sandwiches, lively copy, immediate access to information, and gold-plated police badges for those reporters assigned to cover police news.

But this goodwill disappeared, and newsmen felt his wrath when they tried to be objective. Joe McGinniss (*The Selling of the President, 1968*) was a columnist for the *Philadelphia Enquirer*, a paper owned by Walter Annenberg, who also owned the *Philadelphia Daily News*, WFIL-TV and *Radio and T.V. Guide*. When McGinniss wrote a series of columns about him, Rizzo immediately called his close friend Mr. Annenberg, who in turn ordered the *Enquirer* to publish a lead editorial denouncing McGinniss. Annenberg thus totally disassociated himself from copy appearing in his own newspaper.

However, there is enough about his career in City Hall as detailed by Mr. Hamilton to indicate that Rizzo is finally beginning to realize that running a city is possibly the most difficult job in public service today. This book is not in any way to be considered a scholarly treatise on cities, or on mayors and their accomplishments. It is light, interesting reading, and it can be basically described as a "puff" for Rizzo; but, despite that, some of this man's caustic tongue still comes through, such as a comment he made about Dick Dilworth. When

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the former mayor criticized Rizzo on a social issue, Rizzo replied: "Everything Dilworth has been with has gone down, even the *Andrea Doria*" (p. 199). (Dilworth and his wife were passengers on the *Andrea Doria* when it sank in 1957.) Even as I wince, I have to admire the cutting edge of the Rizzo tongue, but not the total lack of either good taste or good judgment.

Actually the bulk of the book deals with Rizzo's career as a police officer. It does not deal really in an updated fashion with his exploits as mayor. As a candidate Rizzo said constantly, "I am going to turn this city around" and "I am going to save this city." But as his days in office extended into months, the statements became more restricted and more realistic; as shown in this final paragraph of the book: "Given the conditions under which he assumed running the nation's fourth largest city—the crushing financial burdens, the flight to the suburbs of the white middle class, the dwindling economic and tax base—Rizzo may be in over his head. The same could probably be said for any man. But for Frank Rizzo, a man whose ego and pride are overwhelming and easily bruised, the realization that he has 'taken on' a foe more formidable than himself is becoming a painful experience" (p. 204).

Possibly our cities do need a purgative from the leaders of the 1950s and the 1960s, but as a former mayor I feel depressed when I view this record of Philadelphia's current mayor with the records not only of former mayors Clark and Dilworth, but of the late David Lawrence of Pittsburgh, Raymond Tucker of St. Louis, Charles P. Taft of Cincinnati, DeLesseps Morrison of New Orleans, and Bill Hartsfield and Ivan Allen of Atlanta. These last two over a thirty-two-year period guided Atlanta through its most crisis-ridden years to the plateau it occupies today as one of the great cities in America.

I know, of course, that the times are not the same, but these men and dozens of others less well known in the 1950s and 1960s, fought the problems of blight and decay and inequality and civil rights—fought them with every fiber of their being and every ounce of their strength. They were great mayors; they were outstanding citizens; and while on occasion they failed, their only fault was the magnificence of their dreams, not really a fault at all. These two decades were exciting, controversial, filled with problems, and total commitment to seek answers to those problems. The decade of the 1970s, if we are to look at Rizzo's record thus far as an example, probably will not be anything like that, but then perhaps it is a time for absolutists. We will, however, survive, if for no other reason than that man can survive almost anything. And I still feel that way even after reading *Rizzo*.

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Residential Abandonment: The Tenement Landlord Revisited *by George Sternlieb and Robert W. Burchell. New Brunswick, N. J., Center for Urban Policy Research, 1973.—xxx, 444 pp. $15.00.*

For at least a decade both public officials and private citizens have noticed with growing alarm that in many urban areas the loss of portions of the existing housing stock has been occurring at a much higher rate than is accounted for by the "normal" attrition of the poorest quality housing. Some urban neighborhoods consist of block after block of vacant and vandalized hulks of what only recently had been occupied and structurally sound housing. Gradually, the phenomenon of abandonment has been transformed from one of the problems that plague cities to a legitimate political issue deserving focused attention and investigation.

An indication of the emergence of abandonment as a legitimate issue is the recent publication of this new study by George Sternlieb and Robert W. Burchell, who cast aside all euphemisms to title their book *Residential Abandonment*. One can only express admiration for this attempt to approach a much misunderstood phenomenon in a cautious, scholarly way. This study utilizes empirical data for Newark, N. J., from local governmental sources and the U. S. Bureau of the Census. More important, it also analyzes the results of a series of surveys administered in Newark from 1964 through 1972, which concentrate on the same buildings and their owners, thus facilitating an analysis of the dynamics of neighborhood change over time.

The authors themselves imply that their study will raise more questions than it resolves, and they openly state "There is no one clear road to abandonment—nor equivalently one clear cut solution" (p. 327). At present it appears that much urban-housing policy making is based on the simplistic and often inaccurate perceptions of those persons who have tangible political and economic stakes in specific outcomes. These individual interests may do little to alleviate the original problem—the abandonment of structurally sound residential housing.

This current book is really a sequel to Sternlieb's 1966 study of slum housing in Newark, *The Tenement Landlord*. Its different focus reflects the changed nature of the problem over time. In 1966, concern was centered on the impact of slum ownership on the maintenance of housing. The study concentrated on the effects of governmental policies in an attempt to discover what combination of policies would most encourage landlords to upgrade housing.

By 1972 housing deterioration had given way to complete abandonment and the question was no longer why don't landlords upgrade their property, but rather, why don't landlords keep their property? Here the effect of governmental policies plays a marginal role. Sternlieb and Burchell's basic purpose is to explain abandonment by investigating aspects of both supply and demand. The central question they attempt to answer is "whether there were any early

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warning indicators which could be isolated that might signal sometime in advance the future abandonment of a residential structure" (p. xiv).

The authors evaluate a myriad of variables and weave a complex web of relationships. Not surprisingly, the occurrence of abandonment is associated with various indices of decay like tax delinquency, fire, and crime. Relationships between owner and tenant also seem to play a role in the loss or retention of a building. The presence of a majority of nonwhite tenants in white-owned buildings appears to contribute to the abandonment rate. In addition, many landlords perceive that the tenantry, not taxes or other expected causes, is preventing them from improving upon the structure's value. Owners also perceive a "decline in the socio-economic status of the possible tenant pool" (p. 325). This is not a function of race in Newark, since the racial shifts in these areas had occurred long before.

Geographically, abandonment appears to increase in areas of high black and Puerto Rican concentration and in areas of general urban decay characterized as socially and economically substandard by any criteria. The building's physical characteristics play a surprisingly marginal role; in fact, abandoned housing is not necessarily the most deteriorated housing.

Parcels originally purchased for homes and with resident owners were consistently in "better" health by all indicators than parcels bought and operated for rental income only. Thus the authors conclude that "there seems to be little alternative except to continue to encourage this pattern . . ." (p. 306). In Newark, as in many other urban areas, resident ownership is minority ownership. However, while minority ownership has had a positive effect on the building as well as the city, it has not necessarily been good for the owner. The prime incentive for home ownership—capital accumulation—has not materialized. As a result the evidence indicates that upward mobile blacks quickly leave the city. Based on their findings Sternlieb and Burchell make the recommendation that "Any measure which would improve the relationship between renter/owner, increase owner-occupancy and curtail transiency would . . . retard abandonment (p. 351).

As with any "pioneer" study, this one leaves the reader with many questions and reservations. The difficult problem of devising an operational definition of abandonment is not resolved since the various sources of data are not consistent with their definition. The simple lack of reliable data which measure the phenomenon is another difficulty beyond the authors' control. Since the landlord-tenant relationship emerges as a crucial variable in predicting abandonment, it is disappointing that the in-depth interviewing of landlords is not replicated for tenants. One would expect a more "balanced" picture if tenant perceptions were evaluated similarly.

The major question, however, remains: To what extent can this study of Newark be used to help explain the phenomenon of abandonment in other cities? To what extent will variables unique to Newark—e.g., the black majority,

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a black mayor, serious racial disturbances in the 1960s, and the nature of the housing stock—prevent generalizations to other cities? Obviously, one must be cautious in making generalizations, but this study offers a number of hypotheses which can be explored in other cities. One such hypothesis, whose confirmation or rejection is crucial for housing problems and policy making is that the existence of government regulation of rents through rent control and rent stabilization has much less impact on landlord abandonment than the ability of potential tenants in the local market to pay higher rents.

The appearance of this book is welcomed in the hope that it will stimulate similar serious attempts to help explain the phenomenon of residential housing abandonment, so that policy makers can balance hysterical interest group demands with observable realities.

FLORA S. DAVIDSON
Barnard College, Columbia University

Budgets, Bonds, and Ballots *by Philip K. Piele and John Stuart Hall. Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath & Company, 1973.—xv, 216 pp. $14.50.*

It is generally true that the cumulative nature of research on American state and local political processes diminishes as the governmental unit under analysis becomes smaller and more specialized. Thus, scholars concerned with state affairs regularly build upon each others' work, as do those who write about large cities. The results of research on lesser jurisdictions, however, remain scattered and largely periodic. It is because of these patterns in the literature that this book by Piele and Hall is especially welcome, for in it the authors set out to bring together the research findings on the fiscal politics of one specialized but very important smaller governmental unit—the local school district—and at the same time to evaluate these findings and extract dominant themes.

The analysis proceeds through a discussion of the general voting behavior literature, an examination of the correlates of voter turnout in school finance elections, and then, in successive chapters, a systematic presentation of what studies show about the environmental, socioeconomic, and psychological variables that affect voter choice in this sort of electoral situation. The book is concerned to a large extent with empirical explanations of the widely noted phenomenon of declining voter support for school budgets. From these explanations, the authors seek to develop a sound basis for practical advice to school district superintendents who face budget or bond issue elections. The picture that emerges for schoolmen is not a happy one. If they follow their democratic inclinations and seek to encourage voter turnout, they will probably be drawing to the polls people who will vote against their budgets. Normal supporters of the budget—younger, more affluent, more educated parents—are

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likely to vote anyway and even in these demographic groups, the national trend has been away from what has been, until recently, disproportionate support for school budgets and bond issues.

Where contradictory findings seem to emerge from their survey of research, the authors seek to resolve differences through "data quality control." By arranging the studies on a proposition by time period, number of elections covered, type of elections covered, geographic region, and unit of analysis, Piele and Hall seek to determine which of contradictory findings can most likely be relied upon. Using this technique, they are able to find support for the central proposition discussed above, that "the larger the turnout, the smaller the percentage of favorable votes cast in a school finance election," and to largely discount work that denied the presence of a significant relationship between these variables. This is a first-rate technique, though, to be sure, quality control could have been enhanced by more attention to the nature and relative strength of the statistical tests used in the studies the authors categorize.

Though Piele and Hall do a credible job of relating research findings to middle-range theory, one is still struck by the limits that particular local circumstances place upon generalization in the area of school finance politics. In 1973 the voters of Spakenkill in the Hudson Valley flew in the face of national trends and state education department disapprobation to overwhelmingly support a bond issue for a new high school so that their children would not have to continue to attend a school growing increasingly black in the central city of Poughkeepsie. Though school superintendents seem more and more to be viewing their first budget submission as a "bargaining position," as the authors note, this is much more likely to be the case in states like New Jersey, where voter rejection may lead to cuts throughout the budget, than in those similar to New York, where about 90 percent of expenditures are state mandated and cannot be cut for a second submission.

Just as great diversity and the geographic spread of local government makes cumulative research difficult, it makes generalization, even at the middle range and within discrete subcategories of governmental types, a rather risky business. This excellent book should be read with this caveat in mind.

GERALD BENJAMIN
State University of New York, New Paltz

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Government as Employer *by Sterling D. Spero. Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University Press, 1972.—xvi, 497 pp. $10.00.*

The Urban Community and Its Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in Local Government Labor Relations *by Sterling Spero and John M. Capozzola. New York, Dunellen, 1973.—xvii, 361 pp. $12.50.*

One of the most significant developments in the recent history of American labor has been the rapid and extensive growth of unionism in the public sector. During the 1960s at a time when many unions had a declining or stable membership, those organizing public employees were among the few that achieved real growth. And the dimensions of this growth were spectacular. Prior to 1960 only three of the unions primarily organizing government employees had more than 100,000 members; a decade later there were six well above this size. The American Federation of Government Employees had grown by more than 360 percent while the teachers' union had more than doubled its membership. At the same time, on all levels of government such unions were becoming increasingly militant. Despite various municipal, state, and federal prohibitions on strikes by public employees, walkouts did take place. In 1958 there had been 15 work stoppages involving 1720 government workers and 7250 lost man-days; a decade later there were 254 work stoppages involving 201,000 workers and over 2,500,000 lost man-days. There were also job actions where the employees did not strike, but by working to rule they seriously affected public services.

Government as Employer first was published well before these events took place. Yet this unaltered reprint of the 1948 edition has not become stale, and it is understandable why the book was selected to be part of a series called "Masterworks in Industrial Relations." Despite all that has been written during the past twenty-five years about labor-management relations in the public sector, this book remains one of the finest and broadest historical introductions to the subject. Spero—now a professor emeritus of Public Administration, New York University, and the author of several fine works on labor as well as a successful mediator—cast a very wide net in surveying the rise of unionism among government employees. Thus he dealt not only with the celebrated Boston police strike of 1919 but also with the comparatively obscure pre-World War I differences between the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of New York City and that municipality's administrators. Spero also dealt expertly with other groups on different levels of government, including post office employees, teachers, and firemen. The last quarter of the book is a detailed and perceptive examination of government employment policies in the mid-1940s. In this section as elsewhere in the book Spero, in the words of Albert Blum, who edited the Masterworks series: "deals with those issues concerning which government as an employer, and civil servants as employees, still have to concern themselves." Much of the book's vitality lies in its still timely treat-

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ment of questions such as: At what point is public safety endangered? What is the role of collective bargaining in determining the working conditions in government employment?

Of course, since *Government as Employer* originally appeared there have been dramatic developments in labor-management relations in the public sector, most notably President John F. Kennedy's 1962 Executive Order providing for recognition by the federal government of employee organizations as bargaining agencies, and President Nixon's 1970 Executive Order further liberalizing the government's response to such organizations. Although limited to federal employees, these orders also stimulated collective bargaining by government employees on the state and local levels. *The Urban Community and Its Unionized Bureaucracies*, coauthored by Spero and John M. Capozzola, a professor of Public Administration at New York University, is a thorough survey of recent developments in municipal government-employee labor relations. Admittedly, as the authors point out, writing about such a topic is like "shooting at a moving target," but they have displayed first-rate marksmanship. This book is a detailed, objective, and informative topical treatment of such subjects as "the collective bargaining process," "employee organization and public policy," and the "resolution of impasses." And its value is enhanced by a wide-ranging, rich bibliography. Spero and Capozzola are particularly perceptive in characterizing the changing aspects of municipal employment and placing them in a proper framework, "the very essence of which is politics," as they succinctly point out. They are not very sanguine about the future of "public employee-employer relations" and find that serious questions have been raised "the answers to which cannot be foreseen."

The increasing militancy of the burgeoning unions organizing government employees has often caused the public considerable hardship as well as great concern about the future of labor relations between government and those it employs. Both these books are necessary reading for anyone interested in achieving a comprehensive understanding of these relationships.

DANIEL LEAB
Columbia University

From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America *by Walter I. Trattner. New York, The Free Press, 1974.—xii, 276 pp. $7.95.*

In the preface, the author states that his intent is to write "a history of social welfare in America" (p. ix). *From Poor Law to Welfare State* does trace developments in the area of social welfare from the colonial period to the present. The volume begins with the impact of the English Poor Law of 1601 on our welfare system. The earliest settlers patterned their legislation on the English

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experience, leading to the establishment of an assistance system wherein local governments played the major role in providing aid to the poor. The work proceeds to describe the changes that occurred during the nineteenth century when private charities replaced the government as the primary vehicle for providing relief. Government programs were directed chiefly toward institutional care of particular groups: orphans, the aged, the disabled, the mentally ill. These were groups that could not be expected to care for themselves—to become self-sufficient. Finally, the volume ends by tracing the increased role of the public sector during this century.

The book does attempt to explain these developments. Professor Trattner has written a comprehensive account which seeks to explain the changes in social welfare policies and practices by analyzing developments in our economic, social, and political systems. Unfortunately, the author does not make clear his conceptual frame of reference in explaining changing events. There is no theoretical model, either explicitly or implicitly stated, which would aid the reader in relating systemic changes to our social welfare history. The author's selection of causal factors appears to be unsystematic. For example, the question is raised: "Why did these events happen?" The author's response, generally, is to present a "laundry list" of possible contributing factors. In short, this book, like many others written by historians, fails to reflect the impact of a scientific approach to the subject matter.

Another difficulty, related to this same general problem, is the author's tendency to shift from a study which seeks to deal with empirical or descriptive concerns to one which promotes Professor Trattner's point of view. The author clearly approves of the expansion of the government's role in dealing with social welfare problems. As a result, this history, at times, reads like a Hollywood movie script with the "good guys" (the social reformers) doing battle with the "bad guys" (the conservatives). At such times, the effect is to present a highly oversimplified version of reality, and one that antagonizes even the serious reader who is sympthetic to the author's values.

There are strengths in this book, however, that should be noted. The author's description and analysis of the role of private charities is very well done. Professor Trattner has a firm grasp of the contributions and limitations of these institutions, reflecting presumably the growing sophistication of the social work literature regarding voluntary agencies. (Unfortunately, Professor Trattner continues the practice of almost all other writings in this field of ignoring the social service organizations within the immigrant communities.) The study also reflects the growing awareness by social workers of the political constraints existent in the formation of governmental social welfare policies.

Perhaps the fairest summary statement of *From Poor Law to Welfare State* is that it reflects the present state of the literature dealing with social welfare history. Few fields have been as neglected by serious scholars as the American social welfare and social work experience. In a sense, the difficulties en-

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countered by Professor Trattner are due, in large part, to his fellow members of the academy; their failure to apply their professional skills to this significant policy area made it exceedingly difficult for the author to write a comprehensive history of the American social welfare experience.

STEPHEN DAVID
Fordham University

Black Civil Rights During the Johnson Administration *by James C. Harvey. Jackson, Miss., University and College Press of Mississippi, 1973. —xiv, 245 pp. $4.95.*

This is the second book by Harvey, who has been professor of history and social sciences at Jackson State College in Mississippi since 1970. The first, an unnoticed eighty-seven page volume entitled *Civil Rights During the Kennedy Administration* (Hattiesburg, Miss.: University and College Press of Mississippi, 1971), is a cursory review of the struggle for civil rights in the federal government through the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower administrations and an analysis in some depth (though not, by his own admission, an exhaustive one) of what Kennedy brought as candidate and president to the struggle. While he concludes that the Kennedy administration is to be faulted for not bringing about the reforms which Harvey felt were so palpably needed, he nevertheless finds something praiseworthy in the facts that Kennedy did emphasize civil rights in his brief tenure and that he gave presidential leadership to the drive. It is an elementary book, clearly focused and easy to read.

The present book is necessarily over three times as long, since so much happened in the area of civil rights under President Johnson. The major focal points are: the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Civil Rights Act of 1968; internal attention to integration and civil rights in the national government; progress in housing and private employment and in voting and education; and desegregation policies in the health and welfare areas. The book is rounded out by a useful bibliography and index.

It should be emphasized that this is a historical account, not an analytical policy study. And it seems to be accurate history as far as use of the public records are concerned. Once again, the author disavows claims to exhaustive research (p. xiii). It should also be noted that it is not an impartial study; it is written from the black viewpoint, from the preface on page xiii, where the author says this book "deals broadly with the conditions endured by black people in America during the period from 1963 to 1969," to the last paragraph on page 226, where he asks rhetorically, "Afterall *[sic]*, why should black people have to struggle so hard for rights as American citizens which should be automatically theirs?" And in the end, it is a call for its readers to keep up the fight.

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These caveats do not make it the less rewarding reading. It is difficult to say what the intended audience is, though the fact that it is in paperback suggests perhaps it was aimed at a rather wider market than libraries and civil rights courses on college and university campuses. Whoever reads this volume and the preceding one cannot help but be impressed with the track record of the last two Democratic presidents in the field of civil rights, as well as with the considerable distance there is still to go.

It is just as well that Harvey's study is not more pretentious because the period it analyzes is so recent that the record surely is not yet complete. Evaluations of Johnson as president are still coming in, and the resources of his own papers in Austin, Texas, have yet to be fully exploited. Thus any judgment must be a tempered one. As it is, the author finds little for which to blame Johnson as a legislative leader. He finds more objection to Johnson as an administrator—indeed, he charges directly that once the civil rights acts were passed, Johnson "gave [their] enforcement relatively little attention" (p. 224). Whether the judgment will stand the test of further research remains to be seen. In any case, it is doubtful if Harvey's general praise of Johnson as a leader in the drive "to bring black people into the mainstream" of American life is likely to be revoked. In the end, this is more a Johnson book than a civil rights book, and as such it adds another dimension to the picture of this president.

RICHARD H. LEACH
Duke University

Right From the Start: A Chronicle of the McGovern Campaign *by Gary Warren Hart. New York, Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1973.—ix, 334 pp. $7.95.*

In this book about the McGovern prenomination and general election campaigns between 1970 and 1972, Gary Hart offers a detailed description of the organization, activities, and pressured pace of presidential campaigning. Using a diary format, Hart describes the events, strategies, and counterstrategies as they develop. But, curiously, one comes away from the book with only the faintest sense of what the key individuals in the political drama, Senator George McGovern and Gary Hart, were about. While Hart does add to the literature of campaign organization and tactical planning, the different characters in the enfolding political drama are left rather fleshless and without definition.

When Hart moves from campaigning itself to an examination of forces within the Democratic party, he tends to reduce the internal party pressures to an overly simplistic duality—those for the status quo versus those for reform of party politics—"old politics" versus "new politics." As a result the significance of the Wallace movement is dealt with inadequately, first as a political factor greatly aiding McGovern in the *intraparty* conflict (by limiting the breadth of

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appeal of other "old politics" candidates), and then as a constraint on building a majority coalition in the subsequent general election campaign.

Although not adequately grasping the complexity of internal Democratic divisions, Hart clearly shows that the McGovern forces had an excellent grasp of the *weakness* of other contending candidates and their supporters in the Democratic electorate. The organization and execution of McGovern's prenomination campaign was indeed an outstanding example of maximizing political resources and exploiting the weaknesses of opposing strategies. However, Hart was perhaps too close to this campaign to properly distinguish between campaigning pressure and electoral pressure. As a result, the Eagleton fiasco and other "chance" campaign problems are used as far too easy an explanation of Senator McGovern's overwhelming defeat in the general election. The issues of an "issue-oriented" campaign were not as favorable to McGovern as his supporters thought, and McGovern as a candidate did not register well on the electorate at large.

In spite of these criticisms of the scope of Hart's analysis, this book does add to our understanding of political organization and campaigning strategy, although at a minimum, we should have had a fuller development of the characters of Mr. Hart and Senator George McGovern.

RICHARD R. RUBIN
Columbia University

Perspectives on Presidential Selection *edited by Donald R. Matthews. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1973.—xii, 246 pp. Cloth, $6.95; paper, $2.95.*

The perspectives from which presidential selection can be viewed are nearly innumerable, as this collection illustrates. Contributions on voting behavior, today probably the most common perspective on presidential selection, were discouraged by Professor Matthews because electoral behavior is "the most thoroughly and successfully analyzed portion of the total selection process, and hence did not seem to require additional emphasis" (p. 3). It turns out that the omission of voting analysis does not appreciably narrow the book's potential audience, for its chapters still manage to encompass nearly all of the methodologies and analytic perspectives currently to be found in political research.

Hugh Heclo's "Presidential and Prime Ministerial Selection," a comparative analysis of chief executive selection in America and Britain, follows Matthews' introduction. Distinguishing at the outset between selection and election—selection is the initial process in which the party chooses one candidate from a field of potential candidates, while election is the final process in which the public decides which candidate shall hold public office—Heclo suggests that

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American presidential selection has a distinctly "entrepreneurial" quality, in contrast to the "apprenticeship" system by which British prime ministerial candidates are selected. Heclo concludes that the entrepreneurial selective process leads the president to view politics in terms of individual achievement, with the result that he is not fully prepared to govern effectively; the prime minister, having been steeped in the collegial style of leadership during his apprenticeship as cabinet member, is not similarly handicapped.

In the next chapter Carl and Ellen Baar discuss the convention-based executive-selection processes of America and Canada. They identify two features of Canadian conventions, the secret ballot and the low-man-out voting scheme, that set them off from their American counterparts. Predictably, both features severely limit candidates' strategic options once the convention has begun: the potentially unlimited number of public ballots cast on a state-by-state basis in American conventions introduces a fluidity to coalition strength and candidate alliances that has no Canadian parallel. The authors suggest that by circumscribing coalition strategies, Canadian convention rules inhibit the development of the semipermanent party factions which have long cluttered the American political landscape. But the most telling contrast between American and Canadian conventions lies in their representational philosophies (and the authority patterns necessary to implement them): state parties alone are represented at American conventions, while a much broader cross-section of the Canadian parties—including campus organizations, assorted demographic groups, and elected officials—is assured of representation at national conventions. As the authors note, these different approaches to convention representation illustrate the extraordinary subordination in America of national party interests to state party interests.

Elijah Ben-Zion Kaminsky's chronicle of French presidential nominations in the Fifth Republic, the last of the comparative chapters, is overly descriptive and sorely lacking in analytic rigor and systematic comparison. Next, James Zais and John Kessel contribute a suggestive but ultimately disappointing chapter on their computer simulation of coalition formation at American conventions. While the logic of their model is sound, its appeal is diminished by unmeasurable parameters—including the ideological flexibility of the candidate and the location of actors and coalitions in "ideological space"—and by restrictive assumptions—for example, the votes of a state delegation are assumed to be indivisible. Although formal theorizing often requires trade-offs such as these, Zais and Kessel seem in this case to have gained less than they have given up.

"Delegate Turnover at the National Conventions," by Loch K. Johnson and Harlan Hahn, develops several generalizations about delegate recruitment: (1) there has been a nearly constant rate of delegate turnover from 1944 to 1968; (2) the rate of turnover is high, averaging about 65 percent for each party; (3) turnover is marginally related to region and is slightly lower in states with

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primaries; (4) turnover is greatest among Republican moderates and Democratic conservatives and progressives; (5) convention newcomers often vote differently than do experienced delegates. Johnson and Hahn also include an up-to-date, comprehensive bibliography of the academic literature on presidential nomination.

The "average voting power per citizen-voter" is the key measure used by John H. Yunker and Lawrence D. Longley to evaluate "The Biases of the Electoral College." First developed by John Banzhaf, this formally derived measure of voting power is based on the probability that a state could cast a pivotal vote in the electoral college and the probability that a citizen could cast a pivotal vote which would change the destination of his state's electoral votes. Yunker and Longley find that citizen-voters residing in states with a 1960 population of over 7 million are favored by the electoral college, as are suburban residents, residents of central cities, blue-collar workers, and citizens of foreign stock (obviously, not mutually exclusive categories). Citizen-voters in states with populations of less than 7 million, blacks, and residents of rural areas are penalized by the electoral college. Only one of the proposed changes in the electoral college, its abolition in favor of direct presidential elections, eliminates inequality in voting power; the proportional and district plans both favor the small over the large states.

In the book's concluding chapter, "Understanding the Electoral College Controversy," Max S. Power uses the tools of formal logic to demonstrate that the necessary and sufficient conditions for "populistic democracy" (Robert Dahl's term for majority rule) can only be realized when two alternatives are put to a vote in direct popular elections. (No electoral system, including direct elections, fulfills these conditions in three-way contests.) Because it requires that general conditions be fulfilled in principle by an electoral system, Power's formulation leads to the conclusion that all indirect electoral systems violate equality by violating "anonymity," a necessary condition for democracy. Banzhaf's method of analysis, since it requires a different probability for pivotal votes to be computed for each particular combination of voters in an electoral system, leaves open the possibility that indirect elections where the districts are perfectly apportioned will violate the general principle of equality (i.e., anonymity) but will nevertheless distribute voting power equally.

Power concludes with some interesting observations on the limits of formal analysis, noting that contextually based arguments can be, and have been, used to defend the electoral college. Some argue, for example, that the electoral college should be retained because it preserves the two-party system and protects certain voting blocs. Clearly, formal logic cannot take these supposed virtues into account—their existence is a matter of observation, not principle. "In the end," writes Power, "the debate over electoral reform is not so much a controversy over specific issues as a clash of philosophical perspectives. Perhaps

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this explains why the debate has not been resolved in more than 180 years, and why, even if reforms are enacted, the controversy is unlikely to end" (p. 237).

GERALD FINCH
Columbia University

Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War *by Thomas G. Paterson. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.—xi, 287 pp. $12.00.*

This book, which the author cautions is not an economic interpretation of the Cold War, concludes nevertheless that the diplomacy of postwar European reconstruction played a central role in generating tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Divided into two parts, the book first treats five issues relating to the Soviet "sphere of influence" in Eastern Europe: (1) the abortive proposal for a postwar reconstruction loan to Russia and the suspension of lend-lease, (2) trade with Russia, (3) United States relief policy and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, (4) Washington's desire for an economic and political "open door" in Eastern Europe, and (5) United States economic assistance policy toward Eastern Europe. The second part of the book deals with five sources of Allied misunderstanding in the "American sphere": (1) the launching of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, (2) the United States loan to Britain in 1946, (3) the Truman Doctrine, (4) the Marshall Plan, and (5) the rehabilitation of western Germany.

The author's central contention is that at the end of the war United States leaders consciously used American economic hegemony to shape a new world order in which the principles of free trade, investment, and navigation would be the cornerstone of international peace. United States efforts to exert economic pressure for political ends, while successful in Western Europe, Greece, and Turkey, not only failed in their purpose in the Soviet "sphere" according to Paterson, but were counterproductive in slamming the door shut to postwar Allied cooperation and in provoking Stalin to tighten his grip over Eastern Europe. Moreover, the author asserts, the dramatic successes achieved in western Europe aggravated Soviet suspicions that the United States was seeking to turn Western Europe into a cohesive and economically powerful anti-Soviet bloc. Although the author repeatedly cautions that "the paucity of Soviet historical sources renders any judgment tentative," each of his discussions of the ten sources of contention concludes with the general observation that attempts to reach United States goals by the unilateral application of economic power exacerbated the already difficult state of Soviet-American relations.

It is acknowledged, but only in passing, that Soviet expansion into Eastern

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Europe, Communist ideological antipathies, and strained Allied relations during the war all contributed to the origins of the Cold War. Accordingly, although "extreme" revisionists may lose patience with the author's circumspection, orthodox scholars may find the book's "evenhanded" approach unsatisfying. Nevertheless, the author's culling of a large number of published sources as well as manuscript collections and oral history project interviews, results in a study copiously documented from American sources. Yet, the book is necessarily devoid of Soviet primary sources, which, one may conjecture, would paint Stalin and his thoroughly hardened associates in a somewhat less aggrieved light. In fact, the author's frequent admonitions against premature conclusions until Soviet sources become available to Western inspection reminds one of the old Russian expression, conveying an appropriate skepticism, that some devoutly to be hoped for event will occur "when the crayfish learns to whistle." Any number of Soviet actions took place in Eastern Europe in the period from 1944 to 1947 the detailed description of which would tend to exonerate such American statesmen as Roosevelt, Truman, and Harriman of the implicit charge that their willingness to use United States economic strength to curb Russian excesses was a primary cause of postwar tension between the United States and Soviet Union. Rather, the official inclination to resort to economic pressure reflected the essential impotence of the United States in being unable to bring more effective means to bear while Stalin's lieutenants ravaged Eastern Europe.

One of the book's probably unavoidable shortcomings, then, of which the author himself is aware, is the absence of that broader East European political context in which economic diplomacy took place. Historians of the Cold War may endlessly debate whether this or that aspect of East Europe's Sovietization was prompted by Western clumsiness or malice, but the larger point is that the entire context is required to place particular events in proper perspective.

NILS H. WESSELL
Lehigh University and
Foreign Policy Research Institute

Stephen A. Douglas *by Robert W. Johannsen. New York, Oxford University Press, 1973.—x, 993 pp. $19.95.*

In an earlier day, Robert Johannsen's new book might have been called *The Life and Public Services of Stephen A. Douglas.* For this is, par excellence, a political biography. It contains abundent, perhaps excessive, excerpts from Douglas' speeches, but except for a few almost perfunctory glances at his family life, Douglas the man is all too seldom seen.

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Douglas, however, was almost exclusively a political animal. His career, like Lincoln's, demonstrated the unparalleled opportunities offered by the second party system to men of modest origins who possessed driving ambition and a modicum of talent. And Douglas' rise was nothing if not spectacular. Johannsen traces his career from humble origins in frontier Vermont to his role, while still in his twenties, as a leading architect of a tightly disciplined Democratic party in Illinois, and then to Congress, the Senate, and an unsuccessful quest for the presidency.

According to Johannsen, Douglas' career was a blend of pragmatism and principle. As "a man of action rather than intellect," he was an energetic and shameless master of western stump speaking, equally adroit at discussing constitutional issues and appealing to the racial prejudices of his audience. He could even assure a group of Irish-born listeners that his ancestors too had come from the Emerald Isle.

Yet Douglas was also, Johannsen insists, a "man of principle," and the strongest part of the book is its careful and convincing analysis of the principle which framed Douglas' career in the 1850s: "popular sovereignty," or local self-government on the slavery issue. Johannsen shows that popular sovereignty was simply one part of a comprehensive program of which railroad development, homestead legislation, and national expansion were other components. Underlying these policies was Douglas' deep commitment to western and national development, and especially to the preservation of the Union. The slavery question he viewed both as an unfortunate diversion from the pressing task of national growth, and as the only real threat to the preservation of the Union; popular sovereignty was the only way of settling the issue on a basis acceptable to all sections.

Johannsen also spells out Douglas' conviction that under the operation of popular sovereignty, virtually all the western territories would become free states, although he is on less firm ground when he writes that Douglas, as "a northern and western man" was "opposed to the institution of slavery." The evidence for this is very dubious, but what is clear is that Douglas sought to suppress the slavery issue, and restore "order and stability to American politics through the agency of a national, conservative Democratic party." Even Douglas' Kansas-Nebraska bill, which reopened the slavery question in a new and inflamed form, was simply a consistent application of his well-known beliefs, a "logical extension of his western program," as well as an attempt to provide some kind of dynamic leadership for the badly factionalized and policyless Democratic party.

Douglas, in short, was the last of the Union-compromise politicians, the political heir of Clay and Webster. His failure symbolized the nation's failure to avoid the Civil War, and this new biography might have been the vehicle for a new interpretation of the sectional conflict. Yet Johannsen consistently

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shies away from making explicit judgments and analyses. It may seem perverse to criticize a 900-page book for omissions, but Johannsen provides us with no coherent explanation of the causes of Douglas' defeat, apart from a residual revisionism which leads him to characterize Douglas' Republican opponents as "almost pathological and frenzied," while he studiously avoids any hint of disapproval of Douglas' virulent racism (which is simply noted as reflecting "widely held views at the time").

This reluctance to make hindsight judgments may have much to commend it, but it leads Johannsen to refuse to speculate on such questions as the underlying causes of the sectional conflict, the social base of Douglas' support, or the reasons for the Republican triumph of 1860. We are left, therefore, with a purely narrative history, one which no doubt makes it unnecessary for anyone to trace again the course of Douglas' political career, but which leaves unanswered the fascinating questions raised by the life of a fascinating man.

ERIC FONER
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The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Vol. II, Washington to Springfield, 1941–1948 *edited by Walter Johnson and Carol Evans. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1973.—xiii, 620 pp. $15.00.*

The editors characterize their work as "a documentary biography of Stevenson" and "a documentary history" of his times. Volume II of the series falls more fully under the first category since it captures the jaunty personality and spirit of Stevenson as fully as any biography could. Anyone who begins this book will read it virtually in its entirety, because Stevenson possessed an innate ability to be eloquent, charming, or humorous in nearly everything he said or wrote.

The result, however, remains disappointing. It is not conclusive in answering the ever-present questions regarding Stevenson's background, his ability to be president, or whether his election would have altered the course of history. One thing appears certain: he recognized from 1945 to 1947 that the bombastic attitude of the Soviet Union then represented its historical traditions and domestic concerns; Stevenson would have responded less aggressively than other executives did. Yet even he lost patience at times, and by 1952 his earlier calls for understanding may have moderated. The debate over Stevenson's qualifications for high office will merely be stimulated by this volume. It reveals a man capable of hard work, one who thought for himself after sincere effort to learn the facts; it also discloses the growing esteem and reputation he acquired as a result of his labors as special assistant to secretary of the navy Frank Knox during the war and his later activities associated with the United Nations. Offers of jobs came in uninterrupted fashion. Yet his letters and speeches leave no impression

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of an original thinker, or a man with constructive proposals (even where he became as informed as in his U.N. work). Here, his concept of "collective security" remained incomplete, and his ideas regarding an international organization did not move beyond generalities until he was deeply immersed in the U.N.'s tasks. The editors in a note on page 235 indicate their desire to include data which reveal "his own thinking" but Stevenson's personality continually thwarts that objective. He emerges as a well-meaning, dedicated, conscientious, likable (even lovable), competent man without significant intellectual stature. The third volume on his governorship should provide further insight on the as yet unanswered questions regarding his competency as an officeholder.

The student of government and history will find considerable insight in the volume on a variety of subjects. These include the "organizational confusion" in the South Pacific and Italy during the war as revealed in Stevenson's diary accounts of his missions. Stevenson's role in activities associated with creating the U.N. from Dumbarton Oaks through San Francisco, and in the Assemblies of 1946 and 1947, provide information on general problems as well as the policies of the United States. The gubernatorial campaign in Illinois touches upon the political scene there as it documents the colorful and unorthodox fighting campaign of Stevenson in 1948. Interspersed are revealing characterizations of personalities prominent on the national and international scene.

The editors have done a fine but not exceptional job. They have provided adequate introductions to sections and materials, and their selections appear to be representative of Stevenson's work and views. Yet they do not identify all the persons presented, and some of their identifications are curiously incomplete. They seem unaware that younger readers might need explanations to such wartime terms as TARFU and SNAFU, and they make no effort to explain what part of Stevenson's speeches, especially at the U.N., reflected his views as distinct from government policy. Also, especially for Stevenson's wartime duties, they provide no information on the degree to which his recommendations were ignored or implemented. A section of photographs adds to the interest of the work.

WARREN F. KUEHL
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Letters of Louis D. Brandeis: Progressive and Zionist, Vol. III, 1913–1915 *edited by Melvin I. Urofsky and David M. Levy. Albany, N. Y., State University of New York Press, 1973.—xxiii, 705 pp. $20.00.*

The excellence of the editing and the perhaps excessive duplication of subject matter continues in this third volume. As the editors point out in their brief introductory note, these years before Brandeis' appointment to the Supreme Court were full of his long-practiced progressive activities and began his intense participation in the Zionist movement.

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After the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, Brandeis agreed to become president of a newly founded Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs and prepared a circular letter which urged that all strive "for permanent justice, peace, and liberty for the Jewish people in the Jewish land" (p. 292). A telegram to Benjamin Perlstein, the administrative secretary of the committee, urged organizers to select small rather than large halls: "Every man turned away for lack of room is worth two who get in" (p. 306). Characteristic was his request to the head of the Zionist Palestine office in Jaffa, Dr. Arthur Ruppin, to send "monthly" a report on conditions in Palestine (p. 318).

In October 1914 a correspondence began with Chaim Weizmann which continued, intermittently, during the period covered by this volume. The first of these letters covers more than five pages (pp. 322–327). In it Brandeis requested Weizmann to attend a conference planned to be held in Stockholm as representative of the American Committee and gave him full details about its creation and activities. These details are developed by the editors in their excellent explanatory notes for over two more pages in fine print (pp. 327–329).

From that time on the letters in this volume predominantly deal with Zionism. Incidentally, Brandeis discussed anti-Semitism in the United States. He advised one correspondent in Philadelphia "to endeavor to meet such feeling as you may find to exist in the place in which you are working; and not endeavor to escape by removal to another city" (p. 349). The editors note that this advice was not followed (n. 3). In November 1914, Brandeis sought the help of William Jennings Bryan, then President Wilson's secretary of state. And the editors note (p. 355) that the State Department assisted in the transfer of funds to Palestine. In the same month Brandeis asked the French ambassador in Washington, M. Jusserand, to call to the attention of his government a memorandum suggesting that Russia modify laws relating to Jews.

One aspect of anti-Semitism was the case of Leo Frank, convicted of the murder of a female factory worker. After a conversation with Felix Frankfurter (then a professor at the Harvard Law School), Brandeis wrote to Roscoe Pound urging him publicly to state the view, attributed to him by Frankfurter, that Frank was innocent—"it is important that this protest should be made by a non-Jew" (p. 373).

Early in 1915 he stressed the necessity to be daring, saying "It has never been possible for the Jew to 'play safe' or for anyone else indeed 'to play safe' who has sought advances in conditions" (p. 412).

Interesting in the light of the present discussion of Russia's treatment of Jews are Brandeis' comments in a letter of March 23, 1915: "in view of the standards prevailing in Russia, and the devious course of their statesmanship and diplomacy, I had little faith in our ability to accomplish desired results through any course that involved an apology even by way of repression of our opinions as to the quality of their actions, and that we had no reason to expect to obtain results through patient forebearance" [*sic*] (p. 491).

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Brandeis insisted that "to be a good American and a good Jew he must be a Zionist . . . not only in sympathy, but in action . . . " (p. 546).

In 1915 there is the first mention of the later-organized American Jewish Congress, at first warning against premature publicity (p. 408); later there are comments on the difficulties experienced with the American Jewish Committee (pp. 634, 651). Indeed, in the last letter in this volume dealing with Jewish problems Brandeis wrote that the Committee "has taken a step which is likely to prove disastrous to the Congress movement" (p. 681).

One of the subjects Brandeis touched on was woman suffrage. In 1884 he had opposed the idea (Vol. I, p. 66, n. 1). In 1913 he wrote "Woman's suffrage must be generally adopted, because the participation of women in political affairs will promote social efficiency" (p. 48); in 1915 he said "Experience has shown that the American ideal of democracy and social justice requires for its fulfilment that women be granted the suffrage" (p. 535). The previous year when asked whether female suffrage might lessen the frequency of wars he wrote "The causes of war lie I think far deeper than the absence of the franchise for women" (p. 319).

There are several letters to President Wilson about possible appointments [in one instance (p. 87) declining his own appointment as chairman of the Commission on Industrial Relations] and there is also a letter (pp. 113–115) strongly supporting William Jennings Bryan's insistence on legislation that became the Federal Reserve Act. There are many letters to Attorney General (later Supreme Court Justice) McReynolds, including a long one about trust legislation (pp. 247–258). Of him Brandeis wrote his wife "He is weary & I think almost wishes he were out of the job" (p. 259).

There are many personal touches. Just before Wilson's inauguration Brandeis wrote to his brother about the rumors that he might be in the cabinet: "As you know I had great doubts as for its being desirable for me. . . . [and commenting on the opposition] It is almost, indeed quite, amusing how much they fear me, attributing to me power and influence which I in no respect possess" (p. 37).

Late in 1913 he wrote his wife: "Met Justice Holmes on street yesterday which resulted in my dining there pleasantly alone. He is at last growing older but Mrs. is a bit younger" (p. 223). And, a few days later, he wrote of J. P. Morgan's daughter, active in social reform, that she "strode in with her air of dashing royalty" (p. 228).

In June 1914 Brandeis wrote his brother about five days of activity in the Boston area: "4 horseback rides, 1 paddle, 3 drives with Alice [his wife], 2 motorings to Dedham with Herbert [White, a family friend], Harvard class day with Elizabeth [his daughter] & Ruth Adler [daughter of Felix Adler]" (p. 271).

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Political Parties before the Constitution *by Jackson Turner Main. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1973.—xx, 481 pp. $15.95.*

Political Parties before the Constitution is an expansion of the work begun in *The Upper House in Revolutionary America* (1967). It was during Main's investigation of the state senates that he first traced the outlines of legislative parties in the postrevolutionary years, two groups within the upper houses who responded similarly to a number of issues and therefore found themselves aligned against each other. In *Political Parties* he analyzes voting patterns in the lower houses of seven states: Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, which "furnish adequate information concerning political alignments" (p. 296). The legislatures of the remaining six states received briefer scrutiny. The idea that the postrevolutionary period saw the emergence of two parties in each of the state legislatures will surprise no one who knows that most issues confronting them in the 1780s derived from a common problem: how to pay for the Revolution. What Main has done is prove coterminous alignments existed by comparing the voting records of each member of seven lower houses, using computer analysis. He then seeks to explain the characteristics of these alignments by relating them to other phenomena. When it comes to "explanation," Main pursues two strategies.

One is to ask whether or not legislative alignments are related to a division within postrevolutionary American society itself. Those disenchanted with attempts to use the concept of social class in explaining political behavior at this time may be reassured to know that Main tries to transcend the traditional economic categories. Thus he analyzes how such attributes as place of residence, religious affiliation, political experience, age, military experience, mobility, ethnic identity, and world view correlate with voting behavior, as well as those more commonly associated with class, economic status, occupation, education, and social origin. Within the limits of available data, Main can identify the elements which most clearly distinguish one voting bloc from another. These are, in order of positive correlation, place of residence, world view, occupation, and economic status.

Main's other strategy is to relate voting blocs to current political issues. By far the largest section of the book (320 pages out of the 409 given to argument) is devoted to this enterprise. His object is to show that certain issues were interrelated, not because they were parts of the same problem logically considered, but because the two blocs in the lower houses voted on them coterminously. Once this is done, it becomes possible to correlate the attributes of legislators with their stand on issues and to see if the patterns emerging in one state recur in others. Main finds that in all states roughly the same types of people lined up for and against the same types of issues. He labels these groups commercial-cosmopolitans and agrarian-localists, according to the most positive correlations of legislators' attributes with their voting behavior. Finally,

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he suggests that the bloc voting characteristics of state politics during the confederation period was extended into the struggle over ratifying the new constitution.

This book is not trying to reconceptualize the period, but rather to reinforce concepts the so-called progressive school of historians has long been using. It is unlikely that anyone is going to want to challenge Main's correlations, yet for all the rigor of his method, there is a fundamental problem that he never resolves. Though he meticulously identifies independent variables when analyzing the attributes of legislators, he does not do so when correlating attributes with issues. So we do not know whether he thinks the issues determine the alignments and their social characteristics, or vice versa. It seems that he leans toward thinking that the political behavior of these legislators is determined primarily by their social and economic attributes, and that he has uncovered a social fissure in American society. Such a conclusion raises the possibility that the first party system was nothing more than an extension and elaboration of the legislative parties Main identifies in the 1780s.

Main is aware of this possibility, but refrains from full commitment to it. He settles for a more modest conclusion: "If the Cosmopolitan-Localist alignment continued into the 1790s and beyond, the most likely outcome seems to be a process by which the national parties adapted to and modified the state blocs" (p. 406). It is probable that this proposition is cast in the conditional as a direct result of his method's limitations. He is not yet able to rule out the possibility that the first party system grew up around a quite different set of issues, which may have evoked a different pattern of responses not adequately described by the categories "localist" and "cosmopolitan." In other words, it may well be that at this point in our national history, issues were more important than social divisions. A corollary to this, which perhaps Main would not accept, is the notion that ideology gives more direct access to the inner dynamics of early national politics than an analysis of the politicians' social attributes.

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Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts *by Stephen E. Patterson. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1973.—ix, 299 pp. $12.50.*

Stephen Patterson has written a fascinating analysis of Massachusetts politics in the revolutionary era which seeks to fuse a clever reformulation of the Progressive historian's "dual revolution" or "class conflict" interpretation of the Revolution with what is becoming a recurrent theme in recent studies of early American political history: namely, the ways in which "modernization" effect-

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ed a transition from the politics of stable harmonious communities to the politics of communities torn apart by the experiences of economic development, urbanization, and secularization, all of which fragmented the social order and generated conflict.

Prior to the 1760s, Patterson argues, two legislative coalitions, the Court and Country parties, fought for power. The former was the party of the Crown, the latter, the party of opposition. Whereas others have seen such conflicts as factious in nature, each group made of similar social materials, Patterson argues that among the 122 politically active towns he has identified, the 50 composing the Court party "ranked among the commercial cosmopolitan centers of the province" and were becoming the "administrative and judicial centers of Massachusetts." The Country towns, by contrast, tended to be "eastern inland towns . . . within a 40-mile radius of Boston" at an earlier stage of modernization, yet "caught up in the process of rapid growth and change," but neither prepared to abandon the past without a struggle or welcome the future with open arms. Above all the Country party resisted the fragmentation and disharmony, the competition and corruption, which were the fruits of modernization. To restore "community," first they resisted the corrupting influence of the alliance between the Crown and the most commercial-cosmopolitan elements who formed the Court party and later they became the early leaders of the resistance to Britain in the 1760s. Through a struggle that demanded self-sacrifice, placing patriotism before profit, Massachusetts might be "reformed," the centrifugal forces of modernization turned back.

Fear of change and social disorder, however, eventually split the Country party. By 1770, the militants, such as Sam Adams, turned to the back country which after 1774 became the dynamic element within the prerevolutionary movement, pushing the more reluctant, especially Boston's merchants, toward independence. Western Massachusetts, long a sleeping political giant, suddenly awakened, Patterson tells us, and "for the time being, the Revolution was in the hands of the people." For them "Independence could place the seal of permanence on a reformist victory."

The latter half of this book describes the way "radicals" and "conservatives" fought for control in the new republican order in the 1770s. In the end the western reformers fell far short of their goals because while a majority was behind them, they lacked effective organization. Ironically, Patterson concludes, the Revolution actually "accelerated the processes of change that one associates with modernization while bringing at least some men to a closer acceptance of a competitive political order that would match their diversified society."

No summary can convey the complexity, the many qualifications, and pragmatic eclecticism that fashion Patterson's argument and give it resiliency. In the end, this ingenious study leaves one with a feeling that while Patterson has made good sense of much of the data, he has not discovered, any better than

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Beard, Jensen, Becker, or others before him, the way it really was. First, much of his own evidence simply does not support his initial Court-Country dichotomy. Boston, as he acknowledges, the most advanced commercial-cosmopolitan center, aligned with the Country party. Of his fifty Court party towns, only twenty-eight "ranked among the commercial cosmopolitan centers," which for Patterson is "a distinct majority" though one might as fairly characterize it as "a small majority." And what of the other twenty-two which go unexamined? When Patterson describes the actual conflicts between Court and Country parties there is only the most fragmentary evidence that the latter sought to restore organic communalism. Rather his own evidence suggests that factional rivalry over the loaves and fishes goes far to account for the competition prior to the 1760s.

As for the awakening of agrarian democracy after 1774, Patterson's account is full of puzzles. For while he does show that western Massachusetts became politically active in the years just before independence, and was indeed a seedbed for many democratic notions, he leaves one wondering why the back country did not join the resistance movement earlier and in what concrete ways its grievances against Britain were related to the desire to promote social democracy at home. The leadership of the back country never is analyzed; the role of older or newer rural elites goes undiscussed; "the people" just act like some disembodied force. In the final analysis, despite real differences that divided east and west, farmers and urban dwellers, the constitution of 1780 was a compromise, and throughout Patterson's account, one is impressed with efforts on both sides to reach an accommodation. Thus the westerners did not take full advantage of their numerical superiority as they might have; on the other hand, easterners repeatedly granted concessions that made government more popular. Moreover, Patterson's own evidence suggests that the social cleavages were not as deep and lasting as he maintains. Thus of 101 towns Patterson classified as taking an ideologically democratic position in the 1780 constitution, only 20 opposed property qualifications for office holding, 10 favored unicameralism, 42 disapproved property qualifications for voting, and dozens of rural towns were apathetic or gave inconclusive responses which defy classification.

As a suggestive, provocative, well-written, and forcefully argued book, Patterson's study of revolutionary Massachusetts is surely one of the more interesting examples of neo-Progressive history now entering the lists.

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The Old Dominion and the New Nation, 1788–1801 *by Richard R. Beeman. Lexington, Ky., The University Press of Kentucky, 1972.—xiv, 273 pp. $11.00.*

Professor Beeman has given us one of the best studies of state politics ever written about the decade of the 1790s. His thoroughly researched, well-organized book begins with a concise description of the divisions in the Richmond ratification convention of 1788 and then shifts to a brief survey of the structural and ideological foundations of Virginia politics. The author proceeds to describe the gradual erosion of Virginia Federalism when the policies of the national government, especially during the quasi-war with France, alienated more and more Virginians. This led to contested elections, the organization of the Democratic-Republican party, and eventually to the complete collapse of the Federalists. Beeman's mastery of sources is especially apparent when he argues that the Virginia Republicans opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts not because of their violation of civil rights but because of their tendency to limit state authority. Beeman shows how the Virginia gentry seized upon the Republican ideology to defend the local power and government which they so highly prized. His description of the 1799–1800 legislature which worked out the ideological rationale for earlier political decisions is especially well done. He even attempts to relate certain state issues, especially religion and militia affairs, to the rise and victory of the Republicans.

Nevertheless the book has some weaknesses, primarily because of method. Beeman is basically interested in showing change and continuity over time, especially in the voting alignments in the lower house of the Assembly, yet the method that he uses prevents the reader from ever grasping what has really changed or remained constant at any single point in time or for any particular period. He bases his analysis on a sample composed of a relative handful of delegates who served for several terms during one of three periods: 1788–1790, 1794–1796, and 1797–1800. He then analyzes this relatively small group in terms of voting, residence, wealth, and other factors, and uses it as a base for making general statements about Federalists and Republicans. This approach makes it almost impossible to describe continuity and change over time since the reader cannot discern which sections or counties are shifting or retaining their allegiances. By using a different or an additional approach Beeman could have increased the analytical and descriptive power of his work. For example, he might have divided the counties into several units and used these to show change over time; he might have tabulated the changes illustrated in his maps on page 244–246; or he could have taken the three groups of counties in the 1788 Convention, divided them into Federalist, anti-Federalist, and pro-Amendment categories and shown how their delegates voted throughout the 1790s. He might also have taken a series of legislatures, analyzed all the members for par-

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ticular years, and drawn some additional conclusions about the changing patterns of Federalist and Republican support.

Beeman also fails to relate the structure and patterns of politics to some very important differences and changes within Virginia. The westward movement of population including slaves and wealthy landowners, the creation of new counties with few slaves and no gentry planters, the shift from tobacco to wheat farming, the economic decline of the tidewater, developing urbanization and commercialization all created divisions and tensions that simply do not fit into a discussion of partisan politics. Thus the author fails to integrate his discussion of state and local issues into his narrative. Divisions over banks, internal improvements, militia exemptions, penal reform, and slavery are not related to social-economic divisions within the state but are inserted only when they seem to be related to party development.

Yet, within the territory he has mapped out for himself, Beeman has done an excellent job and his book is required reading for anyone interested in the political history of the early United States.

WILLIAM B. HULL
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At the End of the Day, 1961–1963 by Harold Macmillan. New York, Harper & Row, 1973.—xi, 572 pp. $16.50.

In a broadcast eulogy to Hugh Gaitskell, Harold Macmillan remarked: "In some ways, political life has always been cruel; success or failure are so chancy; public favour or disfavour so capricious; the work so hard and pitiless, so that physical strength becomes almost as important as intellectual or moral preeminence" (p. 395). There were, however, certain "great compensations" for all this, notably a "sense of sympathy which binds together sincere men of all parties in a sort of comradeship which is a unique and living thing."

These remarks might well serve as a commentary on the last years of Macmillan's political life, as chronicled in this, the fifth and final volume of his memoirs. After victories in three successive general elections, the Conservatives now began the downhill slide toward the Labour victories of 1964 and 1966. Macmillan's personal prestige, at its height in 1959, suffered from a series of traumatic blows, ranging from de Gaulle's famous "Non!" to Britain's entry into the Common Market (delivered just ten days after the Gaitskell eulogy) to the sordid trivialities of the Profumo scandal that spring. The importance of "physical strength" emerges clearly at several points in the narrative, including the Cuban missile crisis, when Lord Home and the prime minister "sat up cheerfully through several nights, as the crisis deepened, attended by relays of

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devoted secretaries and constant refreshment," to receive President Kennedy's transatlantic telephone calls. A week after Khrushchev had yielded and it was all over, Macmillan confesses in his journal: "I still feel (with all the other work of the week) tired out. . . . At 68 I am *not* as resilient as when I was a young officer" (p. 216). Eleven months later his health broke, and on the very day in which he had told the cabinet, after weeks of most uncharacteristic shilly-shallying, that he would stay on through another election, he was taken to the hospital for prostate surgery, and his seven-year premiership reached an abrupt end.

Macmillan's five volumes have been criticized for failure to reveal very much, either about the author or about the political history through which he moved. It is true that indiscretions are rare in these memoirs, and, one assumed, never uncalculated. In particular, he sheds little light on the mystery of his long and ambiguous (perhaps also ambivalent) relationship with Rab Butler. But that in itself is part of the real Harold Macmillan, and other aspects of his extraordinary personality do emerge, albeit often indirectly.

As before, foreign affairs dominate the work. On the "pay pause" he is vague, reticent, even repetitive: "this strange and rather ragged battle" (p. 51); "this somewhat ragged and inconclusive battle" (p. 54). On the problem of Commonwealth immigration he gives very much the view from the top, apparently lacking in real sympathy for the immigrants themselves, and tending almost to dismiss the whole thing as a deucedly inconvenient problem that was being exploited, very cynically, by his political opponents. But on the Cuban missile crisis he is magnificent, and quotes at fascinating length from his exchanges by phone and cable with Kennedy.

Throughout the work there are revealing and even endearing touches. He urges Selwyn Lloyd, chancellor of the Exchequer, to "read the *Daily Worker* every day" (p. 42) for the sake of its revealing criticisms of the Labour party. (Had poor Lloyd possessed that sort of imagination he might not have incurred dismissal, in a scene that was as harrowing for the far-from-insensitive prime minister as for the victim.) When he gets the news of the Test Ban Treaty success he has "to go out of the room. I went to tell D. [Lady Dorothy Macmillan] and burst into tears. I have prayed hard too for this, night after night" (p. 487). In the Profumo affair he is baffled by "this strange environment in which men of some importance, sometimes even holding high positions, were led to mingle with crooks, charlatans, pimps and courtesans. In my youth, good manners, although not necessarily good morality, made such a confusion impossible" (pp. 450–451).

At times there is a bit of almost small-boy enthusiasm: the new hotline to Kennedy "is (a) better—you talk as on an ordinary telephone; (b) safer—it would take ninety years to break the code; (c) British. A score for us!" (Journal, 16 November 1962, quoted on p. 244). And surely it says something about the author that he quotes Toynbee, Macaulay, and even Ranke's *History of the*

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Papacy. The work is very clearly Harold Macmillan's own, and it will be read when most political *apologias* are deservedly forgotten.

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Aneurin Bevan: A Biography. Volume Two: 1945–1960 *by Michael Foot. New York, Atheneum, 1974.—692 pp. $13.95.*

Ten years ago Michael Foot, the most able and devoted of Aneurin Bevan's disciples, brought out Volume One of his biography of Bevan. Now he has finished his task with the publication of an equally long second volume. No one, however, will wish it a page shorter. It is a captivating and alluring work, written from the inside, and making copious use of the available sources. The author characterizes the fact that Bevan kept few letters as "part of his endearing lack of self-consciousness" (p. 292), a magnanimous view for a biographer since it surely made his task more difficult, while at the same time increasing the need for a complete and fitting biographical study.

Bevan became the youngest member of Attlee's cabinet in 1945 as minister of health and housing. There is a useful and convincing chapter on his work for housing, which has often suffered from adverse and unfair comparisons with the well-publicized efforts of his Conservative successor, Harold Macmillan. Mr. Foot corrects serious misstatements here and shows that not only were "the best houses . . . built in the first five years when the stringency was greatest" (p. 80) but that Bevan's program built over 280,000 houses in 1948, before resources were diverted elsewhere. Bevan's greatest achievement in office, however, was the creation of the National Health Service. There is a subtle appreciation of the tortuous and intermittently ferocious struggles between the minister and the doctors. The leaders of the British Medical Association are given a fair appraisal, and the constraints under which the highly democratic nature of its constitution placed them are helpfully brought out. The issues at stake and the way in which they finally were resolved are analyzed clearly. The author carefully prepares the ground for his judgment on the nature of the Conservatives' opposition: "They dared not oppose the end but they strove to sabotage the means" (p. 130).

In all these respects the book is exemplary and its conclusions will command the serious attention of objective students of the period. Turning from Bevan in power in the 1940s to Bevan in opposition in the 1950s, however, it becomes, not less enjoyable, but less authoritative. Mr. Foot recounts with a veteran's glee the long series of skirmishes between Bevanites and Gaitskellites. He has forgotten nothing—and forgiven nothing. Perhaps the central failure of the book is its portrait of Hugh Gaitskell, whom Bevan dismissed at an early en-

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counter with the words, "But he's nothing, nothing, nothing!" (p. 295). Instead of offering any clue as to why these two dissimilar but magnetic figures should have repelled each other and polarized the Labour party for ten years, Mr. Foot does not bother to give Gaitskell and his ideas the sort of scrutiny which makes his vignettes of other antagonists—Attlee, Morrison, Dalton—such a revealing feature of the book. So Gaitskell remains "nothing" here. The great drama of the Labour party's debate over the meaning of socialism, once it had fulfilled its original program, thus is portrayed in almost Manichaean terms. There is an inconsistency about the way a double standard is applied which weakens the verisimilitude of the book. Mr. Foot effectively deals with the cruder charges of egoistical ambition sometimes leveled against Bevan. He depicts him as the defender of party unity which was breached always by the Right; and in stating, for instance, that "Gaitskellism had to be attacked and defeated in the open" (p. 498), he senses no incongruity. Bevan is indulgently recounted as publicly calling one fellow Labour MP "a pimp," and saying to another, "Shut up, bonehead" (pp. 375, 341). In Bevan's mouth none of this counts as acrimony. Whereas on Gaitskell's part even forbearance and generosity are put under a resolutely unfavorable construction (pp. 579, 610).

Such partiality in tone and interpretation, petty in itself, should be seen as coming not from a judge but from an advocate of rare single-mindedness. And the general case is, of course, formidable. Mr. Foot's final picture of the stricken Bevan—"He was like a great tree hacked down, wantonly, in full leaf" (p. 653)—captures the pathos of the scene and epitomizes the book's great qualities. It chronicles Bevan's life with clarity and verve; more than this, it explicates his political philosophy with understanding and insight; furthermore, it uses high literary gifts to convey the sense of the man and the rich complexity of his personality. Warts and all? It is not that Mr. Foot conceals the warts, but he wants the reader to admire them, as Bevan's warts.

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Lloyd George: Family Letters, 1885–1936 *edited by K. O. Morgan. Cardiff and London, University of Wales and Oxford University Presses, 1973.—x, 227 pp. $14.50.*

The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Antiwar Movement *edited by Stephen Koss. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1973.—xi, 280 pp. $12.00.*

In life the careers of Lloyd George and Winston Churchill vied for public attention and comparison, and received in generous measure the brickbats and adulation attendant upon notoriety in public service; so in death, to satisfy an apparently undiminished interest, the mountain of their private and public papers

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fuels an industry. For Lloyd George, 1973 was a particularly good year, with John Grigg's sympathetic and beautifully written study, *The Young Lloyd George* (London, Eyre Methuen, 1973), as the first installment of a promised continuing saga. The major research source for Grigg's book was the correspondence between George and his first wife, Margaret. These letters, a particularly valuable source of information about George's early parliamentary career, form the core of Kenneth Morgan's edited collection. The letters are arranged in chronological order with notes, and a short introduction is provided for each section. Dr. Morgan's editorial rubric was "to include every item that seems to me to be of historical interest" (p. 3). Though this purpose is impeccably realized, the result, for the general reader at least, is a dull book. I suppose the demands of record had to outweigh those of character, even in a collection of family letters. Consequently, there are only rare glimpses of a uniquely elusive character. "My supreme idea is to get on. To this I shall sacrifice everything. . . . except I trust honesty" (p. 14). How difficult for all of us (especially politicians) to live up to our youthful ideals! "Men's lives are a perpetual conflict. . . . Woman's function is to pour oil onto the wounds . . . and to stimulate to renewed exertion" (p. 19). Only a young man would dared to have written that. But such golden threads are rare in an otherwise drab tapestry.

"No good letter," claimed Lytton Strachey, "was ever written to convey information or to please the recipient. . . . Its fundamental purpose is to express the personality of the writer." In contrast, George's singular quality as a correspondent was his ability to adopt the same thought patterns as the person with whom he was communicating. That same chameleon quality made him the most effective industrial negotiator and turned the pacifist into the war leader and radical prime minister of an almost exclusively Tory administration. We might thus assume that the common tone of most of the observations in these letters to his wife is more a reflection of Margaret's character than his own—or is it? The small exchanges and the trivia of everyday life—gossip about neighbors and colleagues, asking for clean underclothes, anxious inquiry after a child's health, making up for a matrimonial tiff—were as much part of the man as tilting at the carefully tended susceptibilities of the English establishment, the role more familiar to followers of George's public career. Lloyd George was at his best or, more correctly, could best indulge his redoubtable histrionic gifts in the heady atmosphere of a public meeting or debate in the Commons. Is it fair to expect, in the private correspondence between husband and wife, many verbal or philosophical pyrotechnics? Nevertheless, when ploughing through these letters one cannot help wishing that occasionally when he wrote to Margaret he could have been just a little less matter of fact, a little more pompous, a little more aware of his destined place in history. Churchill, in contrast, never doubted his self-cast role; his destiny was manifest, or as he expressed it to Violet Asquith, "I do believe I am a glow worm." Even if he was hated by the servants, such perception makes a man eminently readable and quotable.

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Lloyd George's status as a major politician was promoted and confirmed by his playing the Liberal "David" to Tory Chamberlain's "Goliath" during the Boer War. It took considerable courage for the opponents of the war to brave the hysterical excesses of a nation, the greater part of which confused patriotism with imperialism. For the pains of their opposition, this brave band were dubbed "Pro-Boers"—a title they never really deserved because they never sought England's military humiliation. They maintained that the Boer War was wrong because it was unnecessary. That was a neat analysis, avoiding the decisive issue of conscience and enjoying the imprimatur of prescriptive respectability. Stephen Koss is familiar with the sources and the problems of this particular episode in English history. If we consider the tally of his previous books —studies of John Morley and Richard Haldane, and biographies of John Brunner and A. G. Gardiner—the score is three Little Englanders to one Liberal Imperialist. Thus he is ideally qualified as a guide to the Pro-Boers.

One is always suspicious of collections of documents intended primarily to be read by students because the genre is so often hastily conceived and disjointed. But this present collection is a model of its kind. A catholic mixture of primary and secondary materials, logically arranged for ready analysis of the inherent problems, is welded together so as to afford an unusual degree of homogeneity by the editor's concise explanatory passages written in clear, simple, uncluttered prose. There are just one or two sticky moments (at the very beginning and end of an otherwise sound introductory chapter) where Dr. Koss refers to the "possible" contemporary relevance of the struggle between the British and the Boers to the United States and Vietnam. But Professor Koss does not allow himself to be snared too long by a judgment that sits more easily as a publisher's promotional gimmick than as a historian's assessment.

This collection deserves a wide audience. There is, however, one irritating fault—and the blame for that must lie squarely with the series editor and the publishers. Why have they distinguished the commentary from the documents by such a crude and lazy typographical arrangement—a heavy black bar, sometimes but not always present, and an unaligned inner margin? This is both aesthetically displeasing and confusing to the reader, and could well be changed in future volumes.

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Class and Society in Soviet Russia *by Mervyn Matthews. New York, Walker and Company, 1972.—xviii, 366 pp. $12.50.*

Social Stratification and Mobility in the USSR *edited by Murray Yanowitch and Wesley A. Fisher. White Plains, N. Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1973.—xxxi, 402 pp. $20.00.*

These two books confirm with full authority and describe in great detail what scholars in the field have at least roughly known for some time to be true of Soviet society; namely that, despite its ideology to the contrary, it has achieved for its people no great equality of either condition or opportunity. For those who have not yet heard the story, here are several key items: There are marked irregularities of prestige, income, and living standards among "peasants," "workers," and "employees." The children of "employees," or those in the more highly evaluated and rewarded occupations, have greater access to and higher aspirations and achievement in education, especially in higher education, which gives them great advantages over the children of "peasants" and "workers." Women work, but disproportionately in lower-ranking jobs, and even when they work they carry a far larger share of household tasks than their husbands and have less leisure. People in the higher parts of the occupational structure are much more satisfied with their jobs than those in the lower parts. And, of course, power is concentrated heavily in a small group of men who lead the Communist party. The party is disproportionately recruited from the educated "employee" and "intelligensia" categories rather than from "workers" and "peasants."

While these two books both tell pretty much this same story, they tell it in interestingly different ways. Matthews' book is a systematic synthesis of data from Russian statistical handbooks, the 1959 and 1970 censuses, social surveys or "concrete sociological investigations" as they are called in Russia, and what Matthews describes as "revealing articles by responsible newspaper reporters" (p. xiii). Even the informed scholar should find this a valuable reference book for known facts, with an attractive bonus of some lesser-known facts and insights.

The Yanowitch and Fisher book is a translated collection of articles by Soviet sociologists, including both social surveys and theoretical statements on social class, stratification, and social mobility. A few of these articles have appeared in the mass-circulation media. Among the well-known authors presented are Arutiunian, Shkaratan, and Rutkevich. Except for Chapter 10, no mention is made of similar sociological research and theory by non-Russian scholars. Several authors are visibly caught in their struggle with the dilemma of expressing the Communist ideals of equality and the Soviet society's facts of stratificational inequality. Including the editors' introduction and a penetrating commentary on fact and theory in Soviet stratification by S. M. Lipset, this book

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should be very useful for those who do not command Russian and for students wanting the flavor of Russian social science and the society as well.

Altogether, then, these are two books without much that is new for specialists, but still of considerable use to them and others.

BERNARD BARBER
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Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States *by Robert R. King. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973.—ix, 326 pp. $14.00.*

Assessing the impact of national minorities on the relations between communist states whose territories had been at one time wholly or partly under Ottoman rule, *Minorities under Communism* is primarily a study of the problem of Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, of Moldavians (Rumanians) in former Bessarabia or the present Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, and of Yugoslavia's Albanian minority. Other subjects include the application of territorial autonomy and cultural rights to these and to other minorities and the furtherance of so-called artificial nationalities—Moldavian and Macedonian—partly for the purpose of neutralizing the territorial claims of another state. The use of the term "Balkan" in the title is ill advised, since it does not apply to Hungary and Slovakia and is of questionable value in regard to Rumania and Bessarabia.

Correctly emphasizing the nonexistence of a uniform pattern of nationalism, the author identifies four main patterns, each characteristic of some part of the world and appearing more or less in chronological order: the nationalism of people with a long experience of concurrent development of state power and national consciousness, with citizenship determining nationality; the nationalism of countries without a uniform political experience of long duration but with a common language and a common self-image; the nationalism of countries such as those of southeastern Europe, without a common political experience of long duration and often without an ethnically homogeneous territory, in which the religion of historical association is usually an important determinant of national consciousness; and the nationalism of anticolonialism and of the drive for "modernity," generally associated with the Third World but manifest also in southeastern Europe.

The author adds to his analysis of nationalism a useful discourse on Marxist conceptions of nationality. One of these, developed by Stalin in *Marxism and the National Question*, defines nationality in terms of a common language, territory, history, economic life, and collective psychology, the last being a product of all the foregoing factors, especially language. In its more extreme form, the Stalinist view of nationalism stresses the linguistic-cultural-psychological

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aspects of nationality and turns the latter into an enduring category. The older Leninist view emphasizes the economic basis of nationality and aspires to a reduction and an ultimate elimination of differences between nations. A third view, espoused by many southeastern European (communist and probably other) intellectuals, is that the maintenance of national differences will play a salutary role in preventing the cultural impoverishment of societies as they continue to be subjected to the necessary but standardizing influences of contemporary technology.

Among the various devices adopted by the communist states of southeastern Europe to minimize the authority of national minorities are several that are indistinguishable from the methods of noncommunist states, notably the manipulation of statistical data and the alteration of territorial-administrative boundaries. The USSR and Yugoslavia have had recourse, in addition, to creating or promoting two relatively new nationalities—Moldavian and Macedonian. The author's discussion of these new nationalities is relatively weak. In particular, there is neither a linguistic nor an economic analysis, and the author fails to undertake a critical anthropological study of their cultures. While admirably objective in general, he concludes without serious examination of the subject that most Macedonian Slavs—he makes neither regional nor rural and urban distinctions—regarded themselves as Bulgarians before World War II. It is more likely that the general national consciousness was of a fluctuating or floating character. On the other hand, he provides an excellent analysis of the use of scholarly historical debates—such as the question of the relative merit of social and national struggle in the Hapsburg monarchy—to defend current nationalities policies. He correctly concludes that nationalism has been divisive but less disruptive between 1945 and 1971 than it was between the two world wars. National stability is still sorely wanting, however, in southeastern Europe.

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The Choosing People: Voting Behavior in Israel *by Alan Arian. Cleveland, The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1973.—xvii, 259 pp. $10.95.*

Who Rules Israel? *by Yuval Elitzur and Eliahu Salpeter. New York, Harper & Row, 1973.—x, 342 pp. $8.95.*

The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy *by Norman L. Zucker. Cambridge, Mass:, The M.I.T. Press, 1973.—xii, 282 pp. $10.00.*

Professor Arian has given us a solid, insightful, and carefully researched study of voting behavior in Israel which utilizes quantitative sociological tools of analysis. It places Arian at the head of the roster of experts on Israel's electoral system, and makes the book a fitting tribute to the memory of his gifted brother Phil, a talented American Jewish educator. Some of Arian's conclusions are particularly interesting because of the recent upheaval in Israeli political patterns following the October war, a development which occurred after publication of the book. The elections resulted in a serious challenge to the dominant Labor party; its newly coalesced right-wing rival, *Likud*, captured 39 of the 120 *Knesset* seats (they won 32 in 1969) and Labor dropped to 51 seats (from 56 in 1969). The shaky unity within Labor has been shaken even more, and a breakaway by a right-leaning faction could shatter the long-standing coalition between Labor, the National Religious party, and the small Progressive party, and make Likud a viable alternative. Nonetheless, Arian makes a good case for further Labor domination: "system stability." There are the normal caveats: "the untimely passing of a major leader, progress . . . toward peace, a major change in the electoral laws, a split in the dominant party." But Labor has the built-in advantage, through its control of the Histadrut, which combines trade unions, economic power, and the provision of social and economic services.

A challenge to the Histadrut and Labor may be seen in a trend of the young, Israeli-born voters not to be caught up in the network of the Histadrut (p. 83). This tends to be reinforced by the finding that "[Party] dominance decreases with modernization" (p. 171). The rise of this generation of young, reasonably well-educated *sabras* who are left unmoved by ideological appeals and old slogans, has coincided with the post-Yom Kippur "earthquake" which has led to unprecedented criticism of all officeholders, and has tended to discredit the establishment which has been entrenched for almost forty years. The threat to Labor is very great indeed, especially considering that its establishment has, since the fall of Ben-Gurion in 1963, shunned charismatic leaders.

Arian's book, rich and useful as it is, shows convincingly the limitations of today's political science tools, "scientific" as they may be. For the analysis is of what has been, and the projection is based on what is visible and quantifi-

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able. However, "the truly important contest in terms of political power... takes place within the Labor party itself. [It] is much less visible and takes place among the party functionaries and the party leadership" (p. 204). This is the key struggle, and the projection and prediction seem possible only intuitively, for variables: blocs, liaisons, issues, ideology, interest groups, leadership, voter appeal, internal circumstances, and external crises—all these are too numerous, complicated, and incapable of measurement to provide a "scientific" underpinning. In spite of this exception, the book is an absolute requirement for students of Israel and of comparative politics in general.

Who Rules Israel? is a handy complement, particularly on the intuitive level, to Arian's erudite study. Its two authors, highly respected, reliable, and independent journalists, Elitzur of *Ma'ariv* and Salpeter of *Ha-Aretz* have over two decades of experience each and both have a solid rooting in economic as well as political matters. In a chatty but careful style, they give thumbnail sketches, and sometimes lengthier biographical outlines of the several hundred men, and the few women who form Israel's elites in politics, the military, business, science, the press, and technocracy. These descriptions are buttressed by sections which indicate the interlocking nature of the various directorates, and their interdependence. The instructive final chapter, "The Changing of the Guard," concludes, somewhat optimistically, that Israel's political elite group will be expanded in the future due to the need for the introduction of capable technocrats into the "new power elite." That this need exists is probably true, but the process may not turn out to be as foreshadowed, since political and personal loyalties still play such a great role in appointments of all types. Nonetheless, it is probable that the old "intimacy" will be replaced, and in a decade, another edition of *Who Rules Israel?* will certainly list many more than the present 150–200 names. The book is a penetrating addition to a growing literature and should be useful in all courses on Israeli history and politics.

The Coming Crisis in Israel is in a way a misnomer. The problems indicated in its subtitle, *Private Faith and Public Policy*, are perennial crises. Only the unwitting help provided by Syrian pressure enabled Mrs. Meir to coax the orthodox into the new coalition. The subtitle also betrays a value bias. "Private" faith is a supremely Western concept. Judaism, like Islam, does not see faith or religious behavior as a private matter, but as a way of life which embraces all those who profess the faith and the entire realm. While weighing titles and claims, one must take exception to the book jacket claim that *Crisis* is "the first full-scale objective English discussion of the religion-state conflict" in Israel. Professor Zucker himself cites Ervin Birnbaum's *The Politics of Compromise: State and Religion in Israel*, inter alia. While on the subject, the bibliography shows little or no sign of works in Hebrew, which may indicate further lacunae in the work. The book lacks focus or stance. Subjective evaluation of *Halakhah* (Rabbinic law), described as having "many marvelous as-

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pects" (p. 102), appears side by side with political science "terminology" such as theopolitics, defined as "the attempt to establish a Torah state by means of legislation (p. 2). With greater rigor and focus, this interesting book could have made its contribution with more brevity and pertinence.

AVRAHAM AVI-HAI
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Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present Option and Future Strategies *by Fuad Jabber. London, Chatto & Windus for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971.—164 pp. £2.50.*

This is a provocative book dealing with a controversial and timely issue: Israel's ability to produce and willingness to implement a nuclear weapons capability.

Part I documents the development of Israel's nuclear program. While factually competent, there are no revelations here as "no hitherto unrevealed information is included—as none was available to the author" (p. 10). This should come as no surprise, given the highly secret nature of the program. Given, too, the author's apparent antipathy to Israel, the Israeli authorities would hardly have granted him access to classified information.

Jabber concludes from his history of Israel's nuclear program that its ulterior motive—"peaceful" desalination projects notwithstanding—is to produce a military nuclear capability. He further asserts that while the nuclear option is under the ostensible control of Israel's civilian government, its exercise is in fact ultimately determined by her military elite, who allegedly dominate the decision-making process of the political system, and who utterly disregard the imputed opposition of Israeli public opinion to nuclear weapons (pp. 52–53).

Each of these initial assumptions is questionable. To believe that Israel's sole interest in a nuclear desalination plant is its plutonium by-product suitable for nuclear weapons, rather than in sorely needed water for irrigation, immigration, and industry, is to impute purely militaristic motives to Israel. The myth of the dominance of the Israeli military elite over the elected civilian government has been debunked by the 1973 war. Even under the most adverse military conditions ever faced by Israel, the civilian government prevailed over its generals, who complied with their cease-fire and subsequent withdrawal orders. The ensuing "battle of the generals" of different political persuasions and parties only further dispelled the illusion of a unified, uniformed clique.

The author's unsubstantiated assertion that "public opinion and a large segment of the political spectrum" in Israel are opposed to the development of nuclear weapons (p. 53) shows further his lack of understanding of Israeli internal politics and of the Israeli perception of the Arab-Israel conflict. Jabber claims that "the Israeli man in the street" was unaware of and would not have

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supported Israel's nuclear development program, as the memory of the Holocaust in Europe was still fresh in his mind. Furthermore, the predominant radical socialist tradition, as embodied by the Mapam party, would have instinctively rejected a nuclear option had the public been consulted (p. 28).

In fact, the memory of the Holocaust tends to strengthen the survival-at-all-costs, never-again mentality that would support a nuclear deterrent. As for the radical socialist tradition, the much larger and more powerful Mapai party, characterized by Jabber as "activist right-wingers" (p. 37), is at least as much an heir to that tradition as miniscule Mapam. The author's faith in Mapam is misplaced in any event, for since 1969 Mapam has been "aligned" with Mapai (and others) under the Labor umbrella, and as such has been responsible for all government programs, including nuclear development policy.

Part II is a technical discourse on Israel's ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons, and thereby make her nuclear threat credible. Jabber here evinces an impressive knowledge of the technical aspects of nuclear weapons development. He concludes that "an Israeli nuclear weapons programme would face no insurmountable difficulties in so far as the different requirements, technical, human, financial, etc., are concerned . . . only the decision to go ahead with weapons development—an eminently political decision—is lacking" (p. 85).

Under what circumstances does the author foresee such a strategic decision being made? In Part III Jabber views Israel's own strategy as based on the following assumptions: that Israel must survive; that survival necessitates agreement with her Arab neighbors; but that the Arab states are bent on her destruction. Therefore, her only option is an imposed solution by military victory and/or the development of an overwhelming military capacity to deter permanently any Arab attempts at Israeli destruction.

Jabber accurately notes that the Arabs have refused to be deterred by Israel's conventional military strength. "Arab strategy since the June war has been . . . rapidly to recondition and rearm the military forces in order to attempt a change of the status quo in its favour by violent means as soon as the opportunity may present itself" (p. 119). As a result, the author foresaw, "Israel may again find herself in the near future faced by well-equipped military forces of such a standard that she will have seriously to entertain the possibility of having to fight a fourth war—which will probably be far costlier and of more uncertain outcome than the third" (p. 120).

It is at this point that Jabber predicts that Israel will activate the nuclear option, rapidly building operational nuclear weapons. Such a decision, he feels, might well provoke an acceleration of Arab nuclear programs (which receive only passing mention). The net result would be the same kind of nuclear stalemate that characterizes United States-Soviet relations, which would eventually engender a similar type of detente in the Middle East for lack of a more rational alternative. This he rightfully sees as a dangerous and expensive form of conflict containment.

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It is also an option which does not deal with the underlying causes of the conflict, which he views as Israel's inflexibility in refusing to meet the legitimate demands of the Palestinians. The inflexibility of Israel's Arab neighbors in refusing to recognize the legitimacy of her existence is ignored as a causal factor. This type of one-factor analysis is attributable to what Jabber himself calls "the virtually total absence of communication . . . [which has] resulted in the development of a somewhat distorted and magnified perception of the enemy's wickedness and the lengths to which he may go to attain his goals" (p. 12). This is perhaps the best one-line critique of the book.

During the 1973 war, Israel gave no evidence of activating her purported nuclear option, either immediately or at some future time. There is another alternative, one which is rejected out of hand by Jabber, who can conceive of relations between Israel and the Arab states only in terms of "either Israeli dominance or submission" (p. 107). It is the alternative of a mutually negotiated and respected peace agreement between sovereign and equal states, an alternative whose time has finally come in the Middle East.

GARY S. SCHIFF
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The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi *by Raghavan Iyer. New York, Oxford University Press, 1973.—xiii, 449 pp. $12.50.*

This is one of those studies that has emerged from over fifteen years of preparation, and those who (like this reviewer) have been waiting this long for Iyer's account of the Mahatma must welcome the event. The book will be seen as a landmark in Gandhian studies, for it is the most important contribution to an understanding of Gandhi's political and social thought since the publication of Joan Bondurant's *Conquest of Violence* in 1958. Like Bondurant, Iyer recognizes that Gandhi "was a man of action rather than an abstract theorist," and that this quality imposed major limitations on his "conceptual formulations" (p. 374). Like Bondurant, then, Iyer is concerned with analyzing the implications of Gandhi's experience (theory as related to practice) for political philosophy. But more than Bondurant, Iyer succeeds in uncovering from a painstaking analysis of Gandhi's writings the main thrust of his theory and its significance for both the Indian and Western intellectual traditions.

The experience of reading this book recalls that of conversations with its author. In both instances, one sometimes feels engulfed in syncretism, East-West parallels abounding, Gandhi's example being compared with Plato or Kant, Buddha or Vivekananda. A kind of intellectual breathlessness ensues from having to attempt so many spatial and temporal leaps. Yet, in this book, Iyer maintains his central focus on Gandhi's core concepts. At the "magnetic center" of his thought, Iyer shows, stand the twin theories of *satya* (truth) and *ahimsa*

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(nonviolence). In three closely reasoned chapters (7–9), Iyer succeeds in explaining the meaning of these two ideas and then, equally crucial, exploring their intricate conceptual relationships. The richest part of this section comes with his four-way comparison of *satya* and *ahimsa* with *moksha* (spiritual liberation) and *tapas* (self-sacrifice) on the one hand, and with tolerance and civility on the other (pp. 234–250). The exercise of intellectual discrimination involved here shows Iyer at his best and manifests an adroitness that could come only from a mind entirely at home in the subject matter of theology and political philosophy of Asia and the West.

Sometimes, though, the syncretic attempts are overdone, as when Gandhi's thought is described within the space of ten pages as being "Like Twain . . . ," "Like William James . . . ," "Like Emerson . . . ," "Like Plato and St. Augustine . . ." (pp. 164–174). The heuristic value of so much cross-cultural comparison is dubious. Gandhi himself liked to acknowledge his intellectual indebtedness to several Western writers, chiefly Tolstoy and Thoreau. Iyer goes of course far beyond these admitted influences on Gandhi to suggest a multitude of parallels, and perhaps the most successful are those with Rousseau.

An area of comparison that seems relatively weak concerns the relationship of Gandhi to his own immediate Indian contemporaries in the nationalist movement. For example, Chapter 12 opens with a quotation from Kierkegaard on the relation of the individual to the universal, but it might have begun with equal effect with a passage on this theme from Vivekananda, Aurobindo, or Rabindranath Tagore. In this chapter, the contributions to the theory of *swaraj* (self-rule) by Tilak and Aurobindo are underestimated, and one of the key early formulators of the idea, B. C. Pal, is ignored.

This criticism raises questions that have long troubled Gandhian scholarship: How much is Gandhi's thought encompassed by his immediate political context? How far can his ideas be universalized, to reflect on the perennial concerns of political philosophy, in Asia or the West? Does an understanding of Gandhi's thought demand a close historical examination of the precise interaction between Gandhi's theory and practice, within the context of the Indian nationalist movement? During the last fifteen years, writing on Gandhi has witnessed a growing dichotomy between two approaches: one, now eminently represented by Iyer, has developed the universal quality of Gandhi's thought; the other, represented by American, British, and Australian intellectual historians, explains Gandhi's contribution almost exclusively within the specific moment and locale of his nationalist leadership. In considering these contrasting approaches, it is perhaps useful to note that anthropologists of India have distinguished between the "Great Tradition" of the subcontinent, and its multitude of "little traditions," emerging from a diversity of local subcultures. Students of Gandhi might, by analogy, perceive "great" and "little traditions" in his example, the one representing his universal, the other his provincial aspects. In both traditions, however, Gandhi's identity as a "political moralist" applies; and Iyer is

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right to emphasize this quality (p. 374), for, as Nehru observed, Gandhi's changing political experience in India was rooted in a remarkably consistent matrix of moral values.

This book could have been strengthened by a more rigorous critical dimension. Iyer's lucid and penetrating exposition of Gandhi's thought is not matched by a highly developed critical analysis that seeks to question his value system in a fundamental sense. Certain of Gandhi's positions beg for criticism, but are passed over without adequate attention. His conceptions of conscience and truth, in particular, deserve much sharper critical review than they receive here (e.g., pp. 128, 158, 160, 171–172). On balance, though, the virtue of this study is that it takes Gandhi's thought with ultimate seriousness, and exposes it to a sophisticated level of theoretical analysis that it has not received before. In this respect, the book fulfills its expectations, and future scholarship on Gandhi can only treat it as an indispensable contribution.

DENNIS DALTON
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The Fortunes of the West: The Future of the Atlantic Nations *by Theodore Geiger. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973.—xii, 304 pp. $10.00.*

In twenty-five years or so of writing about international politics, I cannot recall a time since the late 1940s when it has been more difficult to write with any hope that one's judgments or projections would survive the insistent hammering of events; the nature of the international system is changing so rapidly. It is, therefore, valuable to read a study such as Theodore Geiger's, which stands back from current debates, takes a longer historical perspective than most students of the present permit themselves, and attempts to consider deeper springs of social change and harmonization than arguments about nontariff barriers, liquidity, or burden sharing.

The task which he has set himself is an extremely ambitious one, starting from an analysis of the way in which a Hebraic and Hellenic inheritance has been grafted on the rationalist tradition that emerged in the sixteenth century to produce a perspective he calls "redemptive activism," a belief that the world's ills are capable of redress in our own generation. In the Western tradition he rightly includes Russia, so that the book moves logically to an analysis of Soviet-American interaction, including the prospect of conflict between them. There is a good chapter on "The Progress and Prospects of European Unification" and an excellent one on "Transatlantic Relationships in the Period of the New Nationalism," in which his very considerable knowledge of the economic interaction between Europe and the United States provides a num-

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ber of valuable insights into the evolution of the Atlantic relationship. The book ends with a modest attempt at "futurology," "Glimpses into a Possible Twenty-first Century" where his median projection is, he admits, "simply an extrapolation of certain already manifest or incipient trends." This book is commendable both for its clarity, its learning, and the modesty of the author. "The dreams of reason, even when shaped by systems analysis and stored in a computer's memory, are no less insubstantial than the fantasies generated without electronic assistance by primary process."

There are elements in his argument, however, which I find difficult to accept. The conception of the "technocratic state" as a description of the political system within which we now dwell, though possibly true of nongovernmental organizations, is hard to reconcile with the leadership and influence of traditionalist figures like Nixon, Kissinger, and Pompidou. Nor can one at present make such generalizations as that "in contrast to Soviet policy, which is tactically flexible and strategically inflexible, U. S. policy tends to be the reverse." To Europeans, American tactics seem only too flexible. As a European I cannot accept his judgment that "post-war continental positivists have tended to neglect . . . seminal thinkers" like Durkheim, Weber, and Freud; Aron, Dahrendorf, and others come immediately to mind to contradict Geiger's thesis. The analysis of the kinds of Europe that may emerge (though I think he credits Germany with greater freedom of choice than Germans think it possesses) and of the kind of relationship with the United States that might therefore result is excellent. But I am surprised by his readiness to assume that the developing world is likely to become divided into great-power economic blocs. Similarly, I think he assumes greater potential fluidity in great-power relations than they are capable of sustaining.

Moreover—and this is a comment on our times rather than a reflection on the subject matter—he assumes that the "Atlantic system," which includes Japan and the network of alliances and trade-, monetary-, and technical-relations of which the United States is the center, is a more self-sustaining system than it is proving to be. Though this study was written in 1971, it makes no mention of energy problems and little of the new relationships of dependence between the industrial world and parts of the developing world. Finally, the lucidity of the analysis is spoiled in places by the author's tendency, only too common with political scientists, to use nonexistent or obscure words in order to escape elucidating a complex thought: e.g., "progressist," "judgmental," "cosmopolitanization," and "computational." But the reader should ignore these words rather than the book.

ALASTAIR BUCHAN
Oxford University

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The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States edited by Ronald P. Barston. New York, Barnes & Noble Books, 1973.—341 pp. $21.50.

Ronald P. Barston of the University of Lancaster (U. K.) had a novel idea in gathering together articles on the foreign policy of some small states which take their perspective from a level of relative impotence instead of from the customary aspect of the great powers. A great deal of interesting information appears in this collection, and each chapter has a useful short bibliography for those who might wish to learn more. The authors of the individual papers appear to have been given the same outline for analyzing "the factors which shape the framing of foreign policy objectives, the organizational structures used to formulate and implement foreign policy, the range of choice, areas of interest and the methods employed to deal with the issues and problems which make up and stem from external policies" (p. 13).

The editor chose to discuss in his introduction six general propositions relating to how a small state might exercise "disproportionate" influence when compared to some objective ranking of its power. His illustrations are not drawn from the succeeding chapters, and there is no concluding chapter to draw together any integrating themes which might have appeared. I will try briefly to suggest some patterns which are discernible. This is not easy since among the nine there are very new and very old states (Singapore and Switzerland), industrialized countries (Norway and the Netherlands), a very underdeveloped one (Zambia), and an advanced country which is not really industrial (New Zealand). Among the nine, Israel is unique not only because its very right to existence is not always acknowledged by its foes but also because of its concern for Jewish groups in foreign lands.

Unlike Israel, many of the others, especially the less developed, are continually faced with the dilemma posed by the requirements of trade versus security needs. That the most advantageous trade partners may be political adversaries is a particularly acute problem for Zambia with respect to South Africa. Some, like Cyprus, have found a partial solution for their economic perplexities through assistance from the United Nations and other international organizations. Cuba did not lose its economic dependence by turning to the superpower foe of its nearby foe; because of the continued need for economic favors, the Cubans could not ignore Russia's political advice in the 1970s to reduce tensions in Cuba's region. With another turn of the global wheel of economic fortune Dr. Harrison's account of New Zealand's plight due to shrinking agricultural markets seems unduly pessimistic as world food shortages, even in affluent countries, have appeared since he wrote his article.

That a very small elite conducts the foreign policy of the small state seems to characterize each of them; in the case of the less-developed countries it is usually a single strong man who does so. However, the need to create both a legislative and a public consensus to support a particular foreign policy is

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evident in the older European states, and has recently become so in New Zealand as well. The fact that these states which formerly were models of political stability now appear to be facing unprecedented internal tensions may not reduce their strength in external affairs (as in newer countries) but political stress may nevertheless signal changes in their foreign policy orientation. Here Nils Ørvik's persuasive thesis, that Norway's earlier diplomatic strength drawn from the protection of a special friend is melting away with the strength of that friend—Britain—may have implications for others too. Except for Cuba, every other country included in the book had some kind of special relationship to Britain. Yet Barston's proposition, that "a small state can sometimes act with impunity against a great power" seems in these essays not particularly relevant; in most of them, their main foreign antagonists are not the great powers, but rather neighbors or others not normally classified as leading powers.

ANNETTE BAKER FOX
Columbia University

The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future *edited by James Barros. New York, The Free Press, 1972.—279 pp. Cloth, $8.95; paper, $3.45.*

This book is an excellent stock-taking effort by six leading scholars in the field of international law and organization. According to Barros, each author was to focus on one of the six major organs of the United Nations: Leland Goodrich on the Security Council; Stephen Xydis on the General Assembly; Leon Gordenker on the Secretariat; David Kay on the Trusteeship Council; Leo Gross on the International Court; and Robert Gregg on the Economic and Social Council. The last three essayists, however, moved beyond the formal organ assigned to them, and happily so, for the action was elsewhere. Kay focuses largely on the decolonization process in the General Assembly and the failure of both the Assembly and Security Council to resolve the conflicts over Rhodesia, Namibia, and apartheid. Gross devotes only two pages to the Court and concentrates instead on the work of the Assembly and its International Law Commission. Finally, Gregg treats the whole complex of United Nations institutions dealing with economic, social, and technical matters.

Each essayist discusses the constitutional foundation and formal-legal structure of the institutions surveyed. Continuities between United Nations structures and earlier organizations are examined. Policy-making processes are explained and historical synopses are provided of both the institutions and their work in substantive areas. Finally, conclusions are drawn and predictions are made about the future.

All of these essays, then, are in the traditional mode of research and they represent traditional research at its best. They are marvelously synthetic and en-

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cyclopedic, summarizing a wealth of primary and secondary literature. Abundant footnotes provide more than ample material for further reading. And the continual comparison of United Nations activities with those of the League of Nations is well done in each essay. In sum, there is probably no better short introduction to the work of the United Nations.

Although traditional in terms of scholarship, these essays are in no way "utopian" or indiscriminate in advocacy of an activist world organization. They are in fact quite sober and often highly critical of organizational undertakings (especially the writings of Barros, Gross, and Gregg). While the successes of the organization are not ignored, its limitations are accurately, if not starkly, drawn. Gordenker, for example, carefully points out the unique systemic factors that led to the "heyday" of the Secretariat under Dag Hammarskjöld and make a revival of that office again improbable. All the authors underscore well the importance of systemic factors in determining organizational concerns and outcomes.

The picture of the United Nations that comes through these essays is that of an organization suffering from great power neglect, vast discrepancies between voting power within the institution and the actual distribution of power in the international system, a compulsive preoccupation by a powerless majority with problems virtually insoluble in the short run, and a need to curtail its goals and commitments. Nor does there appear to be much optimism about the future. Goodrich warns (p. 50) that an increase in the voting/real power gap through an enlargement of the Security Council to include more small states may very well cause the great powers to further ignore or even withdraw from the organization. Kay fears that failure to deal with problems in Southern Africa may spur African states to block progress in all other areas and institutions of the U.N., thus destroying institutional processes and possibly leading to greater avoidance by the major powers. Gregg argues that the discontinuity between the demands of paper majorities and actual performance in the economic and social field may undermine the credibility of the organization in an area where it has had some of its greatest accomplishments.

In short, we have an Assembly with a record of dubious wisdom in some areas (see Xydis and Gross) which is now in the hands of powerless extremists, a Council largely suffered rather than used creatively by the permanent members, a Secretary-General whose levers of influence are few, a tangle of often competing agencies in the economic and social fields, and a Court with little to do. Whether the great powers will exercise the leadership needed to arrest or change these developments is highly problematical.

James Barros is to be complimented for providing us with a fine book. His editing undoubtedly contributed to the common format and evenly high quality of all these essays.

STANLEY J. MICHELAK, JR.
Franklin and Marshall College

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Radical Political Economy *by Howard Sherman. New York, Basic Books, 1972.—xvi, 431 pp. $12.50.*

This work shows evidence of copious reading in the range of its note references and gives the impression of embracing a wide variety of viewpoints to achieve catholicity of Left opinion. So great, indeed, is this variety today, owing to contemporary fragmentation of the Left, that it may leave an enquiring reader in some doubt about the real meaning of "radical" when applied to theoretical doctrine. It apparently is designed to imply some species of Marxian orientation; the book's subtitle, in fact, is "Capitalism and Socialism from a Marxist-Humanist Perspective." Yet the author makes much of the contrast of "dogmatic" *versus* "undogmatic" Marxists. We quickly are reminded that "the lost World War II era has witnessed the wreckage of dogmatic Marxism and its split into several warring factions, each claiming to be the only genuine Marxism: Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav, Cuban, Trotskyite, socialist, syndicalist and other versions." Despite this, the volume claims to be "devoted to showing . . . that radical political economy is a scientific paradigm, that is, that it provides a systematic and complete framework of analysis." This claim is bold as well as interesting; it may be doubted whether Professor Sherman's work fulfills it with complete success. And one cannot help thinking that the author might have done better to confine himself, with a rather narrower focus, to an exposition of what he himself deems to be the acceptable *corpus* of such an analytical framework, instead of being diverted into covering quite such a wide range of topics and viewpoints.

As one proceeds, however, it becomes clear that the author's prime intention is to give, in summary, a critical analysis of capitalism as an economic system and to contrast it with socialism (more sympathetically but not uncritically) in its several variants. This aim is more manageable than Professor Sherman's broader perspective and the success of its accomplishment is of a definitely high order. Cogently and lucidly presented, there is certainly much of interest in the work to commend it to the inquiring general reader as well as radical-minded students.

The book opens with two historical chapters, surveying rather hurriedly precapitalist society and the origins of capitalism. There follow chapters on value and market allocation, the concept of exploitation, unemployment, monopoly, and "Growth, Waste and Pollution." Following the latter, and perhaps not too successfully integrated with "the systematic framework of economic analysis," come chapters on the State and Democracy, Imperialism and Race, Sex and Alienation. Part III is rather ambitiously devoted to "The Political Economy of Socialism." Again starting with a historical sketch from the Paris Commune to the Russian Revolution and beyond, it goes on to deal with the "Soviet Economic Model," with models of "market socialism" from Lange to Yugoslavia and Liberman, and takes in "Stalinist ideology," China, Cuba, and Work-

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ers' Councils. Despite the extensive range, there is embodied here quite a wealth of miscellaneous information, as one would expect from the author of *The Soviet Economy:* for example, see the chapter entitled "Growth, Waste and Pollution" where, despite some criticism, comparison generally favors the Soviet Union as against America. At the end of the volume come five appendices covering Marxist price theory, capital accumulation, growth and cyclical crises; in the case of at least four of the subjects, one wonders why they could not with advantage have been included in the main body of the text.

MAURICE DOBB
Trinity College, Cambridge University

The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution *by Ira D. Gruber. New York, Atheneum, 1972.—ix, 396 pp., maps. $14.95.*

Ira D. Gruber addresses himself to one of the most persistent questions about the war: why General Sir William Howe and Admiral Lord Richard Howe, commanding respectively the British army and navy in America, failed to end the conflict when the Americans had no well-trained army. The Howes, particularly William, certainly did not lack opportunities, but when the general left for England in 1778, the war had become a virtual impossibility for his successor to win.

The Howes's contemporaries were puzzled and historians have shared their perplexity. Numerous theories have abounded. For example, it has been asserted that the Howes, as Whigs, approved the principles of the Americans to the point of deliberately not defeating them. Or, the Howes, grateful to Americans for commemorating their brother George (killed at Ticonderoga in 1758) in Westminster Abbey, could not bear to press the issue even when attempts at reconciliation failed. Or, the Howes, as Whigs, followed a strategy that would ensure the defeat of the ministry, largely Tory. Or, which is not unlikely, General Howe, appalled by the slaughter of his troops at Bunker Hill, dared not drive home an attack that might have destroyed the American army, as at Brooklyn Heights.

Mr. Gruber has written a discerning analysis and has come up with some important conclusions. Briefly said—and brevity scarcely does justice to his extended and elaborate argument—he sees the Howes attempting a self-defeating mission in trying to conciliate the Americans while enforcing British sovereignty. The ministry, supported by a strong parliamentary majority, wanted the rebellion crushed first of all and negotiations conducted afterward, whereas the Howes, wishing to avoid as much bloodshed as possible while pursuing their conciliatory course, let the Americans off easily time and again when they could have decisively defeated them and probably ended the rebellion.

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A generation ago, Troyer Steele Anderson, in *The Command of the Howe Brothers*, saw the Howes failing because, having to wage a limited war, they followed a strategy the ministry would not support with adequate forces. Basing his contention on a more exhaustive research in both the public and private (particularly private) records, Mr. Gruber feels that the ministry was not chary with men for the campaign of 1776. Nor did they insist that the Howes wage a limited war. While Mr. Gruber does not excuse the failure of the ministry to furnish plans, he insists that the failure did not seriously affect the Howes's performance. With these points this reviewer agrees.

Of all the explanations for the Howes's behavior, Mr. Gruber's is the most acceptable so far. It is regrettable that the Howes's private correspondence burned during the last century, but possibly it would not have added greatly to what we already know. What emerges from Mr. Gruber's examination of the Howes's letters to Germain and Sandwich (who were sad excuses for statesmen for all that may be said in their behalf) is a kind of point-counterpoint, very polite, very eighteenth century, but revealing the commanders and the ministry to be quite at odds over policy.

There are such ironies! Had a less well-connected and more ruthless general been in charge, the rebellion would probably have been crushed in 1776. Had Washington not sprung his brilliant Trenton-Princeton campaign, even Howe's halfway measures, as Mr. Gruber points out, might have succeeded in 1777. As it was, Howe's campaign in Pennsylvania was poorly conceived and poorly timed, while Burgoyne's campaign without adequate support from Howe or Clinton was doomed.

Mr. Gruber's study is a splendid scholarly achievement and, if somewhat overlong and detailed, sets a high standard in clarity of presentation.

WILLARD M. WALLACE
Wesleyan University

The American Revolution and Religion: Maryland 1770-1800 *by Thomas O'Brien Hanley. Washington, D. C., The Catholic University of America Press, Consortium Press, 1971.—260 pp. $13.95.*

The red, white, and blue dust jacket of Hanley's book omits the price—a minor frustration—and the subtitle. The latter omission is regrettable, since it leads the reader to expect much more than the book sets out to offer. What it offers is sufficient for any historical work. The author attempts, with a considerable degree of success, to contribute to a basic revision of generalizations about the status of religion in the new American republic at the end of the eighteenth century.

While Hanley cites only William Warren Sweet and Nelson R. Burr, he could

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have quoted almost any historian who dealt with the subject and the period. They (we) have virtually all said that the Revolution and nation building conspired, along with exhaustion after the Great Awakening and preoccupation with Enlightenment ideas, to help lead Americans to a state of apathy and disaffection regarding their faith. Church membership and attendance reached an all-time low. The churches were on the point of withering away.

Not so, says Hanley, at least not if one concentrates on the crucial instance of Maryland. Maryland showed signs of religious vitality which, for a variety of reasons, can be presumed to have existed in at least some other colonies and young states. The pre-Revolutionary story begins with the Episcopal Church, established by law, falling into disarray and decline. As Revolution approached, clerics in that and other churches had to choose sides. The author succeeds in building some sympathy for the conscientious problems of loyalists. In the main, churches supported the Revolution.

After the war came the major turn. The establishment was doomed. But the alternative, according to Hanley, was not "disestablishment" or "separation of church and state." Instead, the move could best be described as one from a confessional state to a Christian state. While Hanley claims to do little more than detail how such a state came about, while shrugging off the issue of its validity or invalidity, it seems clear that he would like to have his contemporaries take a patient second look backward at the idea of a Christian state. Unfortunately, he never defines clearly what was involved. Nor does he do justice to the ways in which secular pluralist states have sometimes worked better for the prosperity of religion and society than have states which tilt in favor of a generalized Christian resolution. Nor does he tell enough about why the Christian state did not prevail. Most of all, one cannot write "Q.E.D." on his suggestion that the case of Maryland can be duplicated elsewhere. He does too little, finally, with demography, statistics of church participation, and the like, to convince the skeptic.

The style of the book frequently leaves something to be desired, and the proofreading is casual. But Hanley, our time's foremost expert on the papers of the Carroll family (which figures so prominently in this tale), serves the reader well as he canvasses the health of sect after sect. They were each going about their business of rebuilding after the war. The excellences of this volume relate more to the subtitle than to the title. Here is one more worthwhile contribution to the reconstruction of the Revolutionary past, inspired by the preparation for the national bicentennial.

MARTIN E. MARTY
The University of Chicago

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Shipping, Maritime Trade and the Economic Development of Colonial North America *by James F. Shepherd and Gary M. Walton. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972.—ix, 255 pp. $14.50.*

Although estimates of colonial economic growth vary, the authors of this book conclude that per capita output in the American colonies grew from approximately £8-9 at the beginning of the eighteenth century to roughly £11-12.5 by the 1770s. Responsible for this growth were secular increases in the productivity (e.g., output/man) of agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing. Since manufacturing represented only a very small share of total colonial output, productivity gains achieved by this sector are dismissed as being relatively unimportant. Primarily responsible for the growth of per capita output were increases in agricultural productivity. The authors contend, however, that since much of the increased productivity in agriculture was induced by prior increases in the productivity of commerce, any analysis of the growth of the colonial economy must ultimately focus on the commercial sector.

Professors Shepherd and Walton support their contention by introducing a model designed to relate productivity changes in commerce to productivity changes in agriculture. Increases in the productivity of shipping, merchandising, and other elements of commercial activity result in reductions of their cost. From the viewpoint of colonial producers, these cost reductions take the form of increased prices for their tobacco, flour, and other staple products. These price increases encourage (a) those already engaged in market production to use their land more intensively, (b) those on the frontier to abandon self-sufficiency in favor of specialized production for the market, and (c) those living in Europe to migrate across the Atlantic to take advantage of the increased profitability of American agriculture. The net effect of these price-induced changes is the growth of total and per capita output in agriculture and in the economy as a whole.

If the theory is correct, the role declining distribution costs actually played in promoting economic growth was largely a function of the relative importance of distribution costs (measured as the difference between consumer prices and producer prices) and the absolute size of their decline. Shepherd and Walton offer evidence indicating that the spread between consumer and producer prices was far greater than had been previously supposed and reductions in the cost of distribution were substantial. After a discussion of the sources of productivity growth in the commercial sector, the authors complete their study with a detailed presentation and analysis of the colonial balance of trade and payments for the years 1768–1772. Particularly noteworthy here are the estimates of invisible earnings.

Shepherd and Walton have written an important book. Their use of simple price theory and quantitative methods has permitted them to overturn some earlier notions about the colonial economy (e.g., the supposed existence of tri-

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angular trade routes) while increasing the power of others (e.g., the importance of trade). Not only is our understanding of the colonial economy and its growth advanced, but so too is the cause of the "new" economic history. It is a pity that the publisher of this book chose to place such a high price on these advances.

MICHAEL MOOHR
University of Virginia

Medieval Regions and Their Cities *by Josiah Cox Russell. Bloomington and London, Indiana University Press, 1972.—286 pp. $8.95.*

J. C. Russell is an eminent medieval demographic historian. His latest book is an application of the rank-size theory (sometimes termed Central-Place theory) of the growth of cities to the medieval period. It has been found that cities in modern countries often exhibit the relationship $N_r = C / R$ (where N_r is the population of a city of rank r in a series of cities in a well-defined region, C is a regional constant usually equal to the population of the largest city in the region, and R is the rank). However, Russell observes that the second and succeeding cities of preindustrial regions appear to have been larger than the original formula would predict; the author attributes this condition to the inability of premodern societies to support the first-ranked city's population at the appropriate level. Russell therefore chooses to employ a modification of the original equation which inflates N_r by the factor of

$$1 + \sqrt{\frac{R-1}{10}}$$

This is the procedure recommended by the scientific method. More commonly—and not only throughout this book—the reverse is the case: the theory tests the data.

Russell examines twenty-three specific regions; twenty are European, two near-eastern, and one south-Asian. The procedure is first to review the present state of scholarly estimates for the populations of cities in a hypothesized region, and then compare the resulting ranked list with one obtained by employing the above formula. The author finds (Table 33) that the correlation between the list compiled from empirical studies and the hypothesized one is, in general, "quite close" (p. 230). Moreover, by plugging in an empirical estimate for the size of the largest city in a region to the rank-series formula, Russell is able to construct an estimate of the total population of the ten major cities in a defined region, and by employing a posited urban index, he can then generate an estimate of the aggregate regional population.

Throughout the text Russell advances a number of specific speculations (such as "geography behind history" in the development of Tuscan into the Italian language), and corrections and revisions (for example, Chapter 11 raises substantial doubt that seventh-century India was as overpopulated as has often been

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believed). More broadly, the author concludes that this type of study has great potential for improving the cartography in historical atlases. In turn, he suggests, this would properly lead to some reassessment of the relative importance of political units in the Middle Ages, deriving from their respective population bases, which the author sees as the fundamental determinant of medieval political relationships. The final chapter includes a brief discussion of "The Age of Regionalism" and its decay. The rise and decline of regionalism seem in Russell's argument to be largely accounted for by political considerations. This conclusion is at least partially consistent, for although he argues forcefully throughout the text that the origins of the observed rank-series of medieval city populations are at the root economic—principally commercial—his accounts again and again imply that the ultimate fates of cities, and even of entire regions (such as southern France/northern Iberia), are resolved almost exclusively by political events and developments.

In the preface and first chapter, Russell asserts the legitimacy of quantification. Certainly the use of quantitative methodology requires no defense; indeed, in demographic studies it constitutes a virtual *sine qua non*. At issue, and to be scrutinized in each instance, however, are the quality of the data and the care taken in the analysis (which applies equally to all research, quantitative or not). On the former, Russell is likely correct—though less likely to leave all readers comfortably reassured—in maintaining that "estimates of city sizes can be made as accurate as most statements which medievalists make without apology" (p. 12). Regarding the latter question, there is Russell's rather unsettling claim that statistically "the average estimate is apt to be relatively close to accuracy" (p. 21). Although the laws of statistics will operate to guarantee this result under certain specified conditions, in the case at hand the necessary assumptions are very far from being met; indeed, where the size of a medieval city's population is the subject of estimation, the modal estimate is likely to be the most reliable. Again concerning the confidence inspired by the analysis, there is the problem of the author's representation of life tables for "English landholding classes (born about 1276–1300)" as "reasonably accurate for all cities of that period" (p. 21). Aside from his apparent extension of these same parameters well beyond the confines of this narrow period, the assumption—while perhaps a necessary one—nonetheless approaches heroic proportions.

In an era during which it has become fashionable to emphasize the science in social science, Russell's book has a flavor which will be familiar to many readers. But it may also leave many with the distinct impression that doing medieval demographic history is not exclusively a matter of pure science. Some may find themselves disturbed by the mechanical nature of the procedure, others may be puzzled about the object of the exercise. In any event, the book's value as a reference to the scholarly literature in the field is apparent.

RICHARD ROEHL
University of California, Berkeley

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Communism and Nationalism in India: M. N. Roy and Comintern Policy, 1920–39 *by John Patrick Haithcox. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1971.—xiv, 389 pp. $12.50.*

This careful reconstruction of events in the political life of M. N. Roy, from his extremist nationalist period through a stormy career in international communism to his founding of Radical Humanism, illuminates significant aspects of the political history of India and of the Comintern. Professor Haithcox effectively challenges several long-standing interpretations of the role of Roy and his followers. He brings to his study substantial documentation and extensive interview materials; these shed new light on the decolonization controversy of the Sixth Comintern, the efforts of Roy, following his expulsion from the Comintern, to challenge Stalin's policies on India, and his unsuccessful attempts to radicalize the Congress party of India from within.

By the end of 1926, Roy had attained membership on all four policy-making bodies of the Comintern: the Presidium, Political Secretariat, ECCI, and World Congress. At the height of his career in international communism, Roy was sent to China. The author traces the development of Comintern policy on China, details Roy's activities there, and contrasts his approach to that of Borodin. He spells out similarities between the positions of Trotsky and Roy on China, but goes on to show that their views differed in significant respects; he supplies an explanation (which had escaped earlier interpreters) for Roy's expulsion from the Comintern, an explanation based, in part, upon Roy's relationship to Bukharin, with whom he shared a distrust of Trotsky.

Professor Haithcox concludes his book with the statement that one "consistent theme" runs through Roy's political philosophy: "the quest for human freedom and dignity—to which Roy devoted his entire life" (p. 299). Such a spirit was indeed characteristic of M. N. Roy. But he was not a clear or systematic political thinker. As Roy turned away from communism to develop his philosophy of Radical Humanism, he abandoned party politics to write on the establishment of a decentralized, cooperative, political economy without which, he believed, the danger of dictatorship could not be forestalled. Haithcox notes that Roy came to regard as the most serious defect of Marxism the idea that the means of production determine the course of human history. But is the author correct in concluding that Roy had finally abandoned the Marxist concept of historical necessity? In calling attention to Roy's continued attachment to Stalin (reasserted at the time of Stalin's death), Haithcox notes the contrast between Roy and other regenerate Communists who, unlike Roy, developed a personal revulsion both to Stalin's regime and to communism. Haithcox there makes the telling and more accurate observation that "Roy remained too much of a Marxist to interpret historical events in terms of the will of individuals. To him greatness could be achieved only in the service of inexorable historical forces" (p. 141).

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If Professor Haithcox were to undertake the task of further analyzing Roy's political thought, keeping in view the (invalid) historical, comparative method which made possible Marxist theory, we could look forward to a companion volume which might well draw further lessons from such an extraordinary political life. Meanwhile, the book at hand is a significant contribution to the understanding of India's political history and of international communism.

JOAN V. BONDURANT
University of the Pacific

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

I am concerned about Johnson's review of *Latin American Peasant Movements* because it is one of the few instances in which, beginning with the first sentence, one can legitimately wonder whether the reviewer has really digested a book which is the first of its kind. Johnson begins "Although lacking an explicit theoretical framework . . . ," when the first chapter of the book (sixty pages) are (explicitly) devoted to developing such a framework. Not to be convinced by the framework and its hypotheses is one thing. But to begin the review by stating that there is no such framework is, quite honestly, literally incomprehensible to me.

Johnson's review continues in a vein which continues to make one wonder whether he has more than leafed through the book, if that. He characterizes e.g., White's analysis of the peasantry in the Mexican Revolution as a "natural history" with the personality of Zapata as a "central focus." White and other contributers, following the suggested framework, as well as their own inclinations, focus in fact not on history nor personalities (although these are made to play a certain part, as they must) but on changes in social, economic, and political structure, as well as the structure of the movements themselves. A mere leafing through the chapters and their quite unambiguous and visible subtitles brings out this structural emphasis which is fully in line with the many other writings of all of these authors: Stavenhagen, Powell, Feder, etc.

Did Johnson really read the book?

HENRY A. LANDSBERGER
Professor of Sociology
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

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Professor Johnson replies:

I regret that my review elicited so extreme a response. Of course I read the book, carefully, page by page (450 of them); I reread the introduction several times. There are problems with the book which are largely Professor Landsberger's responsibility.

An explicit theory presents a set of general propositions or axioms from which specific propositions are derived in a clear, orderly manner. To be useful the specific propositions (or "hypotheses") must be falsifiable. An explicit *claim* to have a theory is not the same as an explicit theory.

In my view, Landsberger has presented a loose *typology* of peasant movements. If a theory lies behind the typology, I was unable to locate it. Further, the "hypotheses" presented with the typology are not directly falsifiable, and will not become so until vague constructs, such as "expressive violence" and "breadth of goals," are given clear empirical (operational) content.

Nonetheless, as I originally stated, I have found the book to be useful and believe others will also, its problems notwithstanding.

ALLEN JOHNSON
Assistant Professor of Anthropology
Columbia University

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

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